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Preface: 
 
The papers of this dissertation deal with the nervous system of the economy - with institutions. 
Although all chapters focus on a specific historical case of their own, they have a common 
guiding theme: The question how the economy’s organizational nerves respond to changes in 
social and environmental conditions and which circumstances lead to institutional dysfunction 
or paralysis. Anatomists know that the human body possesses a network of uncounted neurons 
which control the interplay of brain, skin, muscles and inner organs. Likewise, economies 
require institutions to establish markets and to coordinate the interaction of groups and 
individuals. Due to their focal role, the “rules of the game” as Douglass North1 famously dubbed 
them have attracted the interest of economists from the beginnings of the discipline onwards: 
Classics like Smith, Mill and Ricardo joined the French Physiocrats in defending the idea of 
competition on free markets. Later, Weber pointed to the economic merits of rational 
bureaucracies, and finally the proponents of New Institutional Economics drew attention to 
transaction costs, asymmetric information and historical path dependency.2 Today, scholars 
widely agree that economic growth depends on a society’s ability establish institutions which 
foster health and education, prevent rent-seeking and corruption and promote mutual trust, free 
competition and long-term investment. Still, the general consensus notwithstanding, matters are 
not settled for good. For, unlike their hypothetical counterparts in economic models, real 
societies are not stable. They evolve, and with them the social and demographic characteristics, 
income distribution and preferences of their members. To promote the welfare of these 
changing societies, institutions must adapt to a wide range variations in the population's 
political and environmental conditions. In a sense, successful institutions therefore need to 
                                                          
1
 Douglass C. North (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press 
2
 To give but a few, review articles of the many currents in the field include: Elinor Ostrom (2005). "Doing 
Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies," Handbook of New Institutional 
Economics, C. Ménard and M. Shirley, eds. Handbook of New Institutional Economics, pp. 819-848; Oliver E. 
Williamson (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 38 No.3, pp. 595-613; Ronald Coase (1998). "The New Institutional Economics," American 
Economic Review, vol. 88, Nr. 2, pp. 72-74.  
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mimic the neurons in our eyes, skin or ears: They have to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
whole system in daylight and darkness, in heat and cold, in noise and silence. This implies that 
we cannot assess the performance of past institutions - let alone inform current development 
policies - unless we understand the process of institutional change and identify the factors that 
promote or impede successful institutional adaptation. 
 As discussed by a voluminous body of research, obstacles to institutional change can stem from 
exogenous (e.g. ecological or geographical) or from man-made (political and cultural) 
conditions.3 To account for these different sources of successful adaptation or institutional 
paralysis the following chapters scrutinize instances where particularly dramatic change of 
either the political, social and cultural or the scientific and ecological framework put institutions 
under enormous evolutionary pressure. 
Starting with an example of man-made challenges of the institutional status quo, the first 
chapter analyzes how administrative modernization facilitated the transition to modern 
economic growth in Meiji Japan. The specific example is so intriguing because the Japanese 
not only experienced an industrial revolution in “fast motion”, but also because they managed 
to enforce a course of radical institutional reform against the interests of powerful traditional 
elites. Uncovering the political ingredients of this staggering success thus contributes to 
previous research on organizational modernization and sources of institutional inertia. Besides 
satisfying historians’ curiosity, Meiji Japan’s case of institutional adaptation does – however –
also have a bearing for current policies. For given that rational bureaucracies are considered 
indispensable foundations for sustainable economic development, understanding how a 
conflict-torn country with limited state capacity managed to embark on a course of almost 
unprecedented economic, social and scientific progress carries invaluable information for 
today’s developing nations. 
Whereas the first case focuses on political and social causes of institutional function or 
dysfunction, the second chapter takes a different perspective. Its vantage point is one of the 
most revolutionary innovations ever made in medical science: Vaccination against smallpox. 
With this weapon at hand, modern medicine was able to protect entire populations against the 
fatal ravages of a hitherto uncontrolled epidemic disease. If anything, vaccination therefore 
initiated a profound change in the biological environment of 19th century Europe. Yet, at the 
same time, the intensification of international trade and mobility during the first globalization 
increased the pandemic potential of the disease dramatically. As a result, health authorities in 
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the 19th century faced more or less the same problems which continue to trouble epidemiologists 
at present: How to avoid epidemic spread if “closing the border” is no alternative? How to 
convince people of the merits of prevention and how to attain high immunization rates? How 
to ensure prompt detection and containment of potential outbreaks? And finally, how to 
minimize the economic costs of the chosen epidemiological policy?  
 
The above suffices to make clear that smallpox has many lessons to teach about past and current 
health threats. More importantly though, some of them relate directly to our analysis of 
institutional adaptation. This is particularly true because, although European governments 
imposed largely identical policies when vaccination was first introduced, their strategies 
diverged markedly in the course of time. As chapter 2 attempts to make sense of this puzzling 
observation, it finds that the different states' institutional response depended crucially on 
specific geographic and political conditions. Whether these factors lead to successful 
institutional adaptation or whether they produced inefficiencies at the national and international 
levels will therefore be at the center of interest in the section. 
To close the discussion, chapter 3 further investigates the role of natural (e.g. biological) 
constraints of institutional change. To advance its argument, it considers one of the major social 
concomitants of the industrial revolution: the demographic transition. Building on a rich 
literature, the paper's approach differs from older research in that it combines elements of 
economic fertility theory with recent results from anthropology and evolutionary biology. The 
quintessence of this analysis is that social progress - like overcoming Malthusian population 
dynamics - can be viewed as an adaptation to altered selective pressures. Thus, long-term 
economic growth and substantial improvements in a society's living conditions can emerge 
endogenously. But whether or not the desired behaviors will be adopted or not depends on 
physiological and psychological processes which belong to the evolutionary blueprint of our 
species. In consequence, policies to promote social and economic progress might be doomed to 
noble failure unless they affect the entire environment such that there is no contradiction 
between biological necessities and economically beneficial collective behavior. 
 
The previous glimpse into the central questions of the subsequent papers underscores the fact 
that thinking of institutions as the nerves of an economy is no void metaphor. Not only does a 
multitude of formal and informal institutions serve to coordinate economic interaction. They 
must also ensure that state and markets remain functional even if the prevailing conditions are 
thoroughly altered. In sum, the institutional nerves of past and present economies are involved 
in a complex web of factors, many of which escape the focus of orthodox economics.  
Trying to disentangle these various relationships was an academic adventure with many 
detours. Keeping me on track was a strain on my advisors, colleagues, family and friends. 
Judging the results of this work is up to the critical reader. Yet, where pushing the boundaries 
of our discipline is concerned, the Meiji reformers of the next chapter would certainly have 
approved of the adventure. And some of them would probably have pointed to ancient Japanese 
folk wisdom: 井の中蛙大海を知らず. “The frog who lives in a well has no idea of the ocean.” 
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Abstract The notion that professional, efficient and non-corrupt bureaucracies
foster economic growth is virtually uncontested. In spite of this wide consensus,
central questions remain unanswered. Thus, while the harmful effects of dysfunc-
tional administrations are extensively covered in the theoretical literature, little is
known about the empirical relevance and the expected costs of insufficient
administrative rationalization. And while efficient bureaucracies are considered a
key ingredient to institutional performance, the existing research rarely investigates
how desirable administrative structures have been implemented in history or which
concrete policy measures constitute feasible reform strategies for present-day
development countries. The present paper therefore aims at providing empirical
evidence to dose this lacuna; to do so, it relies on the case of administrative reforms
in the last three decades of the nineteenth century in Meiji Japan. Building on an
exceptionally detailed set of official statistics and documentary sources, it constructs
a panel of 45 Japanese prefectures and assesses the impact of heterogeneous reform
implementation on canonical indicators of economic performance including mea-
sures of regional GDP, business activity and financial market development. The
central results of the econometric analysis are that delayed administrative ratio-
nalization came along with a statistically significant and robust penalty on all
development indicators. Moreover, this effect was remarkably persistent over time,
as the data show that late-reforming prefectures performed systematically worse
than the administrative forerunners until well into the twentieth century.
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1 Introduction
Looking at early photographs of the Meiji cabinet is revealing: From the sepia-
colored ranks of solemn politicians in Western-style suits, cardigans and bow-ties
one figure inevitably stands out: A tall samurai in full ornate, proudly wearing his
traditional ‘‘hakama’’ and the two swords. The person in question, Saigo Takamori,
was one of the most powerful leaders in the coup d’e´tat that overthrew the
Tokugawa shoˆgunate and restored imperial power in 1868. Still, his prominent
position did not save him from violent and premature death. Turning against his
former allies, he headed a large-scale rebellion of samurai who opposed the Meiji
government’s attempts at abolishing ancient privileges of the warrior class.
Defeated in a three-month civil war, he chose to commit seppuku—ritual suicide by
disembowelment—on September 24, 1877.
The fate of Saigo Takamori is more than a story of triumph and tragedy in an era
of cataclysmic change. It exemplifies a metamorphosis almost all developed
countries underwent during their industrialization: The institutionalization of legal-
rational rule by professional bureaucracies. The transition toward administrative
rationality typically involved two characteristics: First, state action and the
allocation of public goods became subject of universal, clearly defined rules. And
second, no matter how fierce their resistance, traditional elites eventually lost their
dominant influence as holders of public positions were deprived of property rights to
their office and evolved into a class of government-appointed civil servants. Pre-
modern forms of personal rule by privileged social groups thus gave way to rational
bureaucratic governance and allowed socioeconomic development to gain momen-
tum. In a sense, the samurai therefore had to vanish from the pictures before Japan
could accomplish its leap to modernization in earnest.
The potential benefits of administrative rationality are not new to economic
history. In fact, contributions like North (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2008) or Besley
and Ghatak (2009) all stress the growth-promoting effects of impersonal, law-based
and perpetual-lived institutions. Proceeding along similar lines, various authors
including De Long and Shleifer (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), (La Porta et al.
1999), Epstein (2000) and Buchheim (2006) put emphasis on limitations of the
government’s extractive discretion on the importance of transparent bureaucracies
and on the state’s capacity to assert the common public interest against the interests
of established elites. Finally, theoretical ties between the establishment of legal-
rational bureaucracies and economic development in Meiji Japan have been
analyzed by Koh (1991), Ohshima (1994) and Mosk (2011). The literature thus
provides sufficient theoretical ground to consider personal rule by traditional elite
networks as detrimental for economic development. Still, the natural follow-up
question ‘‘If sleaze is bad—just how bad is it?’’ is hardly addressed. And the few
studies that deal explicitly with the empirical relationship between administrative
rationality and economic performance largely rely on current cross-sections which
prevents them from analyzing the long-term effects of retarded bureaucratic
modernization.
To bridge this gap, the present paper considers the case of administrative
rationalization in Japan after the Meiji Restoration. It constructs a panel of 45
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Japanese prefectures1 and employs canonical econometric techniques to assess the
impact of regional heterogeneity in administrative rationality on different indicators
of economic development from 1875 till 1895. This specific setup has been chosen
for several reasons: First, administrative reorganization in Meiji Japan was radical
and took no more than two decades starting in the 1870s. Thus, if the reforms had
measurable effects, they ought to be distinct and distinguishable from secular trends.
In addition, the Meiji Restoration ended a period of more than 250 years of strictly
isolationist foreign policies. In consequence, Japan featured an astonishing degree
of cultural and ethnical homogeneity and a regionally highly fragmented
administration because she had maintained her traditional feudal system throughout
the shoˆgunate period. This unique constellation facilitates both the analysis of
temporal dynamics and helps disentangling the impact of institutional moderniza-
tion from cultural differences. Finally, the favorable identification conditions can be
fully exploited as Meiji statistics provide detailed and comprehensive data down to
the local level.
Put together, the Meiji reforms not only furnish evidence on the costs of
administrative encrustation to past economies. Given that state capacity in
nineteenth century, Japan was just as scarce as in the developing world today,
understanding what allowed the Meiji government to overcome these obstacles also
carries lessons for current public sector reform.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 gives a historical
overview and discusses qualitative evidence of reform success. Section 3 investi-
gates the relationship between administrative reform and economic development
based on an econometric panel analysis. Section 4 performs a set of robustness
checks and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Historical overview
2.1 The Tokugawa legacy
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 ended over two and a half centuries of dominance by
military rulers (shoˆguns) of the Tokugawa clan. Having risen to power in a period of
incessant riots and civil war, the Tokugawa were anxious to craft institutions that
guaranteed stability and their clan’s political hegemony. Yet, skilled political
craftsmen they were, they lacked the resources to assume a position of absolute
sovereignty. Exerting central authority only in the areas of external affairs and the
core organization of the feudal system, the shoˆguns had no means to interfere with
other domains’ inner affairs and neither disposed of a national army, police or
bureaucracy nor a claim to the tax revenue of the daimyo, Japan’s two-hundred-plus
other feudal lords.2 To maintain the fragile equilibrium of power, the Tokugawa
1 Hokkaido and Okinawa were excluded because even before the Restoration, their structural and cultural
background differed substantially from the other Japanese regions.
2 For a summary of Tokugawa institutions and political thought see: Macklin (1992), Harootunian (1970)
and Beasley (1972).
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imposed policies of almost complete isolation from international relations, social
stratification and regional sectionalism. This settlement proved successful in
preventing internal turmoil and bloodshed, yet it was bought at the cost of impeding
joint action at the national level let alone targeted economic or social development
policies.
Under the stress of the forced opening of Japan to the Western powers in 1854,
the structural weaknesses of the feudal arrangements became evident and helped
forging an alliance of court nobles and daimyo—notably the lords of Satsuma,
Choˆshuˆ and Tosa provinces—who overthrew the shoˆgunate and declared the Meiji
Emperor’s restoration to power in 1868. Well aware of their precarious situation
vis-a`-vis the West, the leaders of the imperial government embarked on an
ambitious modernization course under the notion of Fukoku Kyoˆhei (‘‘a rich country
and a strong army’’). Yet, this strategy was unfeasible unless they secured stable
sources of public revenue and assumed full control of society and economy.3
Consequently, the following two decades were marked by the central govern-
ment’s struggle to replace the domains’ semi-autonomous administration with a
centralized, loyal and professional civil service—in short: to support their Fukoku
Kyoˆhei program by almost a textbook example of Weberian bureaucratic
rationalization. Still, due to historical and current political conditions, the timing
and success of these measures differed greatly across regions. This very
characteristic makes the Japanese case a valuable natural experiment. However,
to fully exploit it, three preliminary questions need to be settled: First, which
deficiencies rendered the traditional system inimical to economic growth? Second,
how did the Meiji government address these obstacles and did successful
administrative reform really foster economic development? Finally, given the
reforms’ record varied across regions, how can this variation be used to construct
quantitative measures of reform success for analytical purposes?
2.2 Weaknesses of the traditional administration
2.2.1 Lack of suitable incentives at the national and local levels
The traditional system exhibited weaknesses both at the structural and the
organizational level. The former were due to the maintained territorial and
administrative fragmentation after the civil war period: Given the shoˆguns’ inability
to secure the monopoly of power, domain independence was fiercely protected by
the feudal lords and fostered by the Tokugawa in a divide et impera fashion.
Administrative procedures therefore continued to follow regional customary law
3 Among the Meiji leaders, there were divisions of opinion whether to put more emphasis on economic or
on military development goals. Still, the need to improve administrative performance was less contested
as it was beyond doubt that military and economic strength relied on the government’s ability to ensure
stable sources of revenue and to assert its monopoly of power. Moreover, there is evidence that
transferring competencies to a strong central government headed by representatives from the domains
which had supported the anti-shoˆgunate coalition was conceived as a means to mitigate cleavages
between the powerful Restoration domains, which in turn reinforced the case for administrative
restructuring. For further sources and references see: Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1998), McLaren (1916),
DeVere Brown/Hirota (ed.), The Diary of KidoTakayoshi (1983), Jansen and Rozman (1986).
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which arguably increased transaction costs in inter-dominial economic activities.4
Potential benefits from over-regional trade and division of labor were accordingly
hard to realize, and although Tokugawa accounts probably exaggerate when they
claim that perpetrators who set foot on another clan’s land risked their lives,
fragmentation shaped economic exchange and travelers sometimes spent hours
having their belongings searched or waiting for permission to cross-dominial
borders (Matsushita 2006: 105 Steiner (1965): 50).
In addition to the problems at the national level, the feudal administrations also
suffered from deficiencies at the local level, especially from organizational inertia
and resistance against occupational upward (or downward) mobility. At best, these
conditions gave officeholders few incentives to perform; in more adverse cases, they
provided the ground for impenetrable local patronage networks, administrative
discretion and corruption. These problems too reflected the Tokugawas’ attempts at
preserving the existing social order: To start with, samurai status being a necessary
condition for assuming civil service positions, shoˆgunate legislation which restricted
the number of each lords’ armed vassals had virtually eliminated occupational
mobility in and out the administrative apparatus (Yamamura 1974: 70–85).5 The
absence of merit-based staffing and remuneration policies was further compounded
by the fact that traditional Japanese law prevented the non-samurai population from
bypassing the magistrate’s office and appealing directly to a higher authority.
Although exceptions were made in, e.g., the case of a local magistrate abusing his
position, villages daring to complain could be punished for esso—illegal
bypassing—or simply for ‘‘causing unnecessary trouble to the authorities’’ (Befu
1966: 29,43). On the other hand, bureaucrats themselves had nothing to gain from
reporting illicit behavior of colleagues or subordinates because the traditional law
maintained the Confucian principle of renza, the common responsibility of groups
(Steenstrub 1996: 153). As a result, both potential whistle-blowers and superiors
risked being punished for crimes they merely reported. Reprimands were
accordingly rare and it was far less exceptional for public service positions to
remain in one family for generations than being the object of frequent promotions or
dismissals.
Incentive problems were reinforced by the fact that the low- and middle-ranking
posts of local administrators were unattractive from a monetary perspective: Both
according to contemporary sources and work from present-day scholars, the salaries
of petty officials like clerks were hardly sufficient to cover the necessary daily living
expenses of a family (Murakami 1997: 10–20; Nishizawa 2004: 195–198). Higher-
ranking administrators for their part were vassals of the Tokugawa or the domain
4 Specialization and national market integration where even more directly impeded by shoˆgunate
strategies to prevent alliances of opposing lords (e.g., by deliberately neglecting the maintenance of
certain transit and trading routes) and by numerous daimyo who took recourse to measures like the
implementation of domain monopolies in the supply of regional products to increase the economic
leverage of their fiefs.
5 This pattern was admittedly thwarted toward the end of the Tokugawa period when the need to counter
the increasingly palpable threat of Western aggression created demand for specialist services in the
shoˆgunate’s and the daimyos’ bureaucracies. Yet, advancement in public service careers continued to be a
matter of the putative office holder’s birth rank and personal ties to the feudal lord rather than his
individual ability or achievement (Izumi (2001), p. 15).
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lords and had ipso facto a legal claim to fixed rice stipends the size of which
depended on birth rank but not on the office occupied. If they held official functions,
they received a salary, yakudaka, which varied according to the post (yaku)
assumed. However, yakudaka were paid only insofar, as they exceeded the
hereditary claims6 and the marginal revenue of assuming office was as low as the
losses of a bad magistrate who was removed from his functions and continued to
receive his full stipend (Nishizawa 2004: 191). That both the lack of social
permeability and the failure to impose meritocratic principles perceptively reduced
institutional quality was evident to contemporary observers. A popular handbook for
prospective civil servants in the mid-Meiji period for instance summarized the
shortcomings of the feudal bureaucracies as follows:
Due to their despotism, the policies of the Tokugawa had become deeply
flawed: Usually the offspring of families who had acquired particular deeds in
the distant past were appointed in a hereditary fashion. As a result, pedigree
was of central importance while ability and achievement did not matter at all
[…] Hence, it is now time to establish recruitment rules which address this
ancient predicament and prevent incompetent, degenerated and corrupt
individuals from assuming public offices so easily (Oˆtsu 1881: 8,22).
This observation is further corroborated by quantitative research of present-day
historians who found that among the local magistrates who had been officially
reprimanded or punished at some point of their professional lives, the fraction of
administrators who held hereditary positions was disproportionally large (Izumi
2001: 17–20; Nishizawa 2004: 55).
2.2.2 Problems of asymmetric information
In many parts of Japan, the unfortunate incentive structure was aggravated by
difficulties to supervise and control local officials. Again this was due to specific
feudal regulations. In particular, the daimyo had been subjected to the so-called
sankin kotai system of alternate attendance which required them to spend every
other year in Edo, the shoˆgunate’s capital. With few exceptions, local administration
reflected this national pattern in the sense that samurai were obliged to settle in the
capital of their home provinces. Since no high-ranking samurai was to permanently
take office in a rural area, the district magistrates, commonly called daikan,
typically left everyday village administration to the village headmen and other local
elites unless the need to secure the district’s tax revenue or to enforce a minimum of
public order required direct intervention (Befu 1968: 303–312). That this settlement
created undesired economic side effects was especially apparent in the area of
taxation: As the total staff at a daikan’s office rarely exceeded 20–30 persons, local
magistrates were unable to arrange for frequent controls of all villages under their
6 Thus, a samurai official with a stipend of 100 hyo and a yakudaka of 150 hyo would be compensated
only for the difference between his stipend and the yakudaka and therefore receive an annual
remuneration of 50 hyo.
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jurisdiction.7 Not surprisingly so, land and tax registers were far from even
approximately capturing the extent to which new lands were cultivated and existing
ones improved (Ravina 1998: 53). Accordingly, the distribution of individual tax
loads was unequal and tax assessments or undefined property rights a frequent
source of dispute. The economic harm of administrative fragmentation was—
however—not confined to the increased transaction and contract costs that resulted
from the erosion of the higher authorities’ capacity to act as informed conflict-
solving entities. It also stemmed from downright illicit activities of local magistrates
and village elites: As discussed before, administrative tasks were carried out by a
number of semi-autonomous actors, all of whom had little incentive to report illicit
activities. Hence, in cases that required the interaction of different entities (e.g., the
taxation of newly cultivated land) village elders, clerks and local magistrates formed
a hierarchy of successive monopolists with every actor having the power to hush up
mistakes or to collect bribes without worrying about intervention from higher-
ranking officials. In economic theory, this constellation increases both the
prevalence of institutional failure and the equilibrium bribe level of corrupt
officials.8 Although the number of surviving (and sufficiently detailed) records is
limited, this pattern seems to fit shoˆgunate-era reality: In plain numbers, historians
have estimated that embezzlement and underreporting of newly cultivated land left
the Tokugawa and the daimyo with annual tax losses of no less than 15 % (Tacke
1975: 52). Not less common was the practice of ‘‘Nawa-gokuro,’’ i.e., the
undermeasurement of arable land, a custom the higher authorities would even
tolerate to a certain extent (usually up to 20–30 %) be it as a means of tax
alleviation be it because of their incapability to supervise local officials in remote
areas (Nakamura 1966: 53–56). This quantitative result is supported by numerous,
often vivid qualitative descriptions: The particularly elaborate accounts of unrests in
Omi province in the late 1830s reveal for instance that villagers had been expected
to pay bribes first to the surveyor’s advance guard and then—moving up the
hierarchy of successive monopolists—to his clerks and finally himself. Having paid
the survey team a total of 1000 ryo—i.e., the monetary equivalent of 1000 koku of
rice or 1 % of the average agricultural yield of a small feudal domain—at least one
village succeeded in preventing the taxation of all its newly cultivated agricultural
areas (Ono 1932: 275–289). Moreover, in 1866 toward the end of the Tokugawa era,
a daikan and his subordinates are reported to have spent about 30 % of the taxes
from their jurisdiction in Shinshuˆ province on feasts, alcohol and personnel luxuries
(Nishizawa 2004: 203).9
Summing up, two adverse effects of the traditional government system stick out:
At the national level, administrative and territorial fragmentation precluded large-
scale investment in growth-promoting public goods, impeded market integration
7 Even if a daikan devoted the entire harvest season (i.e., about 3 months) to the inspection of arable
lands and actual revenue, he was left with no more than one to three days per village—the time required
to travel not included.
8 For an overview of these models see: Machlup and Taber (1960), Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
9 Even in less extreme cases, the fact that peasants routinely paid 2.5–3 % in excesses of the official tax
rate to win the favor of local officials caused not even the slightest surprise among contemporary
observers (Mizu no Tomenaga 1980/1981: 8–9).
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and reduced the potential for Smithian growth. At the local level, asymmetries of
information and unfavorable incentives stripped the higher authorities off the ability
to universally enforce proper administrative conduct which arguably increased the
prevalence and the degree of institutional failure. Finally, it should be noted that the
historical sources suggest that harmful network structures emerged only if
influential traditional cliques within the bureaucracy managed to resist external
supervision and control. How the Meiji leaders attempted to break these ties and
why their success varied across regions will be discussed in the next two sections.
2.3 The Meiji administrative reforms
After the Meiji Restoration, structural reform toward national unification under a
strong central government proceeded rapidly: In summer 1869, the daimyo had—in
most cases voluntarily after having been granted compensations—returned their
lands to the Emperor. Two years later, in 1871, the domains were completely
abolished and replaced by prefectures. Purely administrative units, the latter were
stripped off the domains’ traditional autonomy and ruled by centrally appointed
governors—from 1878 assisted by elected assemblies with advisory competences.
Change on the town and village level proceeded along the same lines. From 1872 to
1888, a series of laws was issued according to which towns and villages lost their
role as natural administrative units to newly defined districts (ku). Institutions like
the village assemblies survived the administrative transition but lost most of their
self-governing functions.10 De iure, the laws of 1869 through 1888, thus put an end
to the traditional system’s administrative fragmentation. This structural improve-
ment notwithstanding the de facto modernization of administrative procedures
necessitated improvement of civil servants’ incentives, supervision, education and
training.
To reach this goal, the Meiji leaders relied on a policy of strategic replacement
and staffed key positions in the administration of the newly created prefectures with
samurai from the domains which had led the anti-Tokugawa alliance in the
Restoration War. Providing a prompt, relatively inexpensive means to break
informal networks and to secure the central government’s monopoly of power this
strategy gradually turned into the general rule that civil service positions should be
assigned to candidates who were not natives of the prefecture where they held
office. Later—not the least due to the growing popular demand for political
participation and government transparency—this ad hoc step toward administrative
rationalization was supplemented by efforts to commit officeholders to universal
codes of conduct and to institutionalize the merit principle in the staffing of public
positions.11 Once the reforms of 1869 till 1888 had provided Tokyo with the means
to impose uniform standards and to reward compliance, strategic staffing thus
allowed the central to dissolve local cliques and to redirect officials’ loyalties and
career perspectives from the traditional daimyo-domain to the Tennoˆ-Japan level.
10 For details on the return of the domains and the reforms of the prefectures, towns and villages see
Jansen and Rozman (1986: 103), Steiner (1965: 24–52).
11 For details see: Spaulding (1967) and Motoyama (1997).
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Important to note, personnel restructuring moreover came along with far-reaching
legal reforms that centered on the individual and abandoned the traditional principle
of group responsibility. The new regulations required, for example, both high-
ranking officials and petty bureaucrats to submit their records to internal audits and
revisions of penal law significantly increased precision in the application of
malpractice laws. Both in Tokugawa and early Meiji penal law, corruption was
merely defined as ‘‘officials accepting bribes.’’ By contrast, the Penal Code of 1882
and the ‘‘Regulations on the Personal Conduct of Officials’’ of 1887 bound superiors
and judges to clear instructions by stipulating that:
Officials may not receive in connection with their official functions any
present from others, be it as an acknowledgment of service rendered, as a fee,
or in any other name or under whatever pretext.
For high-ranking bureaucrats, the structural reforms of the 1870s created an
additional element of control when the government installed elected assemblies at
the prefectural and local levels. In fact, the power of these assemblies was limited to
advisory functions with no direct influence on the legislative process. They
nevertheless constituted a supervision mechanism in the sense that even if a
governor could veto any of the assemblies’ decisions, he had to file detailed reports
in order to obtain the Home Ministry’s permission to do so.12
Not only Civil servants’ incentives were modified by the deterrent effect of closer
supervision and higher risk of punishment, but the government also sought to increase
commitment by installing a system of rewards and internal competition. For one,
salaries in the Meiji civil service compared favorably both with the yakudaka of
shoˆgunate times and the wages of comparable private sector employments.13 In the
early years ofMeiji, the incentive effect of high salaries was reinforced by the fact that
individuals whose education qualified them for public officesweremainly drawn from
the former samurai class. As samurai privileges like the claim to hereditary, stipends
were revoked at the same time and since educational reform and the blurring of status
barriers allowed more and more commoners to enter the administration, officials’
salaries—and the risk of losing them in case of incompetency ormisconduct—became
much stronger a stimulus than the traditional yakudaka.14 Furthermore, the
government rewarded outstanding performance on the job. Governors who took
office in prefectures renown as rebellious received special allowances and preferential
12 Imperial Rescript on the Prefectural Assemblies, chapter 1, article 5 and chapter 4, article 33–34., in:
McLaren, Walter Wallace, Japanese Government Documents, Yokohama (1914, p. 273).
13 Data from the 1880s for instance show that the median rank and median annual income of civil
servants who held an official rank were 14th and 300 Yen, respectively, which was more than twice the
wage of a manager at the private Mitsui bank (Kasuya 2005: 224).
14 Incentives in the civil service were increasingly shaped by inner-administrative competition. This
process was initiated by the revoking of samurai privileges which caused birth rank and local family ties
to lose their role as criteria of selection to merit-based indicators: Immediately after 1868, mostly activists
of the Restoration movement were appointed. From the 1870s with the establishment of the first law
schools till the 1887 general examination ordinance, appointment was made a matter of educational
attainment and performance in standardized national examinations. As a result, roughly one-third of
government positions was occupied by non-samurai newcomers after the first two decades of the Meiji
period.
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promotion to high government posts (DeVere 1966: 220; Baxter 1994: 199). Lower-
ranking officials could earn yearly bonuses up to the amount of their monthly salary.15
Finally, capitalizing on caste mentality and symbols deep-rooted in collective
consciousness, civil service was idealized as the continuation of samurai values and
lifestyle. In certain cases, exceptional achievement was therefore rewarded by
elevation to the prestigious chokunin rank (personally granted by the Tennoˆ) and
uniforms of soldiers or police officers included swords, the ancient emblemof samurai
status (Westney 1987: 53, 76, 95).
As the Meiji policies come close to a textbook example of Weberian bureaucratic
modernization, it is straightforward to ask whether they did indeed translate into
sizeable improvements of institutional quality. The answer is an unequivocal ‘‘Yes’’
and is supported both by testimonies of Western and Japanese observers and by
quantitative evidence. Thus, while sharply criticizing the central government on
various occasions, prominent Meiji intellectual and politician Nishimura Shigeki
contributed an essay to the prestigious political journal of the ‘‘Society of the 6th
Year of Meiji (Meirokusha)’’ in which he claimed that
They [i.e. the reforms] have destroyed such despotic measures as forced loans,
compulsory assistance to neighboring villages and property confiscations that
were practiced during feudal days.16
With particular regard to corruption, twentieth-century historian McLaren further
notes that
Corruption of this kind [i.e. local government officials accepting bribes] was,
however, easily enough dealt with when the central Government chose to
suppress it, and after a few years, it had practically disappeared. (McLaren
1916: 129)
From an empirical point of view, the benevolent assessment of contemporaries and
historians is corroborated in that the number of popular protests and uprisings prompted
by corruption or malpractice of local government officials steadily declined after the
restoration. Figure 1 depicts the annual number of incidents registered by the authorities
in the period of 1835–1900. While increasing surveillance after the creation of rural
police forces and the implementation of particularly unpopular policies (e.g., the radical
deflationary policyofMinister ofFinanceMatsukataMasayoshi in1884) causeda rise in
the incidence of protests recorded, corruption-induced incidents exhibit a strongly
negative time trend in both absolute and relative terms.17
15 Law on the Duties of prefectural officials, issued July 27, 1876, article II,2, in: McLaren, Walter
Wallace, Japanese Government Documents, Yokohama (1914, p. 268).
16 The corresponding article can be found in: Nishimura, Shigeki, ‘On Change’, Meiroku-Zasshi vol. 43
(Nov. 1875).
17 Corresponding records were kept on the prefectural and local levels and listed the dates, location, the
reason and the number of persons involved in a protest. Thanks to the work of Aoki these data have been
cataloged both for the Tokugawa and Meiji periods. In the present graph, I classified an uprising as caused
by malfeasance if ‘‘officials’ corruption,’’ ‘‘despotic administration’’ and the like were reported as the
causes of the disorder. For my data see: Aoki, Kouji, Hyakusho Ikki no Nenjiteki Kenkyu, Tokyo (1974),
statistical appendix; Aoki, Kouji, Meiji Noumin Soujo no Nenteki Kenkyu, Tokyo (1967).
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2.4 Regional variation
The general trend notwithstanding reform success varied grossly across regions. The
following section prepares for the statistical analysis by sketching the reasons
behind this mixed record. Considering these factors is imperative because the
qualitative historical evidence shows to what extent the survival of traditional
networks and administrative sleaze jeopardized economic development after the
restoration. Moreover, understanding why the bureaucracies of certain prefectures
were more impenetrable than others provides the main ingredient for the
econometric analysis namely a quantitative measure of ‘‘reform success.’’18
The reasons of retarded administrative rationalization stemmed largely from path
dependency and the territorial arrangements set in place by the Tokugawa in the
seventeenth century. After their victory in the civil wars, they had increased their
fief to about 25 % of the country and controlled economic and strategic centers like
Osaka, Kyoto and Nagasaki, large ports and the main producing regions of raw
materials like silver, iron or copper. To consolidate their power, the shoˆguns
encircled their territories by a cordon sanitaire of daimyo (the fudai daimyo) who
had supported them during the wars. Members of the anti-Tokugawa coalition, the
tozama daimyo, were ousted from central Japan and pushed to the periphery
where—albeit after having lost territories to the fuda i—they continued to rule their
ancestral fiefs.
Fig. 1 Total and relative incidence of uprisings
18 One particularly valuable source to investigate the experiences of the different prefectures is the Meiji
15nen/16nen—Chihoˆ-Junsatsu-shi Fukumeishoˆ (CJF), a collection of reports submitted to the Meiji
government in 1882/1883 which gives detailed accounts of the economic, political and administrative
state of affairs in every of the then existing Japanese prefectures.
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Since entry to the samurai class was strictly regulated, this constellation gave rise
to a distinct pattern with the reduced tozama territories featuring very high densities
of warrior population, whereas the Tokugawa and the fudai commanded relatively
large areas in relation to the number of vassals whose rank qualified them for
administrative posts (Izumi 2001: 20–21). As a result, shoˆgunal ordinances that de
iure obliged samurai to reside in the castle town of their home province were de
facto unenforceable in the jurisdiction of many tozama lords. In these areas, a class
of so-called goshi (‘‘samurai farmers’’) emerged who combined social character-
istics of warrior and peasant status and frequently assumed low- to middle-ranking
posts in the local administration.19 Yet, while the goshis’ in-depth knowledge of
regional particularities and close personal ties to their native communities made
them apt administrators, the tozama bureaucracies became much more vulnerable to
the influence of patronage and personal networking than the fudai and Tokugawa
administrations.20 In the latter, the number of potential officeholders was so
restricted that the district of a single magistrate easily rivaled the size of a small
feudal domain which made close ties to single localities hard to establish. Although
hereditary offices and limits to occupational mobility existed also in the shoˆgunate’s
sphere of influence, magistrates were therefore more often appointed from without
and changed positions more frequently than in tozama territories. In other words: the
transition from feudal retainers who ruled based on traditional authority to a class of
salaried, professional civil servants was more advanced in the former Tokugawa and
fudai regions. By contrast, the landed samurai of the large tozama domains was
better able to shield their stakes from the central government’s attempts at control
and merit-based recruitment.
Adding to that, reform activities reflected political currents within the Meiji
oligarchy and long-standing personal relationships made it hard for the leaders to
confront former associates in the local bureaucracies of their native (tozama-
)domains. What is more, mistrust and internal cleavages drove them to jealously
guard the stakes of their home provinces from external intervention be it from the
central government or other prefectures.
Mixed reform success was thus largely predetermined by the different
prefectures’ proneness to develop strong personal networks within their adminis-
trations. That the survival of these traditionally status- and loyalty-based structures
proved fatal in socioeconomic terms is illustrated by a voluminous body of
historical sources. The following testimonies of contemporary observers are
intended to provide a flavor of the extent and the actual mechanisms behind retarded
administrative rationalization. As a starting point, they take the case of Kagoshima
prefecture (formerly Satsuma domain) where substantial reforms occurred only after
the Rebellion of Saigo Takamori in 1877 and continued to be a cumbersome
business for a long time afterward. As late as 1898, a Meiji-era scholar noted:
19 For instance, goˆshi were granted the right to wear arms and could be appointed to a limited number of
public offices. Yet, their hereditary stipends were typically so small that they had to rely on additional
sources of income—mostly agricultural activities.
20 Regional expertise allowed them to better assess potential tax yields and to react early to popular
unrest. Full blown peasant uprisings were accordingly far rarer events in goˆshi controlled areas than in the
jurisdiction of the shoˆgunate and its allies. Matsushita (2006: 200), Paik et al. (2012).
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The influence of former samurai is admittedly high in all the South-Western
parts of the country. Yet this is true to the extreme in the former Satsuma
domain. Here, public affairs no matter how big or small they may be lie
entirely in the hands of samurai cliques and among the deputies to the national
parliament and the prefectural and municipal assemblies, the prefectural,
district and village officials, the policemen, judges, clerks (…) teachers and
even among the students of middle and high schools 99 % are of samurai
descent (Honmi 1898: 37).
The detrimental influence of local samurai elites is equally stressed in a report
from the Chiho-Junsatsushi Fukumeisho (CJF):
Only after the Satsuma Rebellion has the prefecture been integrated in the
central government’s sphere of influence. (…) In a few years, many projects
were initiated and he [i.e. the new governor] managed to reestablish the public
order. However, once he struggles to handle things in a way that wins him the
favor of the powerful clans in the prefecture, he is unable to undertake
decisive action. CJF I: 759)
The struggle against local networks and institutional encrustation was not
confined to Kagoshima. An internal government report about Ishikawa prefecture—
like Kagoshima a former tozama domain with high ratios of native officeholders—
noted the following:
They (i.e. the local samurai) have not yet woken from their feudalistic dreams
and do not know any other way of making their livelihood than turning to the
prefectural government or their former daimyo to request aid and financial
relief. (…) The middle and lower ranking officials of the prefecture are mainly
natives who (…) might know Ishikawa and in particular Kanazawa [i.e. the
prefectural capital] but are largely ignorant of anything else. Due to their
excessive provincialism they have no idea of the currents of the time and
visiting the prefectural offices today is like inspecting the daimiate admin-
istration of the feudal past. Furthermore, one hears that Ishikawa officials
loathe collaborating with appointees from other prefectures and that they had
the bad habit of forming cliques. (…). (CJF I: 517)
How serious a threat conservative elite attitudes presented to long-term growth
perspectives is stressed by observers in Kagoshima and Ishikawa alike. For instance,
a Kagoshima teacher attributed the prefecture’s failure to take part in Japan’s rapid
industrialization to social inertia and explicitly stressed the fact that ‘‘The former
samurai of Satsuma show not the slightest interest for applied sciences and their
sons are particularly weak in the field of mathematics’’ (Matsushita 2006: 189).21
And the Ishikawa report in the Chiho Junsatsu-shi Fukumeisho denounces the
harmful impact of successful lobbying activities by influential samurai networks:
21 Indeed his observation seems to the state of affairs in Kagoshima well enough as both Meiji era
statistics and studies of present-day historians show that the prefecture ranked among the last where
school attendance and educational outcomes were concerned (Ohkawa 1957: 24, Honmi 1898: 42).
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In order to promote samurai enterprises, large funds have been distributed and
numerous businesses have been set up subsequently. Yet, most of these start-
up firms are caught in a state of decline and stagnation with no hope of future
recovery. This situation is due to the samurais’ lack of perseverance and their
strong spirit of dependence.[…] It is not sufficient to acknowledge that these
factors (i.e. the lack of suitable incentives) determine the current state of
samurai enterprises and that the easy availability of public funds and aid
remains ineffective. Besides that, there is no denying that samurai in this
region use employment creation as a pretext to acquire government
subventions and protection. (CJF I: 518–520)
Things were hardly different in Koˆchi prefecture, formerly Tosa domain, where
according to the Chiho Junsatsu-shi Fukumeisho ‘‘the prefecture’s veteran officials
‘sternly opposed’ all appointees from other prefectures and managed to render the
implementation of central government ordinances utterly impossible’’ (CJF I: 741).
Important to note, the report goes on and points out that these unfortunate
circumstances started to change noticeably as the newly appointed governor
successfully pushed for rapid personnel restructuring.
Other regions fared far better. In the Kantoˆ plain for instance, the booming
prefectures in the vicinity of Tokyo mostly consisted of former shoˆgunate territories
and had experienced comprehensive, hardly opposed personal restructuring and
merit-based appointments from the first years of Meiji onwards. In the 1880s, the
fruits of these efforts became apparent as government reports found no fault with the
functioning of the prefectural administrations but in the case of Kanagawa where the
following—excusable—flaw was found:
Compared to other regions, administrative procedures are somewhat slow, but
upon noting this fact it has to be taken into consideration that the prefecture’s
engagement in trade and contacts with foreigners raise particular challenges
for the administration. (CJF II: 1379)
The development of many former Tokugawa and fudai territories not only
illustrates that early administrative rationalization fostered economic activity by
facilitating specialization and trade, but also shows how the reforms built on the
higher degree of occupational mobility in the shoˆgunate territories where the need
for specialist services had paved the way to administrative positions for low-ranking
samurai and commoners even before the restoration. Given that social permeability
in these regions tended to be higher, the successive abolition of samurai privileges
and occupational barriers for commoners was met with relatively little resistance as
former vassals who lost their stipends and public offices frequently turned to
business activities without the administration. Capitalizing on this historical
precondition, administrative modernization could then provide the final impetus
to overcome long-established institutional deficiencies as can be seen, for example,
in the case of Tochigi prefecture: Here, municipal bureaucracies were ridden by
endemic corruption and collusion between popularly elected local officials and
village elites. Since patronage networks constituted a permanent cause of conflict
and reduced both the prefectural and central government’s capacity to enforce their
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monopoly of power, the governor of Tochigi prefecture temporarily suspended all
elections for administrative offices and replaced the officials in question by
appointees from other prefectures. The corresponding reports from the Chiho
Junsatsu-shi Fukumeisho reveal that this radical step did indeed perceptively reduce
the incidence of officials’ misconduct and illicit activities. Yet they touch on two
equally noteworthy details, namely first that the governor invested time and effort to
obtain the approval of the prefectural assembly and second that the central
government nevertheless required him to officially justify his infringing upon the
general election procedures (CJF II: 928–929).
The bottom line of these testimonies is clear: The replacement of feudal
bureaucrats with centrally appointed civil servants was no sign of central
government discretion and despotism. It was an indicator of ongoing administrative
modernization. In addition, all accounts highlight the fact that while administrative
rationalization proved conductive for economic growth, the replacement of
traditional structures, let alone the implementation of development plans like the
Fukoku Kyohei policies, was possible only after local personal networks were
stripped off their influence.
In terms of analytic procedure, this observation creates exciting avenues for
quantitative research. Given that the Meiji leaders’ instrument of choice to suppress
regional particularism consisted in strategic staffing policies and seeing that this
strategy apparently served their ends, it is possible to quantify early reform success
by the extent to which the government enforced personal restructuring in the
different prefectural administrations. In order to assess the economic benefits from
administrative rationalization, the statistical analysis then only needs to construct
variables which capture the Meiji leaders’ recruitment policies and to relate these
measures to indicators of economic development.
3 Econometric analysis
3.1 Data and estimation strategy
The first indicator of strategic staffing is the variable, Nativetj which denotes the
share of native employees (i.e., the number of persons who held office in the prefecture
where theyhadbeenborn) in prefecture j in year t.Nativejt can thereforebe interpreted as
a measure of the administration’s openness to over-regional influences. To refine the
picture drawn by this general indicator, I consider the distribution of native and non-
native officeholders across the administrative hierarchy. This extension is necessitated
by the fact that—as shownby, e.g., the experiences of Ishikawa andKoˆchi prefectures—
high-ranking native officials could and did use their position to influence regional
policies in favor of traditional interests.
To account for these factors, a second variable, RatioNativeHighjt (RNHjt) was
introduced to the model. It gives the ratio of the fraction of native staff in the top
layers of the administration to the fraction of natives among all employees in
prefecture j and year t. RNHjt thus reflects the hierarchical distribution of foreigners
and natives. Values of RNHjt[ 1 thereby indicate that native officeholders
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clustered at the top positions, whereas RNHjt\ 1 implies that high-ranking posts
were hold by foreigners and subordinate positions by natives.
This general rationale set out, I proceeded to use the two explanatory variables
Nativejt and RNHjt to account for inter-prefectural differences in three fundamental
indicators of economic development. The indicators considered are measures of
prefectural per capita income, business activity and financial development. Formally,
the corresponding reduced-form model is captured by the following equation:
zjt ¼ b1  Nativejt þ b2  RatioNativeHighjt þ cjt  Xjt þ consþ ejt
z therebydenotes the value ofdevelopment indicator i in prefecture j andyear t.b1 andb2
capture the partial effects of changes either in the fraction of native officeholders or in
their distribution within the hierarchy. Xjt is a vector of prefectural-specific control
variables with their coefficients cjt and ejt is a white noise error term.
As the empirical implementation of the model is concerned, the estimation relies
entirely on data obtained from primary sources and official statistics. The necessary
information to construct the two central explanatory variables, Nativejt and RNHjt,
was from the so-called Meiji Kan-in Roku (=Lists of public employees during the
Meiji Period).22 Based on this evidence, I obtained Nativejt by counting the number
of native administrators and dividing the result by the total number of prefectural
officials.23 RNHjt was constructed accordingly by assessing the fraction of natives
22 The ‘‘Meiji Kan-in Roku’’ were published from the early years of Meiji onwards and contain
comprehensive monthly lists of all administrative posts in the different prefectures together with the
names and native provinces of the corresponding officeholders.
23 An important advantage of ‘‘Meiji Kan-in Roku’’ is the fact that it proves relatively robust against
changes of prefectural boundaries in the early Meiji period. In fact, a central government act known as the
Haihan-Chiken first transformed the feudal territories of the Tokugawa period into 72 prefectures, a
number which was subsequently reduced to 47. Consequently, the variable ‘‘Native’’ might misstate the
fraction of native to non-native officials if officeholders remained in their ancestral fief but were no longer
recorded as natives when the territory in question was amalgamated into another prefecture. Fortunately,
though, the historical circumstances and certain characteristics of the Kan-In Roku mitigate potential bias
from this source. For one, there is no evidence that changes in prefectural boundaries were more frequent
in regions which had performed particularly well or badly before the Meiji Restoration. The direct effect
of territorial modifications was therefore probably small. As the indirect effect of misstating the true
number of natives in newly formed prefectures is concerned, it suffices to note the following
characteristics of the Kan-In Roku: Officeholders were listed with their names and family names. Hence,
by following backwards the career path of an administrator, I could verify his native province even if
prefectural boundaries changed in the course of his professional life. The problem then came down to
dealing with new entrants to the civil service. Kan-In Roku treats this staff always in a way that—to the
extent old prefectures ceased to exist—natives of these territories were recorded as born in the prefecture
to which the old province was annexed. Changes in prefectural boundaries therefore tended to slightly
overstate the true fraction of native to non-native officials. Bias from this source is, however, likely to
distort the expected statistical estimates downwards rather than upwards. The reason is as follows: Since
changes in prefectural boundaries were frequently undertaken for efficiency reasons, they ought to have
improved administrative performance after a certain time. Distortions from the misclassification of newly
appointed officials also becoming sizeable with a time lag, prefectures with overstated values of ‘‘Native’’
were arguably already reaping the benefits from the efficiency gains after the geographical restructuring.
Hence, if high realizations of ‘‘Native’’ indicated institutional backwardness, the positive impact of
improved administrative performance after boundary changes will at least partially offset this effect in the
econometric estimation. This implies that if the statistical analysis confirms the anecdotical historical
evidence—i.e., if the coefficients of ‘‘Native’’ are negative—these estimates would constitute a lower
bound for the true relationship between administrative backwardness and economic development.
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among the high-ranking officials (i.e., officials who held the so-called chokunin
rank)24 and dividing the resulting fraction by Nativejt.
Turning to the set of development indicators, a preliminary problem to
overcome consisted in the fact that statistical data from the early Meiji era do not
allow us to construct annual GDP estimates at the prefectural level. To introduce
a measure of regional per capita income, I used the following approximation:
From the first post-restoration years onwards, the central government levied
national taxes on consumption goods and services like alcohol, sugar, soy sauce,
tobacco, postal fees and transport. Data on each prefecture’s per capita tax yield
have been collected and published in the Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese
Empire (Nihon Teikoku Toukei Nenkan). These comprehensive time series show
that neither the set of the targeted goods and services nor the tax rate varied
across prefectures. What is more, the items which were subject to national taxes
were consumed across the entire country and can reasonably be assumed normal
or superior in private consumption (Ohkawa 1957, statistical annex). Thus, the
corresponding demand should have been sufficiently elastic to ensure that
heterogeneity in regional per capita income translated into differences in the tax
yield. Following this rationale, the econometric model approximates interpre-
fectural income differences with the variable RelativeTaxtj which denotes the per
capita yield of consumption taxes in prefecture j and year t divided by the average
national tax yield. By construction, realizations of RelativeTaxtj[ 1 therefore
indicate above-average tax revenue—and presumably higher per capita income—
in prefecture j, whereas RelativeTaxtj\ 1 suggests low tax yields and per capita
income.25
In addition to the main indicator RelativeTax, I consider two auxiliary measures
of development. The first builds on the notion that besides per capita income, the
institutional heterogeneity captured by Nativejt and RNHtj probably also influenced
regional business activity. To investigate this possibility, I relied on the variable
Startupjt which can be derived from the Shuyo kigyo no keifuzu, a compilation of
corporate genealogies edited by the business historians Yagura and Ikushima. This
source contains the histories of more than 1,000 firms that were established during
the Meiji era and listed on the Tokyo stock exchange in 1984.26 Based on this
24 As mentioned before, the choˆkunin rank was exclusively awarded by the Emperor and was restricted to
high-ranking officials.
25 The reason for relying on relative rather than their absolute tax yields stems from the fact that—while
taxation regulations were centrally determined—the set of taxed items and the corresponding rates
changed over time. As a result, absolute tax revenue is not directly comparable for different years which
rendered its use unsuitable for the present analysis.
26 Shuyo kigyo no keifuzu arguably constitutes the most comprehensive record of business activity in the
early Meiji period and is the subject of a recent in-depth analysis by (Tang 2011). His work features a
prefectural-level database with the annual number of company start-ups from the first year of Meiji
onwards.
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unique information, I was able to introduce Startupjt, i.e., the number of newly
established businesses in prefecture j and year t as an indicator of private
entrepreneurial activity.27
The set of dependent variables is completed by a measure of financial market
development: The variable Lendingratejt gives the average annual lending rate on
standardized loans collected by banks in prefecture j and year t. The corresponding
data have been collected by the prefectural statistical offices and provide the
percentage lending rates on secured private loans of 100 Yen. From the early 1880s
onwards, these lists are published on a yearly basis in the Fuken Toˆkeisho, the
‘‘Statistical Yearbooks of the Japanese Prefectures.’’ Starting in 1884, coherent
monthly series of standardized 100-Yen loan rates appear in the series Ginkokyoku
Nenpo published by the bank of Japan. The particular appeal of this evidence stems
from the fact that lending rates reflect region-specific risk perceptions, transaction
costs and expected costs of contract enforcement. Hence, they provide an
opportunity to get an idea of the contemporary agents’ assessment of institutional
quality. Unfortunately, though, this advantage does not come without shortcomings.
Given that data on lending rates are unavailable prior to the 1880s, the period of
most fervent restructuring (i.e., the mid-to-late 1870s) remains uncovered. In
consequence, the years where institutional differences were probably most acute
drop from the econometric analysis which might cause the effects of Nativejt and
RNHjt to be downwards biased.
To close the econometric model, I introduced a set of control variables which
account for regional heterogeneity in non-institutional determinants of economic
growth. In particular, the corresponding covariates include measures of the
economy’s sectoral structure, pre-Meiji prefectural output and human capital
formation. In addition, I controlled for population density, distance to Tokyo and
Osaka, the country’s main industrial centers, each prefecture’s access to ports and
periods of political unrest and wars. Regarding these variables, it should be noted
that the need to account for the sectoral composition of the economy stems from the
fact that late Tokugawa and early Meiji agricultural development varied across
prefectures. Hence, whereas backward cultivation techniques survived in some
regions, others featured a highly productive first sector or became centers of
burgeoning proto-industrial activities. However, while agricultural progress and
proto-industrialization arguably increased prefectural per capita income, both
factors might be underestimated by my development indicators. The reasons are first
that agrarian households probably used part of their production for personal
consumption (reducing ‘‘Relativetax’’), second that agricultural businesses, not to
mention small-scale craft producers and manufacturers, were less likely to be
registered at the stock exchange (driving ‘‘Startups’’ downwards) and finally that
27 Considering this indicator, critical spirits might be concerned with the fact that Startupjt reflects only a
part of overall economic activity as businesses which failed or were not listed at the Tokyo stock
exchange in 1984 are not included in the database. However, issues of survivor bias are mitigated by the
inclusion of defunct firms whose assets were transferred to direct successors (Tang 2011). Moreover,
since favorable institutional conditions like administrative rationality should have similar effects both on
the establishment and on the long-term success of businesses, this shortcoming does not seem to
jeopardize the overall validity of the development indicator Startupjt.
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agricultural and proto-industrial finance frequently relied on other sources than
credit from regular banks.28 To account for these possibilities, I constructed the
control variable ‘‘AgriSharejt’’ which denotes the fraction of agricultural households
in each prefecture and thereby measures the importance of agriculture for the local
economy.29
The additional control variables were constructed as follows: Gakko, the measure
of human capital formation is derived from the nine volumes of the Nihon Kyouiku-
shi Shiryou edited by the Ministry of Education in the early 1890s. This source
reprints the results of a government survey which specified the number of primary
schools that existed before 1872. Using this information, I approximated prefectural
human capital by the adjusted ratio of primary schools to inhabitants.30 Regional
differences in pre-Meiji per capita income are captured by a second control variable,
Kokudaka, i.e, the product of a territory (e.g., a domain) as assessed for taxation
purposes.31 The construction and interpretation of the remaining control variables is
straightforward: The variable Distancej gives the kilometer distance between the
capital of prefecture j and Tokyo or Osaka depending on which of the latter two was
closer. Popdenjt renders the population density of prefecture j in year t and relies on
data from the Kokudaka and Population Tables of the Domains and Prefectures and
the Statistical Yearbooks of the Japanese Empire. Landlockedj and Conflictt are
binary variables, the first of which takes the value of one if prefecture j had no
access to ports (i.e., if costal shipping was impossible) and zero otherwise. Conflictt
28 In fact, there is a substantial literature (see p.e. Francks 2002; Howell 1992; Smith 1988) showing that
agricultural and commercial development in rural areas relied strongly on better-off merchants and land
owning families (sometimes referred to as ‘‘Meiboˆku’’) who combined traditional cultivation and
landowning activities with money lending, trading or the establishment and operation of putting-out
systems. If those agents were better able to assess the prospects of investments and the solvency of their
local clientele, they might have picked the ‘‘plums’’ from the prospective borrowers while leaving more
risky enterprises to other financial intermediaries. Hence, ordinary banks might have increased their risk
premia which in turn would cause Lendingrate to be higher in the corresponding prefectures.
29 ‘‘AgriShare’’ arguably also reflects agricultural productivity: As shown in the seminal work of
Nakamura (1966), agricultural innovation tended to be labor-intensive throughout the early Meiji period
such that prefectures that derived most of their per capita income from agriculture should exhibit high
realizations of ‘‘AgriShare.’’ Hence, ‘‘AgriShare’’ is unlikely to underestimate the relative importance of
agriculture in highly productive regions as it would be the case if innovation had been primarily labor-
saving.
30 Note that the necessity for modifications in the number of primary schools stems from the fact that
historical records contain only data of private primary schools (shingakkoˆ) and temple schools (terakoya).
These schools were mainly frequented by commoners while most samurai had their children privately
educated. Hence, measuring human capital formation by the unadjusted number of schools per capita is
likely to bias the estimates in favor of regions with relatively large commoner populations. In order to
correct for this problem, I proceeded as follows: Schooling rates are estimated to have reached about
40 % for commoners and 100 % for samurai. Using 1868/1869 census data, I identified regional samurai
population psamurai at the time of the Meiji Restoration. Based on these material, I multiplied the number
of schools in each prefecture by a correction factor of (1 ? psamurai = ptotal 9 (1 = 0/4)). For an
exhaustive account of measuring school attendance in pre-modern Japan see: Dore, R.P., Education in
Tokugawa Japan, London 1984, S. 317–323.
31 The shoˆgunate and the daimyo collected lists of their fiefs’ taxable kokudaka output. These data can be
found in Hansei Ichiran (A Summary of the Domain System) edited by the governmental department for
historical research as well as in the official Kokudaka and Population Tables of the Domains and
Prefectures issued in 1869 and hold by the Okuma Shigenobu online library of Waseda University.
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controls for political turmoil and takes the value of one for the years 1877 (Satsuma
Rebellion) and 1894/1895 (Sino-Japanese War). Finally, exogenous time effects are
accounted for by the variable Trend, a linear time trend starting in the first
observation year 1875.
3.2 Estimation and results
The basic specifications of the econometric model concentrate on the contempo-
raneous effects of Native and RNH on the three development indicators. The
estimated relationship is stated in the following equation:
zjt¼b1 Nativejtþb2 RatioNativeHighjtþc1 Gakkojtþc2 Kokudakajtþc3 Distancej
þc4 Popdenjtþc5 Landlockedjþc6 Conflicttþc7 Trendþconsþejt
In terms of the direction of the partial effects of Native and RNH, the historical
evidence suggests that high proportions of native staff were associated with inertia
and delayed organizational reform. Consequently, the coefficient b1 ought to carry a
negative sign in the regressions on Startup and RelativeTax as institutional defi-
ciencies discourage business activity and reduce regional per capita income. Con-
cerning lending rates, the opposite holds because efficient administration reduces
transaction costs and fosters mutual trust.
Proceeding to the expected relationship between RNHjt and the development
indicators, both the influence of established elites and the Meiji leaders’ reliance on
strategic recruitment need to be born in mind. In particular, in the early Meiji years,
it was not uncommon for accomplished governors and their high-ranking staff to
literally hop from one troubleshooting prefecture to the next. Regions that managed
to oppose the central’s attempts at administrative rationalization were accordingly
unlikely to be headed by non-native governors and high-ranking bureaucrats. In
combination, these considerations imply that small values of RNHjt should be
associated with institutionally advanced prefectures that exhibited high occupational
permeability at all levels of the bureaucracy. In terms of econometric estimates, one
would therefore expect the coefficient b2 to be negative in the regressions on
RelativeTax and Startups and positive in the regression on Lendingrate.
As it turns out, the expectations formed from the qualitative historical evidence
are supported by the quantitative analysis. Table 1 shows the estimation results for
the basic specification of the model. In order to take account of the dataset’s panel
structure, the simple OLS regressions in column (1) were subsequently subject to
the following modifications: Column (2) introduces regional controls and panel
robust standard errors, Column (3) further includes lacked values of the respective
dependent variable, and Column (4) relies on the Arellano–Bond technique to
address possible serial correlation.
No matter which estimation technique is chosen, the coefficient of Native almost
always conforms to the expectations, that is, b1 is negative and significant in the
regressions on RelativeTax and Startups and positive in the regressions on
Lendingrate. The results are less conclusive for RNH as many estimates end up
insignificant albeit mostly carrying the expected signs. Also, concerning
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Table 1 Effects of strategic recruitment on development indicators
Dep. variable: RelativeTax Dep. variable: Startup
OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond
Native -0.2500***
(0.0817)
-0.1480*
(0.0869)
-0.0972**
(0.0412)
0.0077
(0.0609)
-0.2830*
(0.1670)
-0.1060
(0.1810)
-0.2370*
(0.1160)
-0.4250
(0.5400)
RatioNative 0.0093
(0.0269)
0.0305
(0.0264)
-7.11e-06
(0.0175)
-0.0089
(0.0212)
0.0259
(0.0545)
0.0346
(0.0550)
-0.0215
(0.0587)
-0.0659
(0.0971)
Relativetax_Lagged 0.7900***
(0.0569)
-0.0987
(0.1210)
-0.0009
(0.0702)
-0.1860
(0.1310)
AgriShare -0.6880***
(0.1110)
-0.5420***
(0.1140)
-0.1650
(0.1260)
0.2280
(0.3170)
-0.9550***
(0.2240)
-0.9430***
(0.2380)
-0.9670**
(0.3970)
1.8690**
(0.8200)
Popden 0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-3.26e-05
(9.44e-05)
-0.0014***
(0.0005)
0.0019***
(0.0002)
0.0019***
(0.0003)
0.0020***
(0.0005)
-0.0021
(0.0038)
Kokudaka -0.0009***
(0.0002)
-0.0013***
(0.0003)
-0.0003***
(8.72e-05)
5.11e-05
(0.0004)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
6.16e-05
(0.0002)
Distance -0.0008***
(8.33e-05)
-0.0009***
(0.0001)
-0.0002*
(8.34e-05)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0005**
(0.0002)
-0.0003*
(0.0001)
Gakko 0.0693***
(0.0192)
0.0716***
(0.0216)
0.0072
(0.0105)
0.0935**
(0.0386)
0.1060**
(0.0445)
0.0941***
(0.0294)
Landlocked -0.0334
(0.0355)
-0.1010**
(0.0416)
-0.0144
(0.0237)
0.0332
(0.0711)
0.0018
(0.0859)
0.0334
(0.0638)
Trend -0.0013
(0.0020)
-0.0004
(0.0019)
-0.0003
(0.0009)
0.0095
(0.0081)
0.0006
(0.0040)
0.0006
(0.0040)
-0.0003
(0.0045)
0.0627**
(0.0278)
Conflict -0.0072
(0.0320)
-0.0074
(0.0312)
-0.00186
(0.0125)
0.1990***
(0.0660)
0.1980***
(0.0660)
0.1980***
(0.0700)
Constant -0.6970***
(0.1110)
1.743***
(0.137)
0.437***
(0.134)
0.6710***
(0.2330)
0.6550**
(0.2550)
0.6940*
(0.3810)
Observations 723 723 646 557 801 801 767 687
R-squared 0.344 0.387 0.407 - 0.283 0.289 0.290 -
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Table 1 continued
Dep. variable and coefficients OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond
Lendingrate
Native 0.3620
(0.6000)
0.3450
(0.6210)
0.4040
(0.3940)
0.4500
(0.5480)
RatioNative 0.1680
(0.6550)
0.2270
(0.6460)
0.0062
(0.6850)
0.0414
-1.400
Lendingrate_Lagged 0.7140***
(0.0345)
0.3640***
(0.0485)
AgriShare 2.3090***
(0.8030)
2.3590***
(0.8410)
0.0143
(0.5660)
2.8150
(2.8440)
Popden 0.0002
(0.0009)
-0.0004
(0.0009)
-0.0005
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0027)
Kokudaka 0.0064***
(0.0014)
0.0024***
(0.0016)
0.0010**
(0.0005)
Distance 0.0032***
(0.0006)
0.0053***
(0.0009)
0.0011***
(0.0004)
Gakko 0.1520
(0.1300)
0.1070
(0.1460)
-0.0165
(0.0875)
Landlocked -0.1320
(0.2350)
-0.6160**
(0.2910)
-0.0144
(0.1730)
Trend -0.3760***
(0.0209)
-0.3760***
(0.0205)
-0.1170***
(0.0199)
-0.2650***
(0.0347)
Conflict 1.5320***
(0.2590)
1.5310***
(0.2550)
1.4310***
(0.1380)
Constant 15.300***
(0.8780)
15.740***
(0.9380)
5.0770***
(0.8350)
Observations 553 553 516 445
R-squared 0.453 0.489 0.750 –
* Indicates significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 5 %, *** indicates significance at 1 % level
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Lendingrate, b1 and b2 indicate the expected relationship between administrative
rationalization and loan rates, but the estimates fail to reach statistical significance
at the conventional levels. Admittedly a caveat, this finding does not come entirely
unexpected as due to the discussed data restrictions, the sample size is smallest in
the interest rate regressions and covers only the final years of reform activity—a
period in which institutional quality had arguably already started to converge.
Finally, the control variables are largely significant and carry plausible signs among
other things, suggesting a beneficial impact of high levels of pre-Meiji human
capital accumulation, closeness to the country’s economic centers or high
population density.
While the econometric analysis provides quantitative backbone to the historical
sources, the dataset contains further intriguing insights if temporal dynamics are
accounted for: Since the provinces that had supported the shoˆgunate experienced the
most rapid and comprehensive personnel restructuring after 1868, regions that had
supported the restoration managed to maintain more independence and lower levels
of occupational permeability. Yet, in the course of time, this relationship probably
changed. As appointment to public posts ceased to depend on status or personal ties
and became a matter of achievement in standardized examinations, having many
native officeholders no longer needed to be an unambiguous indicator of
institutional backwardness. Rather it might point to a prefecture’s ability to provide
its citizens with the educational infrastructure they needed to excel at the national
level. In this case, the effect of Native and RNH ought to weaken if not to change
signs. To investigate this possibility, I generated the additional variables
Native_time and RNH_time by interacting Native and RNH with a linear time
trend. Both variables capture the temporal change in the impact of the two
independent variables. Concretely, in the regressions on Startups and RelativeTax,
negative signs on the interaction terms imply that the positive effect of strategic
recruitment policies declined over time, whereas positive interaction coefficients
suggest increasing benefits from personnel restructuring. Again, the inverse is true
for the regressions on Lendingrate. The results of the extended estimation are
displayed in Table 2.
The estimates confirm that the unfavorable impact of regional dominance in the
prefectural administration became less palpable during the reform years. This is
most evident in the regression on RelativeTax and with regard to the pair Native and
Native_Time with both variables being significant and carrying opposite signs. The
same pattern emerges in the cases of Startup and Lendingrate, although more
coefficients fail to reach significance. These observations are not only worth noting
because they confirm the qualitative historical evidence almost by the letter, but also
carry general policy implications, namely first that strategic replacements constitute
a powerful instrument to overcome institutional inertia and to initiate necessary
reforms. Second, given that RNH and RNH_time turn out insignificant in many
cases, it seems that beneficial growth effects were largely due to increased
administrative permeability per se, whereas the question whether personnel
restructuring occurred at the top or the lower strata of the bureaucracy was less
important. Finally, no matter its instantaneous impact, this strategy seems to lose its
strength over time because it becomes superfluous when meritocratic principles are
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Table 2 Estimation with time effects
Dep. variable: RelativeTax Dep. variable: Startup Dep. variable: Lendingrate
OLS Regional
controls
Lagged
values
Arellano
Bond
OLS Regional
controls
Lagged
values
Arellano
Bond
OLS Regional
controls
Lagged
values
Arellano
Bond
Native -0.4940***
(0.1490)
-0.4830***
(0.1540)
-0.0969
(0.0666)
0.0244
(0.1450)
-0.2630
(0.3130)
-0.0376
(0.3330)
-0.3360
(0.3620)
-0.1940
(0.1310)
6.4100***
(1.9180)
6.5870***
(1.9530)
0.1830
(1.8830)
-0.0877
(3.2630)
RatioNative 0.0755
(0.0572)
0.0698
(0.0560)
-0.0220
(0.0329)
-0.0730
(0.0512)
0.1760
(0.1190)
0.1740
(0.1190)
-0.1970
(0.1630)
0.2370
(0.1820)
1.3720**
(0.6550)
1.2930**
(0.6460)
0.8430
(0.6850)
-0.0683
-1.400
Native_time 0.0202*
(0.0109)
0.0231**
(0.0108)
0.0003
(0.0040)
0.0007
(0.0093)
0.0005
(0.0226)
-0.0078
(0.0231)
0.0057
(0.0292)
-0.0656
(0.0770)
-0.4070***
(0.1140)
-0.3890***
(0.1150)
-0.0394
(0.0999)
0.0192
(0.1600)
RatioNative_
time
-0.0046
(0.0039)
-0.0023
(0.0039)
0.0017
(0.0017)
0.0054
(0.0039)
-0.0114
(0.0081)
-0.0110
(0.0082)
-0.0130
(0.0118)
-0.0222
(0.0143)
-0.0757**
(0.0382)
-0.0679*
(0.0378)
-0.0484
(0.0360)
0.0014
(0.0713)
Relativetax_
Lagged
0.7910***
(0.0572)
0.0530
(0.1240)
-0.0050
(0.0702)
-0.0050
(0.0702)
0.7090***
(0.0345)
0.6460***
(0.0621)
AgriShare -0.6970***
(0.1110)
-0.5530***
(0.1140)
-0.1620
(0.1260)
0.1430
(0.3170)
-0.9720***
(0.2240)
-0.9690***
(0.2380)
-0.9960**
(0.4070)
2.0070**
(0.8500)
2.4610***
(0.7960)
2.4880***
(0.8340)
0.1190
(0.5650)
3.7660
-2.8440
Popden 0.0003**
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0001)
-3.66e-05
(9.59e-05)
-0.0014***
(0.0004)
0.0020***
(0.0002)
0.0019***
(0.0003)
0.0020***
(0.0005)
-0.0018
(0.0038)
0.0002
(0.0009)
-0.0002
(0.0009)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0004
(0.0032)
Kokudaka -0.0009***
(0.0003)
-0.00121***
(0.0003)
-0.0003***
(8.97e-05)
5.62e-05
(0.0005)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
7.80e-05
(0.0002)
0.00613***
(0.0014)
0.0052***
(0.0016)
0.0014***
(0.0005)
Distance -0.0008***
(8.37e-05)
-0.0008***
(0.0001)
-0.0002*
(8.31e-05)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0005**
(0.0002)
-0.0002*
(0.0001)
0.00322***
(0.0006)
0.0024***
(0.0009)
0.0011***
(0.0004)
Gakko 0.0682***
(0.0192)
0.0531***
(0.0203)
0.0074
(0.0105)
0.0902**
(0.0386)
0.1020**
(0.0447)
0.0913***
(0.0295)
0.1430
(0.1290)
0.0923
(0.1440)
-0.0057
(0.0886)
Landlocked -0.0283
(0.0354)
-0.0502
(0.0373)
-0.0148
(0.0239)
0.0377
(0.0713)
0.0088
(0.0862)
0.0387
(0.0644)
-0.1660
(0.2340)
-0.6350**
(0.2880)
-0.0380
(0.1750)
Trend -0.0100
(0.0065)
-0.0118*
(0.0064)
-0.00115
(0.00271)
0.0052
(0.0134)
0.0093
(0.0136)
0.0024
(0.0185)
0.1050*
(0.0637)
-0.1240*
(0.0707)
-0.1380*
(0.0709)
-0.0758
(0.0664)
-0.1660*
(0.0995)
Conflict -0.0072
(0.0320)
-0.0074
(0.0312)
-0.00186
(0.0125)
0.1920***
(0.0662)
0.1920***
(0.0662)
0.1910***
(0.0703)
1.4640***
(0.2590)
1.4710***
(0.2550)
1.1110***
(0.1400)
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Table 2 continued
Dep. variable: RelativeTax Dep. variable: Startup Dep. variable: Lendingrate
OLS Regional
controls
Lagged
values
Arellano
Bond
OLS Regional
controls
Lagged
values
Arellano
Bond
OLS Regional
controls
Lagged
values
Arellano
Bond
Constant -0.6970***
(0.1110)
1.743***
(0.137)
0.437***
(0.134)
0.6270**
(0.2720)
0.5740**
(0.2900)
0.6760
(0.4180)
11.230***
(1.3960)
11.860***
(1.4460)
4.3770***
(1.4300)
Observations 723 723 646 557 801 801 767 687 553 553 516 445
R-squared 0.350 0.386 0.728 0.284 0.291 0.752 0.477 0.500 0.755
* Indicates significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 5 %, *** indicates significance at 1 % level
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successfully introduced or powerless when traditional elite networks are replaced by
a new clique with other identifying links.
4 Robustness and extensions
As a matter of fact, policy lessons as those outlined above cannot draw only unless
the Japanese case stands up to a close assessment of the estimation results’ validity.
Readers might be especially concerned with two points. For one, at least during the
early Meiji years, rapid economic development and industrialization revolved
mainly around the country’s traditional metropolitan areas Tokyo, Kyoto and
Osaka. At the same time, the three cities had been political, cultural and
administrative centers from shoˆgunate times onwards—a role they continued to play
after the restoration. As a result, the administrative apparatus of the urban
prefectures was regularly charged with over-regional tasks, implying an increased
demand for specialist staff. Moreover, given the cities’ strategic importance, the
central government had strong reasons to staff administrative positions only with
such individuals whose loyalty was beyond doubt. This implies that Tokyo, Kyoto
and Osaka were not only the nuclei of the country’s industrialization, but also the
prefectures where permeability for non-native officeholders was arguably highest.
Consequently, the prior results concerning the favorable impact of strategic
replacement policies might be largely driven by the three cities’ influence and not
pertain to other prefectures. To address this concern, I re-estimated the model and
excluded the metropolitan prefectures. The corresponding results are provided in
Table 3. They show that for none of the three development indicators, the restriction
of the sample leads to a change in the direction of the predicted relationships as far
as the estimates remain significant. That this observation does not apply to the
variable Startup is probably due to the fact that business activity clustered in the
urban prefectures until well into the observation period with other regions becoming
economic centers only at later points in time. As a result, variation in Startup
becomes substantial only at a time when administrative structures had already been
the subject of modernizing reforms for several years—i.e., when the influence of
Native had started declining. As they arguably stem from ex-ante structural
conditions, it seems therefore permissible to consider the insignificant results in the
regression on Startup a minor drawback which does not fundamentally change the
impression given in the previous sections.
The second potential problem relates to the possible endogeneity of population
growth and administrative appointments. Concerning the former, readers might
suspect that successful economic performance boosted population growth in the
early reforming prefectures and thereby increased the ratio of native to non-native
officials. Yet, given the statistical evidence, this was not the case as the correlation
between population growth and the variable ‘‘Native’’ is small and negative (the
correlation coefficient being merely -7.99 %). Counterintuitive at first, this result is
less surprising once the timing of events is considered: Even if fast administrative
rationalization fostered growth and even if economic success translated directly into
higher fertility, this nexus would not be reflected in the ratio of native to non-native
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Table 3 Estimation after sample reduction
Dep. variable: RelativeTax Dep. variable: Startup
OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond
Native -0.2320***
(0.0754)
-0.1620*
(0.0800)
-0.0877**
(0.0412)
-0.0066
(0.0627)
-0.0064
(0.1160)
-0.0006
(0.1250)
0.0146
(0.1420)
0.0175
(0.4740)
RatioNative 0.0324
(0.0276)
0.0463*
(0.0268)
-7.11e-06
(0.0175)
-0.0292
(0.0196)
-0.0305
(0.0417)
-0.0168
(0.0415)
-0.0479
(0.0481)
-0.0980
(0.0951)
Relativetax_Lagged 0.8620***
(0.0516)
-0.2980***
(0.0566)
0.2020**
(0.0917)
-0.0577
(0. 0726)
AgriShare -0.5260***
(0.1390)
-0.2580***
(0.1640)
-0.1700
(0.1010)
0.5710
(0.4190)
0.1740
(0.2120)
0.6270**
(0.2580)
0.1330
(0.2540)
2.6520***
(0.8910)
Popden 0.0006***
(0.0002)
0.0006***
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0012***
(0.0005)
0.0006**
(0.0003)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0005*
(0.0003)
0.0009
(0.0022)
Kokudaka -0.0009***
(0.0002)
-0.0011***
(0.0002)
-0.0001***
(7.93e-05)
-0.0004
(0.0003)
-0.0005
(0.0004)
-0.0003***
(0.0001)
Distance -0.0007***
(7.76e-05)
-0.0007***
(0.0001)
7.895 - 05
(7.77e-05)
-0.0004***
(0.0001)
-0.0003*
(0.0001)
-0.0003*
(0.0001)
Gakko 0.0741***
(0.0178)
0.0724***
(0.0196)
0.0049
(0.0098)
0.0503*
(0.0270)
0.0866***
(0.0302)
0.0414*
(0.0249)
Landlocked -0.0186
(0.0334)
-0.0763*
(0.0401)
-0.0005
(0.0211)
0.0737
(0.0506)
-0.1690***
(0.0620)
0.0577
(0.0464)
Trend 0.0027
(0.0019)
0.0039**
(0.0019)
-0.0010
(0.0008)
0.0195
(0.0101)
0.0036
(0.0029)
0.0060**
(0.0030)
-0.0025
(0.0028)
0.0195**
(0.0120)
Conflict -0.0317
(0.0300)
-0.0341
(0.0290)
-0.0130
(0.0098)
0.1810***
(0.0466)
0.1770***
(0.0460)
0.1570***
(0.0547)
Constant -1.4920***
(0.1280)
1.2440***
(0.1510)
0.3300***
(0.0978)
-0.0980
(0.1950)
-0.4240*
(0.2380)
-0.0570
(0.2720)
Observations 667 667 596 494 740 740 709 634
R-squared 0.220 0.281 0.726 – 0.057 0.091 0.085 –
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Table 3 continued
Dep. variable and coefficients OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond
Lendingrate
Native 0.0094
(0.6310)
0.3730
(0.6610)
-0.3640
(0.4080)
0.2370
(0.5550)
RatioNative 0.2520
(0.2210)
0.3580
(0.2210)
0.0451
(0.1320)
0.0273
(0.2630)
Lendingrate_Lagged 0.7200***
(0.0364)
0.3700***
(0.0477)
AgriShare 3.4350***
(1.410)
2.3660
(1.4220)
-0.0591
(0.7800)
0.6760
(2.7670)
Popden -0.0008
(0.0014)
-0.0010
(0.0015)
-0.0006
(0.0009)
-0.0189
(0.0090)
Kokudaka 0.0061***
(0.0014)
0.0052***
(0.0017)
0.0014**
(0.0006)
Distance 0.0031***
(0.0007)
0.0024**
(0.0010)
0.0010**
(0.0004)
Gakko 0.1370
(0.1360)
0.1210
(0.1510)
-0.0230
(0.0915)
Landlocked -0.2640
(0.2580)
-0.6600**
(0.3230)
-0.0085
(0.1870)
Trend -0.3710***
(0.0225)
-0.3760***
(0.0225)
-0.1140***
(0.0205)
-0.2430***
(0.0379)
Conflict 1.5320***
(0.2740)
1.5260***
(0.2700)
1.050***
(0.1450)
Constant 14.490***
(1.0770)
15.760***
(1.3550)
4.9930***
(0.8930)
Observations 515 515 481 415
R-squared 0.448 0.470 0.752 –
* Indicates significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 5 %, *** indicates significance at 1 % level
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officials until the turn of the century when the first post-restoration cohorts reached
the age to assume administrative positions. Since the observation period ends in
1895, endogenous fertility is therefore unlikely to seriously bias the previous
estimates. To the extent this effect might become detectable in the last observation
years, it would moreover distort the coefficients downwards. In other words: if high
economic performance drove population growth and increased the number of
suitable native applicants, ‘‘Native’’ would assume higher values in faster
developing regions. Yet, this works in the opposite direction as the observed
inverse relationship between ‘‘Native’’ and the development indicators. Similar
considerations apply to the case where non-native administrators were deliberately
appointed to ‘‘trouble provinces.’’ In that case, high fractions of non-native staff
coincide with weak economic performance and the endogeneity bias works against
the positive effect of strategic replacement. The estimates obtained so far would
then constitute a lower bound for the true impact of Native and RNH, and the
direction of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables
would remain unbiased. Things are more involved if booming regions were subject
of within-country immigration or if they systematically attracted non-native staff.
This scenario is conceivable if the central government used appointment to
developed, wealthy regions as a means to reward outstanding personnel, if the
administration of more advanced prefectures called for more specialist (non-native)
staff or again, if prospective officeholders actively sought appointment in the highly
developed prefectures. Given the historical record, the last two scenarios probably
occurred because at the time, civil servants typically retired early and continued
their careers as entrepreneurs or high-ranking managers in private companies.32
In order to avoid bias from these sources, I employed an instrumental variables
approach and instrumented the variable Native. To follow this strategy, it was
necessary to find an instrument which was correlated with Native and otherwise
exogenous to the development indicators. The instrument used in the present
estimation is the variable Governorjt. Governor is a binary variable which takes the
value of 1 if a new governor was appointed to prefecture j in year t and 0 otherwise.
That the requirements for a valid instrument are met is apparent if the following
historical details are taken into consideration: Governors were typically appointed
according to fixed office terms or—in case of extraordinary circumstances like the
Satsuma Rebellion—on special order of the central government. In any case, the
staffing decision was taken in Tokyo with no indication of local economic
characteristics having had any systematic influence on the timing or the choice of
native and non-native governors. These appointment cycles warrant attention
because new governors were regularly followed by a number of other new
(predominantly non-native) appointees at the lower levels of the administrative
hierarchy. Hence, years with a change at die prefecture’s leadership offer a source of
variation in the ratio of native to non-native officials that is independent of current
economic performance. Repeating the analysis using Governor as an instrument
leads to the estimation results depicted in Table 4.
32 This phenomenon was widespread enough to enter contemporary Japanese under a special expression:
‘‘amakudari’’—literally translated ‘‘descending from the heavens’’.
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Table 4 Instrumental variables estimation
Dep. variable: RelativeTax Dep. variable: Startup Dep. variable: Lendingrate
OLS Lagged values OLS Lagged values OLS Lagged values
Native -0.2580***
(0.0821)
-0.0976*
(0.0567)
Native -0.2460*
(0.1270)
-0.2520*
(0.1280)
Native -0.0362
(0.6000)
0.4040
(0.4030)
RatioNative 0.0082
(0.0270)
-0.0006
(0.0182)
RatioNative 0.0240
(0.0546)
0.0194
(0.0569)
RatioNative 0.1680**
(0.1850)
0.0062
(0.1260)
Relativetax_Lagged 0.7900***
(0.0263)
Startup_Lagged 0.0003
(0.0390)
Lendingrate_Lagged 0.7140***
(0.0277)
AgriShare -0.6910***
(0.1110)
-0.1650***
(0.0772)
AgriShare -0.9690***
(0.2380)
-0.9740***
(0.2390)
AgriShare 2.3090***
(0.8030)
0.0143
(0.5580)
Popden 0.0002*
(0.0001)
-3.28e-05
(8.23e-05)
Popden 0.0019***
(0.0003)
0.0020***
(0.0003)
Popden 0.0002
(0.0009)
-0.0005
(0.0006)
Kokudaka -0.0010***
(0.0003)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
Kokudaka 4.55e-05
(0.0005)
5.58e-05
(0.0005)
Kokudaka 0.0064***
(0.0014)
0.0014
(0.0009)
Distance -0.0008***
(8.33e-05)
-0.0002***
(6.02e-05)
Distance -0.0003
(0.0002)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
Distance 0.0032***
(0.0006)
0.0010**
(0.0004)
Gakko 0.0696***
(0.0192)
0.0073
(0.0132)
Gakko 0.939**
(0.0386)
0.0945**
(0.0404)
Gakko 0.1520
(0.1300)
-0.0165
(0.0871)
Landlocked -0.0313
(0.0355)
-0.0143
(0.0242)
Landlocked 0.0364
(0.0713)
0.0367
(0.0745)
Landlocked -0.1320
(0.2350)
-0.0144
(0.1580)
Trend -0.0012
(0.0019)
-0.0003
(0.0014)
Trend 0.0008
(0.0040)
-0.0001
(0.0044)
Trend -0.3760***
(0.0209)
-0.1170***
(0.0181)
Conflict -0.0023
(0.0321)
-0.0027
(0.0211)
Conflict 0.2020***
(0.00662)
0.2020***
(0.0675)
Conflict 1.5320***
(0.2590)
1.1430***
(0.1720)
Constant 1.7710***
(0.1110)
0.4290***
(0.0930)
Constant 0.6820**
(0.2330)
0.7060***
(0.2500)
Constant 15.300***
(0.8780)
5.0770***
(0.7310)
Observations 722 645 Observations 800 767 Observations 553 516
R-squared 0.345 0.728 R-squared 0.283 0.290 R-squared 0.462 0.755
* Indicates significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 5 %, *** indicates significance at 1 % level
2
3
0
K
.
M
u
eh
lh
o
ff
1
23
As in the case of the sample reduction, none of the effects changes signs and most
estimates which had been statistically significant in the non-IV specification remain
so if Native is instrumented for. Overall, it thus seems save to conclude that the
prior results stand up both to changes in panel composition and to cases where
endogeneity is controlled for.33
Keeping this encouraging conclusion in mind, there are still two additional ways
to corroborate the robustness of the proceeding sections and to assess the
developmental significance of the observed effects. The first builds on the notion
that if personnel restructuring was beneficial, prefectures where strategic recruit-
ment policies were implemented earlier should have exploited their institutional
head start to outperform late-coming regions. Following this argument, I introduced
the variable mintimejt. Mintimejt takes advantage of the fact that the temporal
evolution of Native almost universally conformed to a degenerated U-shaped
pattern. In particular, high ratios of native staff were followed by a decrease until
regional dominance attained some minimum. Then, the process usually reversed
with Native increasing again but typically not reaching its initial level. Mintimejt is
therefore constructed as a count variable which renders the number of years until—
or from—the point in time when Native reached its first local minimum. Thus,
mintime takes the value of 0 in the minimum year and is increasingly negative for
points in time before and increasingly positive for points in time after the minimum
has been attained. Accordingly, if the previous results were to be confirmed, the
estimated coefficients on mintime ought to take positive values in the regressions on
Startup and RelativeTax and negative ones in the case of Lendingrate. This pattern
would point to the fact that low realizations of the development indicators occurred
before traditional networks had lost their influence and administrative rationaliza-
tion had set in.
33 Another piece of corroborative evidence can be derived from a direct measure of corruption. In its
account of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji bureaucracies, Sect. 2 has outlined that administrative
failure and questionable if not illegal activities of local officials were particularly frequent in the tax
assessment of cultivated land. To reduce the tax losses from the common practice of undermeasuring the
true size of cultivated fields, the imperial government conducted two large-scale cadastral surveys in 1872
and 1899. Unfortunately, the accuracy of these surveys is unknown. It is, however, known that they were
mainly undertaken by local officials whose work was subjected to on-the-spot controls from centrally
appointed surveyors. Hence, if undermeasurement survived into the twentieth century, it most likely did
so in prefectures where traditional local influences were strong and administrative rationalization
retarded. The first reliable quantitative assessment of undermeasurement was undertaken in the course of
a comprehensive countrywide sampling survey in the 1950s (survey data are reported in Nakamura (1966)
statistical annex). The corresponding reports include an Undermeasurement Index (UI) which denotes the
ratio of the true size of a cultivated area relative to its reported size (i.e., if there is underreporting, the UI
is larger than 1). Under the admittedly strong assumption that cross-prefectural differences were
perpetuated for a long time or vanished very slowly, a high prefectural UI in the twentieth century would
suggest a lack of institutional quality in the nineteenth century. I investigated this possibility by,
respectively, correlating the two reported UIs (one for paddy and one for upland fields) with the
institutional indicator ‘‘Native.’’ The resulting correlation coefficients were both positive and amounted to
12 % for paddy and 29 % for upland fields. With all necessary precaution regarding the long time span
between the observed institutional data and the undermeasurement indices, the estimates obtained in
section 3 are therefore also supported by direct indicators of corruption. (For corresponding data see
report in Nakamura (1966) statistical annex).
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I report the estimates of the modified regressions with mintime as explanatory
variable in Table 5. Once again, the statistical analysis confirms the expectations
and the estimates are largely significant with the postulated signs. Moreover, the
predicted effects are fairly substantial. For depending on which specification of the
model is chosen, prefectures which reached their minimum say 3 years before the
national average would be expected to exhibit a 1–2 % higher per capita income (as
captured by RelativeTax) and 3–9 % lower lendigrates.
The final implementable robustness check provides an extension to the previous
estimations by introducing an additional dependent variable. As stated before, lack
of annual prefectural GDP data necessitated the recourse to the indirect develop-
ment indicators. Yet, for single years at the end and after the observation period,
comprehensive GDP estimates at the prefectural level have been compiled by Fukao
et al. (2009, annexes). Again, the special appeal of this dataset stems from the fact
that it provides an idea of the persistence and the magnitude of the economic
damage inflicted by delayed institutional reform. Both of these aims are pursued in
Table 6. The depicted results give the estimated coefficients of 4 regressions in
which the average values of Native and RNH during the periods 1875–1879,
1880–1884, 1885–1889 and 1890–1894 were, respectively, regressed on the GDP
estimates for 1890 and 1909, the two years for which corresponding data were
available.
In terms of robustness, the estimates reconfirm what has been found before as, to
the extent they are significant, the coefficients on Native and RNH all carry the
expected signs. Moreover, the temporal evolution of the estimated coefficients
suggests the following: First, one finds that the repercussions of early reform
activity—i.e., the realizations of Native in the first periods—are detectable even in
the much later GDP estimates of 1909. The impact of rapid bureaucratic
modernization at the beginning of the Meiji era therefore seems to have retained
its economic significance until well into the twentieth century. This remarkable
persistence goes along with the observation that the explanatory power of variation
in Native and RNH declines over time. Hence, as the process of administrative
rationalization went on, as incentives changed and meritocratic principles became
dominant, the importance of strategic recruitment policies as a short-term
development strategy apparently declined. Yet, that early attempts at administrative
modernization are nevertheless likely to translate into considerable developmental
benefits becomes clear if the magnitude of the effect of reform activity on later GDP
outcomes is accounted for. In particular, the estimated coefficients of Table 6
suggest that increasing the share of native officeholders in the first period by 1 %
(i.e., increasing Native by 0.01) would have been reflected by a decrease of 0.69
Yen in the real prefectural per capita GDP of 1890 as measured in constant prices of
1934. The same pattern applies to 1909 with the corresponding estimate amounting
to 0.37 Yen. Given that the national average per capita GDP for the two years was
133 Yen in 1890 and 168 in 1909, this implies that late-reforming prefectures like
Kagoshima or Ishikawa with their shares of native officials, respectively, exceeding
the national average by roughly 40 and 18 % paid dearly for the maintained
dominance of traditional regional elite networks: In plain numbers, the econometric
estimation predicts that their failure to participate in early strategic recruitment
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Table 5 Timing of reforms and economic performance
Dep. variable: RelativeTax Dep. variable: Startup
OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond
Mintime 0.0040**
(0.0017)
-0.0045**
(0.0020)
-0.0120**
(0.0073)
0.0088
(0.0074)
-0.0050
(0.0034)
-0.0010
(0.0040)
-0.0067
(0.0243)
-0.0395
(0.0381)
Relativetax_Lagged 0.0127
(0.0090)
-0.1110
(0.0902)
0.0116
(0.0258)
-0.1800
(0.1120)
AgriShare -0.6150***
(0.1060)
-0.4840***
(0.1110)
-0.4810*
(0.2630)
0.0959
(0.4110)
-0.8750***
(0.2070)
-0.9200***
(0.2240)
-0.8610*
(0.4720)
1.6570**
(0.7120)
Popden 0.0004***
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0014
(0.0002)
-0.0011***
(0.0004)
0.0020***
(0.0002)
0.0018***
(0.0002)
0.0017***
(0.0006)
-0.0024
(0.0032)
Kokudaka -0.0009***
(0.0003)
-0.0011***
(0.0003)
-0.0015***
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0004)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
Distance -0.0008***
(7.60e-05)
-0.0008***
(0.0001)
-0.0014***
(0.0003)
-0.0003**
(0.0001)
-0.0006**
(0.0002)
-0.0004*
(0.0002)
Gakko 0.0674***
(0.0181)
0.0745***
(0.0206)
0.0783
(0.0482)
0.0856**
(0.0352)
0.1050**
(0.0411)
0.0864**
(0.0339)
Landlocked -0.0250
(0.0339)
-0.1150**
(0.0401)
-0.2280**
(0.0984)
0.0285
(0.0657)
0.0296
(0.0799)
-0.0056
(0.0787)
Trend -0.0062**
(0.0026)
-0.0056**
(0.0027)
0.0028
(0.0058)
0.0688
(0.0730)
-0.0056
(0.0049)
-0.0012
(0.0054)
-0.0042
(0.0067)
0.0034
(0.0358)
Conflict -7.01e-05
(0.0312)
-0.0036
(0.0304)
-0.0185
(0.0190)
0.2050***
(0.0624)
0.2030***
(0.0623)
0.2020***
(0.0685)
Constant 1.5950***
(0.0967)
1.5640***
(0.1070)
1.8550***
(0.2760)
0.5530***
(0.1890)
0.6640***
(0.2150)
0.6060
(0.4280)
Observations 777 777 775 601 881 881 875 797
R-squared 0.338 0.379 0.702 – 0.270 0.277 0.269 –
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Table 5 continued
Dep. variable and coefficients OLS Regional controls Lagged values Arellano Bond
Lendingrate
Mintime -0.0117
(0.0129)
0.0335
(0.0153)
-0.0112
(0. 0088)
-0.1360**
(0.0596)
Lendingrate_Lagged 0.6970***
(0.0356)
0.7140***
(0.0430)
AgriShare 2.570***
(0.7900)
2.1710***
(0.8290)
0.0774
(0.5500)
5.0070*
(2.6810)
Popden 0.0003
(0.0008)
-0.0003
(0.0009)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.0024
(0.0029)
Kokudaka 0.0065***
(0.0013)
0.0057***
(0.0015)
0.0015***
(0.0005)
Distance 0.0031***
(0.0006)
0.0025***
(0.0009)
0.0007*
(0.0004)
Gakko 0.1920
(0.1280)
0.1480
(0.1430)
-0.0019
(0.0862)
Landlocked 0.0272
(0.2370)
-0.5500*
(0.2940)
0.0054
(0.1710)
Trend -0.3400***
(0.0240)
-0.3190***
(0.0248)
-0.1020***
(0.0221)
0.0445
(0.0608)
Conflict 1.4140***
(0.2630)
1.4260***
(0.2570)
1.0780***
(0.1360)
Constant 14.810***
(0.7790)
15.590***
(0.8450)
4.9090***
(0.7880)
Observations 515 515 481 415
R-squared 0.448 0.470 0.752 –
* Indicates significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 5 %, *** indicates significance at 1 % level
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Table 6 Persistence of reform effects
Period 1 (1875–1879) Period 2 (1880–1884) Period 3 (1885–1889) Period 4 (1890–1895)
Dep. variable: GDP 1890
Native -69.280**
(32.690)
-118.80***
(38.990)
-75.970**
(34.070)
–
RatioNative 31.540
(20.240)
-12.990
(16.410)
24.520
(14.730)
–
AgriShare -92.360*
(52.920)
-105.40**
(46.560)
-118.50**
(49.830)
–
Popden 0.1260**
(0.0500)
0.1000**
(0.0400)
0.0815*
(0.0400)
–
Kokudaka 6.5600
(12.580)
-0.7500
(8.9300)
0.3900
(0.2600)
–
Distance -0.0400
(0.0300)
-0.0400
(0.0300)
-0.0200
(0.0300)
–
Gakko 12.170
(7.8800)
15.530**
(7.2700)
12.760*
(7.1000)
–
Landlocked 3.7900
(13.650)
10.870
(13.260)
4.8300
(13.440)
–
Constant 182.60***
(53.860)
246.90***
(46.650)
214.80
(43.170)
–
Observations 40 43 43
R-squared 0.683 0.701 0.708
Dep. variable: GDP 1909
Native -36.830**
(15.170)
-52.800**
(19.410)
-15.980
(17.190)
-14.110
(17.250)
RatioNative 16.000*
(9.4000)
-2.8150
(8.1700)
11.320
(7.4300)
6.7950
(7.7600)
AgriShare -48.800*
(24.570)
-48.120**
(23.170)
-59.140**
(25.150)
-52.020*
(26.260)
Popden 0.0831**
(0.0200)
0.0777***
(0.0200)
0.0701***
(0.0200)
0.0723***
(0.0200)
Kokudaka -3.2620
(5.8400)
-4.0670
(4.4500)
0.1600
(0.1300)
8.96e-05
(0.0300)
Distance -0.0312*
(0.0200)
-0.0370**
(0.0200)
-0.0332**
(0.0200)
-0.0402**
(0.0200)
Gakko 4.4430
(3.6750)
7.0460*
(3.6200)
4.4590*
(3.5820)
4.7810
(3.6760)
Landlocked 3.6200
(6.3360)
3.6200
(6.6000)
2.7800
(6.7800)
3.1400
(7.0460)
Constant 120.90***
(33.6191)
136.60***
(40.510)
116.40***
(19.440)
113.30***
(10.540)
Observations 40 43 44 44
R-squared 0.789 0.761 0.752 0.737
* Indicates significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 5 %, *** indicates significance at 1 % level
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policies caused prefectural per capita GDP to lack behind the national average by
approximately 21 and 10 % (1890) and 9 and 4 % (1909).
Put together, the two facts provide clear-cut implications both about the workings
of the institutional reforms that facilitated Japan’s staggering development record
during the Meiji era and about possible modernization policies in today’s
developing countries. In fact, what they suggest is first that early efforts at
eradicating bureaucratic sleaze have a sizeable and persistent impact on future
economic performance. And second, strategic recruitment and personnel replace-
ment at all levels of the administrative hierarchy provide a powerful—and relatively
inexpensive—strategy to reach this aim.
5 Conclusion
As Japan embarked on its rapid modernization course after the Meiji Restoration, it
underwent a process of profound administrative rationalization. The essence of this
evolution has arguably been grasped most cunningly by nineteenth-century novelist
Soseki Natsume who somewhat exasperatedly stated:
We eat for the Nation, wash our faces for the Nation and even go to toilet for
the Nation. (Soseki 1914: 313)
Put less sarcastically, Soseki’s statement hints how traditional region- and status-
based institutions gave way to increasingly impersonal, professionalized and
centrally designed forms of governance. These structures were deliberately
implemented by the imperial government to support its Fukoku Kyohei development
strategy. As a result, Meiji officials other than their shoˆgunate predecessors faced
strongly merit-based incentives and a close internal supervision system. Yet, this
profound organizational change occurred only to the extent that the new central
government was able to impose its de iure monopoly of power vis-a`-vis traditional
local elites. In particular in the early post-restoration years, overcoming regional
dominance came largely down to replacing native officials in the prefectural
bureaucracies by centrally appointed staff from other parts of the country. Using the
ratio of native to foreign officeholders and their hierarchical distribution as
indicators of administrative rationalization, the present paper has aimed at assessing
the long-run benefits from increased institutional permeability and the suppression
of administrative sleaze. Its basic results are as follows: First, applying canonical
econometric techniques, one finds that prefectures where strategic personnel
restructuring was delayed performed significantly and consistently worse with
regard to measures of regional per capita income, business activity and financial
market development. What is more, the corresponding coefficient estimates not only
prove fairly robust against modifications of sample composition and potential
endogeneity, but are also of considerable size with, e.g., a 10 % increase in the ratio
of native officials in the 1870s translating into an estimated 6 % penalty on 1890
prefectural per capita GDP. Finally—arguably due to historical path dependency—
the impact of differences in the timing of administrative modernization exhibits a
striking persistence over time. As long as well into the first decade of the twentieth
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century, the composition of the prefectural bureaucracy—i.e., the ratio and the
distribution of native versus non-native officials—in the 1870s and 1880s,
constitutes a potent predictor of regional economic development.
From a historical perspective, these observations lend empirical backbone to the
notion that administrative rationalization acted as a major catalyst for economic
growth. Moreover, the present results provide an intriguing vantage point for
research in current development studies. Once agreed upon the fact that personnel
restructuring apparently provides a prompt and relatively inexpensive means to
initiate institutional change, understanding under which socioeconomic conditions
strategies similar to those embraced by the Meiji government facilitate public sector
modernization in today’s developing countries seems a worthwhile task. Lastly,
since the Japanese evidence points to a diminishing significance of recruitment
policies as compared with meritocratic, incentive- and surveillance-orientated
structural modifications, identifying the optimal mix and the optimal timing of these
interventions carries lessons which deserve as much attention from development
scholars and present-day policy planners as from economic historians.
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Future Lessons from Past Epidemics? 
The Economics of Smallpox Vaccination in 19th Century Germany 
 
 
Abstract: 
In the last century, medical innovations like antibiotics and antiviral therapy promised to render the 
horrors of epidemics a matter of the past. Yet, recently new infections emerge in worrying frequency, 
while diseases which had long been under control make a comeback in many countries. Given the 
enormous increase in international trade and mobility, the identification of suitable strategies to prevent 
the spread of epidemics has therefore become an urgent challenge for social and economic politics.  
The present paper argues that a country’s epidemiological environment is a key factor in 
explaining the long-term evolution and efficiency of national health policies. Its vantage point 
is a simple question: How do biological, geographical and institutional conditions determine 
health strategies? And: Do decision-makers adjust institutional structures to changing 
exogenous conditions or does historical path-dependency produce persistent inefficiencies? To 
address these questions, the paper combines epidemiological modelling with a case study of 
smallpox prevention in 19th century Germany. 
 Its central results hold first, that international disease externalities are substantial and 
increasing in the connectivity between countries and their heterogeneity in epidemiological 
conditions. Historical evidence supports these predictions as policymakers in states which were 
highly exposed to imported epidemics tended to create institutions which facilitated rapid and 
coordinated response to outbreaks. In contrast, comprehensive prevention policies were not 
imposed unless initial conditions put decision-makers under the pressure to see for a high degree 
of institutionalization. The salient feature of this result is that institutional inertia apparently 
prevented states like e.g. Prussia and Wurttemberg from reforming their decentralized or 
uncoordinated policies.  
With all due caution, history therefore suggests that the disease environment of a country has a 
lasting impact on its long-term health policies. Thus, there might be a lot to gain if the heighted 
interest in current health threats like Ebola was channeled into initiatives for multilateral health 
institutions, binding commitments to certain immunization and documentation targets and 
cooperation in the detection and containment of outbreaks. 
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Introduction: 
When the armistice of January 28th 1871 ended the Franco-Prussian war, neither of the 
belligerents anticipated that the worst was yet to come: Lurking from the battlefields and the 
barricades of the Paris Commune, an aggressive strain of smallpox dogged the steps of soldiers 
and refugees, slipped from one country to the next and finally turned into a pandemic which 
left more than 500.000 Europeans dead. Smallpox have been eradicated for good. But other 
diseases quickly replaced it and seeing that Polio is ripping through Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Syria, while Ebola keeps preying in conflict-torn Africa, and the MERS virus infests South 
Korea, there is no reason to put the epidemics of the past to the history books. This is all the 
more true as even the most careful evaluations of current policies have little to tell about the 
long-term effects of specific health policies. Hence, when it comes to conceiving efficient 
prevention programs, stepping back in history is probably worth the effort.  
The pandemic of the 1870s is particularly intriguing because the disease appeared strangely 
picky as it continued its raid throughout Europe: Originating from France it killed more than 
70.000 of Prussia’s β0 million inhabitants but only 5000 of 5 million Bavarians. It raged in 
Austria, Belgium and Holland but failed to take foothold in Sweden. And while it claimed 
roughly 1000 lives per million in England it spared Scotland where the fraction approximated 
only 500 casualties per million.(Kotar, 2013, pp. 170-191). The mixed record largely stemmed 
from the fact that vaccination against smallpox was strongly encouraged or mandatory in some 
but not all countries of 1870 Europe. Stating the obvious does – however – miss the central 
question behind the epidemic: How could it be that many states failed to pass or to enforce 
comprehensive immunization laws although vaccination was inexpensive and its protective 
capacities widely known?  
As it attempts to solve this puzzle, the present paper will go beyond the history of public 
healthcare in Europe and touch on matters which are crucial for the economical control of 
today’s epidemics. Its vantage point is a simple question: How do biological, geographical and 
institutional conditions determine what kind of epidemiological policies are adopted in different 
countries? Seeing that microorganisms care little for political borders, it will subsequently ask: 
are the decisions of national health authorities inefficient at the international level? If not, what 
are the common characteristics of strategies which produce superior results in terms of long-
term cost-efficiency and disease prevalence? And finally: Do decision-makers adjust 
institutional structures to changing exogenous conditions or does historical path-dependency 
produce temporal and inter-regional inefficiencies? 
Given this broad set of questions, it is necessary to draw on various fields of research. The first 
– theoretical – cornerstone of the paper is the methodological toolbox of mathematical 
epidemiology and optimal control theory. While these methods capture the biological 
“mechanics” of an epidemic, economic theory is needed to model the optimization problem 
faced by health planners. The paper therefore also builds on canonical dynamic optimization 
models like Solow (1956), Ramsey (1928), Dixit (1990) and Romer (2001) as well as work on 
behavioral health economics and vaccination including Brito et al. (1991), Francis (1997), 
Gersovitz (2003) and Gersovitz and Hammer (2004). Based on this analytical framework it will 
be possible to create links to a second area of theoretical literature namely the optimal provision 
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of public goods and empirical work on actual health interventions like Baldwin (2001), Sköld 
(1996) and Rigau-Pérez (1989).  
Even with these fundamentals established, some basic knowledge of the historical 
epidemiology of smallpox is needed to render the past epidemics a useful precedent for today. 
While this issue will be dealt with in the following section, the reminder of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 3 introduces the structural framework of the model. Sections 4 to 
6 discuss the corresponding historical evidence. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Historical Overview: 
The year 1798 brought about a stir in the scientific community when English country doctor 
Edward Jenner published his findings about the possibility to induce immunity against smallpox 
by inoculating patients with cowpox, a  disease similar to smallpox, but much less virulent. 
Knowledge about the new method spread rapidly from England to the continent and by the turn 
of the 19th century doctors all over Europe had started to vaccinate people with the pus from 
cowpox blisters. The tremendous impact of Jenner’s modest 75-pages essay was no surprise. 
For at the time it appeared in print, smallpox was one if not the most aggressive and devastating 
disease. In fact, its death toll was so overwhelming that 18th century scholars claimed no-one 
would make a difference between the ravages of smallpox and the plague, were it not for the 
habit to count children’s lives only once they had survived the former (Struve, 1802, p.1). 
Concerning smallpox prevalence, the picture looks even gloomier as contemporary sources 
from France and Germany estimated that approximately 80% of each cohort would catch the 
disease – a number which present-day research only slightly corrected to 66-75% (Wolff, 1998, 
p. 101).  
As a result, getting a grip on smallpox promised such considerable economic and strategic 
benefits that most European governments encouraged the use of the lancet by means of 
information campaigns and free public vaccinations. Some of them like the German states of 
Baden and Wurttemberg even passed legislation which required the universal vaccination of all 
infants. Things changed markedly when the temporal limits of the vaccination-induced 
immunity became apparent: As more and more individuals who had been inoculated with 
cowpox as children caught the disease at a later point in time, even the most ardent vaccinators 
had to abandon the view of the vaccination’s absolute protective capacity. Admitting that its 
strongest weapon was not invincible constituted a major blow for the newly forming science of 
medicine and created the breeding grounds for various schools of “alternative medicine”. The 
academic dispute exerted noticeable influence on immunization policies because it ignited 
popular skepticism and cooled political enthusiasm for vaccination.  What was more: after the 
first wave of massive vaccination, smallpox incidence had rapidly declined in many countries 
and since the risk of epidemics was low, policymakers of the revolutionary 1830s and 1840s 
were reluctant to provoke popular protest by newly introducing vaccination laws that bourgeois 
and liberal circles would largely reject as a token of despotic ancient regime policy.  
Thus, the states which were to form the German Empire in 1871 might have been almost free 
of smallpox when the war broke out. Yet, their capacity to deal with a large-scale outbreak 
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varied drastically. The South-Western states as well as most of Thuringia, Oldenburg and 
Hannover required the vaccination of all infants and often encouraged the revaccination of 
school-age children. By contrast, Prussia followed a midway path by mandating only the 
vaccination of soldiers but not the civilian population, whereas the Hanseatic cities in the North 
passed no regulations at all. The institutional patchwork of different public health provisions 
was reflected in the impact of the 1870-74 pandemic. Figure 1 shows the geographical mortality 
rates of the epidemic. It is evident that the states which saw for the comprehensive 
immunization of their civilian populations fared far better than those which did not. This notion 
is further corroborated by the fact that the mortality difference between vaccinating states and 
laissez-faire states is statistically highly significant and stands at roughly 30%. 
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Figure 1: Smallpox Mortality during 1870-74 Pandemic and Vaccination Laws in Germany 
 
Source: Imperial Health Department (ed.) Mitteilungen aus dem Reichsgesundheitsamt, 
various issues, 1881-1884 
While different vaccination policies explain the bulk of regional variation in disease incidence, 
they cannot answer the question why the German states embarked on such different policy 
trajectories in the first place. In order to understand what initially determined the decisions of 
Germany’s health planners, the next section will introduce a standard epidemiological model 
which will frame the choice problem of the historical policymakers in the subsequent analysis. 
This framework is necessary, because it will help us to determine how different conditions 
affected a country’s expected epidemic costs and how these costs created incentives for 
policymakers to adapt the institutional structure in a particular way. 
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3. Modeling Epidemics: The SIR Model: 
To analyze, how geographical, socio-economic and biological factors affected disease costs and 
optimal countermeasures, we replicate the decision problem of the German health authorities 
in the following stylized world: Epidemiological policies are determined by a single benevolent 
decision-maker who seeks to minimize the damage from infectious diseases. By assumption, 
the costs of an epidemic are proportional to the total number of infections, i.e. �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖ =���௢��௟.  
The policymaker influences the spread of the disease by means of a single health input ℎ which 
reduces the population’s susceptibility and therefore the final rate of morbidity and mortality. 
In order to concentrate on the optimal provision of prophylaxis, the effect of ℎ is assumed purely 
preventive and treatment – even if providing some relief to the sick – has no significant impact 
on the epidemic process.  
We account for possible interaction at the international level by assuming that the spread of an 
epidemic in country i does not only depend on its own health investment ℎ௜but also on the 
prevention effort of adjacent countries, ℎ௝ . The problem of the national decision-maker is then 
to minimize the sum of health expenditures and expected disease costs for given levels of 
foreign prevention. In formal terms this objective can be stated as follows: mγnℎ೔  ℭ =  ሺ�௜ ∙ �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜ ሺℎ௜, ℎ௝ሻ + ܿℎ௜ ℎ௜ሻ 
The parameter �௜ thereby denotes the natural prevalence rate of a disease in country i as a 
function of environmental characteristics like climate or the presence of animal hosts required 
by certain pathogens. Country i is epidemiologically more exposed, the higher �௜. The other 
terms capture the per-unit costs of prophylaxis ܿℎ௜  and the expected costs of an epidemic 
outbreak, �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜ ሺℎ௜, ℎ௝ሻ. To complete the formal set-up of objective function, we impose the 
realistic assumption that the marginal returns to prevention are decreasing in both countries 
with 
��೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ (ℎ೔,ℎೕ)�ℎ೔ < Ͳ and �2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ (ℎ೔,ℎೕ)�ℎ೔2  > Ͳ.   
Given the structure of the problem, the health authorities in country i face the tradeoff between 
the certain costs of prophylaxis ܿℎ௜ ℎ௜ and the benefit from limiting the expected size of an 
outbreak �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜ ሺℎ௜, ℎ௝ሻ. The optimal choice of prevention will therefore equate the marginal 
benefit of reduced disease incidence with the marginal costs prophylaxis. In other words: in 
order to derive the policymaker’s choice of optimal prevention effort ℎ௜, we have to specify 
explicitly how the epidemic – and with it its expected costs – react to variation in environmental 
and institutional preconditions as well as to adjustments in the intervention variable ℎ௜.  
A classical approach to model the biological “mechanics” of infectious diseases is the 
compartmental SIR model by Kermack and McKendrick (1927). The term compartmental 
stems from the fact that the total population (N) is divided in the three compartments of those 
susceptible (S), infected (I), and recovered (R) with movements between the different states 
being represented by the below set of differential equations.  ܵ̇ =  −ߚ�(ℎ௜ , ℎ௝)ܵ�  (i) 
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�̇ =  ߚ�(ℎ௜ , ℎ௝)ܵ� − ሺγ + ߜሻ�  (ii) ܴ̇ =  ሺγ + ߜሻ�  (iii) 
The interpretation of this system is straightforward:  
(i) As hitherto healthy individuals contract the disease, the fraction of susceptibles 
(S) declines and that of infectives increases by the same amount. The 
corresponding rate of infection depends on the transmission rate ߚ,  which 
captures the biological virulence of the pathogen and the (institutionally 
determined) intensity at which susceptibles interact with potential carriers of the 
disease. One can therefore think of ߚ as a measure of the epidemic’s inherent 
ability to spread whereas its sensitivity to health interventions is depicted by the 
function � ቀℎ௜ , ℎ௝௜ቁ which denotes the effect of prevention on susceptibility with ��ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ�ℎ ൑ Ͳ and ��2ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ�2ℎ ൒ Ͳ for ℎ௜ and ℎ௝ .  
(ii) Mirroring the dynamics of the susceptible class, the fraction of infected 
individuals (I) grows due to contagion and declines as infected individuals 
recover at rate γ or succumb to the disease at rate ߜ. Finally, individuals who 
have recovered from the disease are temporarily immune against reinfection. 
Just as those who have died, they cannot spread the pathogen any further and 
enter the compartment of those “removed” (R) from the epidemic process.1  
 
Attempting to employ the above set of dynamic equations to derive the optimal prevention 
level, the health planner encounters an obstacle: What she needs to plug into the objective 
function are the values of S and I as functions of time and not the temporal derivatives 
determined by the SIR-system. Unfortunately, solving this task is not trivial because the 
corresponding transcendental equations cannot be solved analytically for S and I. To arrive at 
the desired result, it is useful to distinguish between different prototypical outcomes of the 
epidemic: To understand this approach, note first that S(t) and I(t) have to be nonnegative. 
Hence, whenever either of the two reaches zero, the epidemic process terminates. Since ܵ̇ < Ͳ  
for all S and I, the spread of the disease will follow one of three possible patterns depending on 
the decision taken by the health planner: 
(i) A sizeable outbreak in which the infected population share grows as long as  ܵ > ఊ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁఉ  
(i.e. as long as there are enough susceptibles to ensure that the rate of new infections exceeds 
the recovery rate) and then decreases and ultimately approaches zero. 
(ii) The occurrence of some sporadic cases if the initial size of S is small with ܵ ሺͲሻ < ఊ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁఉ  
which leads to herd immunity and prevents the disease from affecting a sufficient number 
of victims to sustain an epidemic outbreak. And finally, 
                                                          
1
 To keep things mathematically tractable, the model abstracts from demographic effects by assuming that the 
population is stable in absence of diseases and that deaths occur only due to infection. While simplifying matters 
considerably, this assumption does not appear overly restrictive since the timeframe of the sort of epidemic 
infectious diseases considered in this paper is far shorter than that of demographic change.  
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(iii) A catastrophic epidemic which terminates only if there are no susceptibles left, i.e. as S 
converges to zero.  
The last two scenarios correspond to “corner solutions” with respect to the optimal health 
intervention h: In the second case, prevention is so comprehensive that the disease fails to 
spread within the population and the number of infections remains negligible. With ��௢��௟ ≈ Ͳ, 
total costs ℭ are equal to prevention costs ܿℎ௜ ℎ௜. This outcome is only optimal if the costs of 
permitting one single infection � ∙ ͳ/� are higher than the costs ܿℎ௜ ℎప̅ of setting prevention to 
the level ℎప̅ which ensures herd immunity, i.e.  � ቀቀℎప, ℎఫపቁ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ቁ < ఊఉ�ሺ଴ሻ .2 The equilibrium is then 
given by ܵ∞ = ܵሺͲሻ, �∞ = 0 and ℎ௜ , ℎ௝௜ =  ቀℎప, ℎఫపቁ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
Another corner solution occurs if the costs of prevention are prohibitively high, that is, if 
purchasing one unit of h is more costly than the expected damage caused by an epidemic which 
affects the entire population. In this case, the optimal prevention investment is equal to zero 
and the spread of the epidemic will remain unaffected by policy interventions.  
It is evident that none of these two scenarios applied to 19th century Germany – or to any current 
health threat for that matter. For, neither had smallpox been eradicated prior to the 1870-74 
pandemic (case ii) nor did any state refrain completely from attempting to stop the assault of 
the epidemic (case iii). This leaves us with the epidemiologically relevant cases, in which a part 
of the population will be affected while a strictly positive fraction of individuals escapes 
infection.  
Mathematically, a limited epidemic outbreak is characterized by the conditions �∞ = 0 and ��௢��௟ = S(0) - ܵ∞ with ܵ∞ > Ͳ. Using these relationships and the first two dynamic equations 
of the SIR system, it is possible to derive I as a function of S – albeit not of t directly. To do so, 
it suffices to divide the two differential equations to obtain the relationship 
  
ௗ�ௗ� = ሺఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ�−ఊሻ�−ఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ� = −ͳ + ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ� .  
Integrating this expression with regard to S yields: � =  −ܵ + ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ ∙ ln ܵ + � (iv) 
where K is a constant of integration which is determined by the initial values S(0) and I(0).3  
Moreover, since the epidemic must eventually abate, the number of infectives will decrease 
over time such that lγm�→∞ �ሺݐሻ =  �∞ = Ͳ. Plugging this into (iv) and solving for S, one finds: 
                                                          
2
 In this case, a single infection produces less than one secondary infection such that each removed individual is 
replaced by less than 1 new infection. Hence the infected compartment shrinks monotonously and the outbreak 
abates before growing to a full-blown epidemic.   
3
 Note that If the environment allows for an epidemic outbreak (i.e. if �ሺͲሻ ൒ Ͳ and  ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ > ͳ ), K will 
necessarily be larger or equal to 1. 
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ܵ∞ = ݁−�(   ഁ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ೐
−�ഁ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁംം )  
 +�ഁ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁം
 (v) 
 
where �ሺ…ሻ denotes the Lambert W function. Since S(0)
 
is exogenous, Cepidemic is given by:  
�௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖ = �
(  
   ܵሺͲሻ − ݁−�(   ഁ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ೐
−�ഁ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁംം )  
 +�ഁ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁം
)  
   
 (vi) 
With this result, the policymaker can move on to determine the optimal prevention level by 
plugging the above expression into the objective function. As she solves the optimization 
problem, the decision-maker in a country i will rely on the following first order condition: ∂ℭ∂ℎ೔ = �௜ ��೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ (ℎ೔,ℎೕ)�ℎ೔ + ܿℎ௜ = Ͳ (vii) 
This relationship is central because it depends only on ℎ௜ , ℎ௝  and exogenous parameters. It will 
therefore serve our purpose of characterizing the behavior of ℎ௜ and �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖ under varying 
environmental conditions. To do so, it suffices to consider the total derivative of (vii): dℭ = �௜  �ଶ�௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜ (ℎ௜, ℎ௝)�ℎ௜ଶ  ݀ℎ௜ + �௜ ቆ�ଶ�௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜�ℎ௜�ߚ ቇ݀ߚ + �௜ ቆ�ଶ�௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜�ℎ௜�ߛ ቇ݀ߛ+ �௜ �ଶ�௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜ (ℎ௜, ℎ௝)�ℎ௜�ℎ௝  ݀ℎ௝ = Ͳ 
The following subsection will scrutinize this expression. In doing so, our aim will be the same 
as the purpose of the hypothetical policymaker: Assessing which circumstances require 
comprehensive preventive strategies and which conditions allow for less intensive effort.   
 
3.2. Identifying Optimal Prevention Strategies and Assessing the Costs of Epidemics:  
In order to assess how prevention strategies will change when they are adapted to different 
diseases and different socio-economic environments, one has to determine the signs of the terms ௗ ℎ೔ௗఉ , ௗ ℎ೔ௗఊ  and ௗ ℎ೔ௗℎೕ . Performing this exercise first for the two health inputs we find: 
ௗ ℎ೔ௗℎೕ = − �2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ℎೕ�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ ቀℎ೔,ℎೕቁ�ℎ೔2    (viii) 
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Since returns to prevention are decreasing, the denominator of the expression is positive and 
indicates, that health planners cannot expect large additional gains from reinforced prophylaxis 
if they are already pursuing a rigorous preventive strategy. More importantly, because 
prevention activities at home and abroad are imperfect substitutes in the “production” of 
immunity, increased prophylaxis in one country reduces prevalence abroad.  
The term  
�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ℎೕ   will therefore be positive such that the total expression (viii) is strictly 
negative and the optimal level of domestic prophylaxis falls. Keeping this result in mind is 
important because it implies that countries can free-ride on the prevention effort of their 
neighbors and thereby create negative disease externalities at the international level. Proceeding 
to the partial effects of changes in two epidemiological parameters Ȗ and ȕ yields: 
ௗ ℎ೔ௗஓ = − �2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ಋ�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ ቀℎ೔,ℎೕቁ�ℎ೔2 +�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ℎೕ ∙೏ ℎೕ೏ℎ೔    (ix) 
ௗ ℎ೔ௗ ஒ = − �2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔� ಊ�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ ቀℎ೔,ℎೕቁ�ℎ೔2 +�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ℎೕ ∙೏ ℎೕ೏ℎ೔   (x) 
The denominators of the two expressions are larger than zero because at an interior optimum 
the second-order effect 
�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ℎೕ ∙ ௗ ℎೕௗℎ೔  is necessarily smaller in magnitude than the direct effect �2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔ (ℎ೔,ℎೕ)�ℎ೔2 .  Since �(ℎ௜ , ℎ௝)is homogenous and independent of Ȗ and ȕ, the fact that the 
principal branch of the Lambert W function is strictly concave, causes  
�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ఉ   to be strictly 
negative and 
�2�೐�೔೏೐�೔೎೔�ℎ೔�ఊ  to be strictly positive.  
These mathematical relationships translate into unambiguous policy directions for actual health 
planners: First, since ௗ ℎ೔ௗఉ   is strictly positive, the optimal reaction to higher epidemic spreading 
capacity ȕ is an increase in the level of prevention. The necessary increase in ℎ௜will thereby be 
larger if health planners in neighboring countries take advantage of reinforced prevention in 
country i by reducing their own efforts ℎ௝ .4  
Conversely, the impact of epidemics is mitigated if the infective spell ଵఊ  is reduced because 
infectives will transmit the disease to fewer susceptibles the shorter the infective period. Hence, 
to be optimal, preventive activities should be reinforced in case of low recovery rates ߛ, whereas 
shorter infective periods and fast recovery necessitate less intensive prophylaxis. In sum, the 
                                                          
4
 The reason for this is that ceteris paribus the total level of infections - and hence �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖  - rises as ȕ grows 
larger. In order to ensure that the optimality condition is fulfilled, �′ሺℎሻ therefore has to decline to offset the 
increase in �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖. (Note that � �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎�ஒ  is >0 because K>1). 
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damage of an uncontrolled epidemic outbreak – and hence the expected return prevention – is 
greater, the higher the so-called effective contact rate ܴ =  ఉఊ.   
This fact is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows the trajectory of the epidemic in the S/I space 
for different values of R.   
 
Figure 2: Disease trajectories for different effective contact rates R
 
The respective directions of the relationships between a population’s socio-environmental 
conditions and the optimal epidemic strategy may be intuitive. Yet, the model can be used to 
investigate a broad range of additional questions. In the interest of conciseness we will 
concentrate on two central aspects of the epidemiological process: First to assess whether health 
planners did (and arguably still do) adapt their prevention strategies to the prevailing 
environment, it is important to understand under which conditions the costs of disease outbreaks 
were highest. For, the higher the expected costs of an epidemic, the stronger the incentives to 
take political action. This aspect is particularly evident with regard to time: If a country's 
characteristics punish failure to detect and contain outbreaks severely, the health authorities 
will be more inclined to establish a reliable epidemiological infrastructure. What is more: 
Besides for their long-term impact through historical path dependency, the expected costs of 
epidemics are also important because they impose a current burden which might be unbearable 
for countries with limited financial and expertise resources. The next section will address the 
policy implications of these issues by retracing the risks and incentives of different expected 
epidemic patterns and by discussing the costs of delayed response to disease outbreaks.  
 
To begin with, the size of actual outbreaks is strictly decreasing in exposure and increasing in 
a country’s exposure and prevention costs. This is the case because – as discussed previously –
the health authorities in country i determine their epidemiological strategy by equating the 
marginal decline in the expected size of an outbreak with the certain marginal costs of 
prevention. If prevention becomes more burdensome or if the risk of a serious outbreak 
declines, policymakers will therefore be increasingly reluctant to enforce comprehensive 
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epidemic policies.5 Thus, if effective countermeasures are hard to implement or again, if the 
prevalence of the disease declines, epidemic outbreaks will be rare events. But when they do 
occur, the risk of large-scale epidemics overwhelming a country’s capacities is far higher than 
in the case of endemic or frequently recurring infections.  
The public health infrastructure might – however – not only collapse if low prevalence rates 
lull the authorities into a false sense of security. The same applies to increases in the effective 
contact rate = ఉఊ . Relying on graphical analysis, this relationship is illustrated in figure 3 which 
depicts total health costs of country i as a function of domestic prophylaxis ℎ௜∗ሺℎ௝ , ܴሻ and the 
effective contact rate R.  
Figure 3: Epidemic costs for different values of R 
 
Taking foreign epidemic policies as given, the red curve shows the optimal choice of domestic 
prevention ℎ௜∗(ℎ௝ , ܴ)if adjacent countries impose the fixed prevention level ℎ௝ .  The total costs 
faced by country i, ℭሺℎ௜, ℎ௝ , ܴሻ are then determined by the intersection of the red curve and the 
black iso-costcurves. That infectious diseases cause more harm, the faster their spread follows 
from the fact that the red reaction curve ℎ௜∗ሺℎ௝ , ܴሻ intersects higher cost-curves the larger R.  
It is important to note in this context that the cost function is eventually concave because the 
total number of infections is limited by the size of the population. In other words: No matter 
                                                          
5
 The reason is that the derivative of the maximum number of infections, �௠�� = ܵሺͲሻ − �ሺͲሻ −ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ ln(ܵሺͲሻ) − ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ+ ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁ ln ሺ ఊఉ�ቀℎ೔,ℎೕ೔ቁሻ with respect to ℎ௜  is larger in absolute terms  than the 
derivative of ܵ∞ with respect to ℎ௜. 
Increase in C 
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how fast the pathogen spreads and how devastating its impact, it cannot infect more than all 
individuals within its reach. Thus, once the epidemic runs out of potential victims, further 
increases in R have no effect on the final costs of an outbreak.  
Unspectacular at first glance, this finding has profound implications for the interpretation of 
our historical evidence and for the coordination of current prevention strategies: It implies, that 
marginal changes in an epidemic's spreading capacity are more harmful when the contact rate 
R starts to increase from low initial levels. Thus, if changes in socio-economic or environmental 
conditions (e.g. mobility, climate) remove the natural barriers of pathogen transmission, the 
countries which experience the strongest marginal changes – and hence the most urgent need 
to adapt – are not the most isolated and backward ones. Nor will it be highly developed 
industrial nations. Rather, the disease's assault will be most harmful – i.e. the elasticity of the 
cost function with respect to R will be largest – for societies whose health institutions are in 
their infancy while mobility and contact rates begin to increase. This scenario arguably captured 
the situation of Europe during its industrialization and – more importantly – it continues to 
apply to today's emerging economies.6 The important message from the epidemiological 
planning model is that - given the costs of a potential outbreak are concave - the marginal impact 
of these changes is ceteris paribus maximized when ȕ reaches the level at which the effective 
contact rate R crosses the epidemic threshold R = 1. Then, the population's initial spreading 
capacity is still low and its variation hard to notice for the authorities. But if unforeseen events 
- like the Franco-Prussian War - cause small and transient increases in ȕ, the corresponding 
change in infection numbers and hence the strain on the health sector will be considerable. What 
is more, as mobility and interregional contacts intensify, the maximum number of infections 
which occur at the height of the outbreak increases by more than the final size of the  epidemic 
as figure 4 shows.7 
 
                                                          
6Adding to that, due to climate change and population growth, initially low epidemic spreading capacities ȕ can 
grow imperceptibly in any society no matter whether developed or not. The reason is that most diseases with 
pandemic potential are zoonotic, that is, the causative pathogen spills over from animal to human hosts or requires 
an animal vector. Due to environmental change, human populations which used to be hard to infect for a certain 
pathogen might then end up facilitating its spread and produce large-scale epidemic outbreaks. Such increases in 
ȕ take currently place in temperate regions like Europe where global warming paved the way for the insect hosts 
of formerly "tropical" diseases like Dengue or Yellow fever. On the other hand, population growth typically results 
in the intensification of agriculture and in the advancement of human settlements into hitherto untouched 
ecosystems. In both cases, zoonoses like coronaviruses (SARS) and H5N1 (avian flu) – which typically originate 
from poultry farms – or HIV and fibroviruses (Ebola and Marburg fever) – which used to be diseases of wild 
primates – benefit from strongly increased spreading possibilities. See: Lindgren et. Al. Monitoring EU Emerging 
Infectious Disease Risk Due to Climate Change, in: Science, vol.336, 2012, pp. 418-419 
7
 As with changes in the conditional costs of an outbreak, this is the case because the derivative of the maximum 
number of infections �௠�� is strictly larger than the derivative of the epidemic’s final size. 
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Figure 4: Epidemic trajectories for different spreading capacities 
 
This epidemiological characteristic is a serious challenge for past and present health authorities 
alike because sudden peaks in prevalence threaten to overwhelm the capacities of the existing 
prevention infrastructure. For example, when Germany was hit by the 1870-74 pandemic, 
numerous regions ran out of vaccine and especially big cities like Berlin and Hamburg were 
forced to treat their sick in provisional isolation wards – sometimes even in tents – because 
hospital beds were lacking. And, the problematic is by no means resolved as limits in the 
production capacity and delays in the supply of vaccine occurred as recently as the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic.8          
The above sketch has shown to what considerable extent social and biological conditions boost 
the expected costs of epidemics. Since the final size of actual outbreaks depends crucially on 
the time lag between the occurrence of the first cases and the implementation of appropriate 
countermeasures, the health planners choice of prevention strategies will finally be guided by 
the potential harm of delayed response. In fact, the model has so far assumed that health 
authorities are able to detect disease cases and take appropriate countermeasures with no delay. 
In the real world, there will – however –be a time lag between an outbreak and the 
implementation of containment policies. During this “reaction period”, the disease will spread 
unimpeded from one country to the next. The number of imported infections will therefore be 
larger the more time it takes to detect and contain the outbreak. The adverse effect from higher 
numbers of initial infections will – however – vary according to a country’s environmental 
conditions. The public health response is particularly crucial the higher the population’s 
                                                          
8
 See: Abramson, John Stuart, Inside the 2009 Influenza Pandemic, New York 2012, chapter 1. Moreover, given 
that even an industrial country like Germany disposes nationwide of 5(!) ICU wards to treat Ebola victims, the 
possibility that hospital capacities might fall short of the needs in case of an outbreak does not seem too far-fetched 
I 
II
I: Increase in Total Infections 
II: Increase in Maximum Infections 
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epidemic spreading capacity ߚ and the longer the infective spell  ଵఊ.  The reason is that - if the 
system allows for an outbreak - the introduction of a newly infected individual results in more 
than one secondary infection. In this case, the initial growth rate of the infected compartment 
obeys to the condition  ௗ�ௗ� = − ఉ�ሺℎሻ�ሺ଴ሻ−ఊఉ�ሺℎሻ�ሺ଴ሻ > ͳ , which ensures that a marginal increase in the 
number of imported infections �଴ will produce more than one additional infection. In a less 
technical way, the vulnerability of populations whose characteristics facilitate epidemic spread 
(high ȕ) or extend infectious periods (low Ȗ) can be illustrated graphically. This approach is 
followed in figure 5, which plots total epidemic costs for countries with different R as a function 
of the initial number of infections. Longer reaction periods – and hence larger values of  �଴ – 
always result in higher realizations of �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖. The potential benefits from reinforced 
prevention are therefore greater the higher the probability of imported infections and the weaker 
a country’s capacity to detect and contain outbreaks.  
 
Figure 5: Total Epidemic Costs (y-Axis) as a Function of Delay in Response (Measured by the 
Number of Infected Persons I(0) at the Point in Time When Countermeasures are initiated) 
 
 
 
 
   Larger values of R  
 
 
 
 
 
  �ሺͲሻ 
 
We have just seen what determines the costs and benefits of national epidemic policies. Yet, 
in connected economies diseases spread freely across borders. Whether or not this will give 
rise to additional inefficiencies will be discussed in the following section. 
 
3.3. Deadly Negligence? Accounting for International Disease Spillovers: 
So far, the problem of the health planner has been considered in isolation. In fact, epidemic 
strategies used to be – and still are –  often determined at the national level with no consideration 
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for the effect of local health initiatives on prevalence and disease costs abroad. Since germs pay 
no attention to political borders when spreading across populations, one country’s prophylaxis 
is an unpaid factor in its neighbors’ “production” of immunity. In order to assess the size of this 
Meadean externality (Meade, 1952), consider the following modification of the first order 
condition in which health planners fully internalize the effect of their prevention activities. 
  ∂ℭ∂ℎ௜ = �௜ � �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௜�ℎ௜ + �௝ � �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖௝�ℎ௜ + ܿℎ௜ = Ͳ 
The optimality condition for the international allocation differs from the national problem by 
the term �௝ � �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎ೕ�ℎ೔ , i.e. by the beneficial impact of prevention on other countries’ expected 
disease costs.  Following the tradition of public economics, the size of the prevention externality 
in country i can be measured as the Pigouvian subsidy which would induce its policymakers to 
impose the internationally optimal health investment h*. 
 Considering �௝ � �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎ೕ�ℎ೔  constant as a national policymaker would do and integrating with 
respect to ℎ௜, we find the size of the per-unit subsidy required by country i to be equal to  ݏ = − �௝ � �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎ೕ�ℎ೔∗ .  
As a matter of fact, this will always be positive unless the populations under study are 
completely isolated   – case in which� �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎ೕ�ℎ೔ = Ͳ and prophylactic efforts in one country have 
no impact abroad. 9  
Using our previous results on the way epidemics spread, there is – however – a lot more to learn 
about the potential size of the externality under varying initial conditions. First, we observe that 
the subsidy s* is higher, the higher 
� �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎ೕ�ℎ೔ ' for given values of h. This implies that prevention 
externalities are increasing the closer the connectivity between two countries. Moreover, since 
the decentralized planners will react to high exogenous disease risk by reinforcing national 
health efforts, the relative importance of the externality for country i declines if its neighbor’s 
exposure �௝ – and hence foreign prevention effort – increases. Turning to the epidemiological 
parameters ȕ and Ȗ, it is useful to assume that the biology of the pathogen does not vary across 
regions (i.e. that Ȗ is the same in all countries). Then, limiting the duration of the infective spell 
will mitigate the marginal impact of health interventions no matter whether imposed at home 
or abroad. As a result, the partial derivatives of �௘௣௜ௗ௘௠௜௖ with respect to h are smaller for given 
prevention levels and both countries will reduce their corresponding effort. Matters are more 
involved with respect to spreading capacity ȕi which has a different impact on domestic and 
foreign prevention policies. Thus, if health efforts are substitutes, countries whose conditions 
facilitate rapid contagion suffer more from disease spillovers when they border regions where 
                                                          
9
 Remember that increased prophylaxis reduces the expected costs of an outbreak  
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epidemics hardly spread. For again, ignoring the potentially disastrous impact of imported 
infections, their neighbors will exert little effort in prevention which - given that 
� �೐�೔೏೐�೔೎ೕ�ℎ೔  is 
higher for small h - will cause the distortion to grow.10 Conversely, countries which are adjacent 
to regions with high epidemic risk will benefit from the other states' efforts at detecting and 
containing outbreaks and experience only minor prevention externalities. In sum, the adverse 
impact of national prevention activities falling short of the international optimum is larger the 
closer the connectivity between countries and the greater their disparities in epidemiological 
conditions.  
As before, the intuition of the mathematical results can be conveniently illustrated by means of 
numerical and graphical analysis. Figure 6 shows the size of the externality under varying 
environmental conditions. Panels (a) and (b) capture the effect of increased connectivity on the 
health costs of country i. The red curves correspond to all pairs of hi and hj which satisfy the 
optimality condition in country i and j if the policymakers act exclusively at the national level 
(C1) or if they account for the marginal impact of domestic prevention in adjacent countries 
(C2). Put differently, C1 and C2 denote all possible combinations of prevention strategies which 
would be chosen under international cooperation (C2) or in absence thereof (C1). The avoidable 
costs which arise from the international coordination failure can be read from the different 
intersection points between C1 and C2 and the country's iso-costcurves. As the graphs show, 
disease spill-overs create excess costs in both cases, but since the distance between C1 and C2 
is lager in (b) than in (a), the additional harm is obviously increasing in connectivity.  
This is also true if countries are more heterogenous with respect to their epidemiological 
characteristics. The corresponding effect is depicted in panels c-d. In both cases, country i’s 
own epidemic spreading capacity ȕi is fixed to some constant level. Yet, in the first case, country 
i is assumed to border a region whose epidemic risk ȕj is sufficiently high to promote 
prophylactic activities in j and – consequently – to reduce the scope for international prevention 
externalities. The scenario in the last figure (d) is different. Here, ȕj is low in comparison to ȕi. 
Country i’s efforts to cope with its permanent epidemic threat will therefore reduce the number 
of infections imported into country j to negligible levels. At the same time, the low spreading 
capacity of the population in j will discourage its policymakers from taking serious – and costly 
– health action. While this epidemiological free-riding entails only modest changes in the 
expected size of an outbreak in j, the consequences for its epidemic shield, country i, will be 
severe with larger disease spillovers and dramatically increased health costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Note that for interior equilibria, the second-stage adjustments ௗ ℎ೔ௗℎೕ  remain of second order in magnitude. 
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Figure 6: Changing Size of Externality in Response to Increased Connectivity (Panels a-b) 
and Increased Epidemiological Heterogeneity Panels (c-d) 
(a)                                                                                    (b)  
(c)                                                                                     (d)                                                         
Note: The cost differential between any two iso-cost curves is the same across all graphs. Hence, the 
externality is larger the more iso-cost curves lie between C1 and C2. 
 
C2 
C1 
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As we close the theoretical analysis and move back to the historical case of Germany, two 
points warrant closer attention. First, connectivity is not stable over time. For, as trade and labor 
mobility increase, commuters, migrant workers or refugees create epidemiological links 
between formerly unconnected regions. This is all the more important as the marginal return to 
prevention, � π�ℎ   and with it the degree to which countries are affected by epidemiological 
connectivity, decreases if health efforts are reinforced. Conversely, this implies that the impact 
of rising integration and mobility will be maximized in regions with a large number of 
heterogenuous countries and underdeveloped public health systems. In particular rapidly 
growing urban centers are then at risk of falling victim to negative disease externalities of 
dramatic dimension: As the interdependency between metropolitan areas and the periphery 
becomes closer, health policies undertaken in backward rural regions can influence the 
epidemic risk of densely populated industrial areas long before urban communities establish 
institutions which ensure appropriate preparedness and prompt reaction. Thus, low population 
density and mobility limit the immediate harm of lacking capacity or expertise and meager 
commitment of local authorities. Yet, this check will be removed once the disease is carried 
into a population which facilitates its epidemic spread. 
A second factor relates to the possibility of eradicating diseases - or at least - of preventing them 
from getting endemic. As the analysis of the SIR model has shown, these aims can be attained 
if and only if prophylaxis is at a level which ensures that the basic reproduction rate R is strictly 
smaller than 1. However, if prevention is costly and marginal returns are decreasing, the fact 
that health policies are taken by national decision-makers can easily cause the levels of 
prevention hi and hj to remain below the critical threshold of herd immunity. In consequence, 
mitigating the prevention externality by creating avenues to coordinate epidemiological 
strategies at the international level carries potentially large benefits for all countries. For, only 
if the under-provision of prophylaxis is reduced, getting rid of the epidemic threat will become 
possible. 
The previous section might contribute to our understanding of past epidemics. But even those 
who do not care for history might be left with awkward feelings: Seeing that the volume of 
international trade and the speed of mobility rise at staggering rates, not being concerned by the 
potential impact of rising epidemic spreading capacities in insufficiently protected populations 
would require a lot of carelessness – if not downright fatalism. Still, these risks would be mere 
mathematical artifacts if real policymakers found ways to avoid them. Let us therefore return 
to the case of smallpox prevention in to assess whether the historical evidence supports the 
notion of sizeable prevention externalities.       
 
4. Coordination Failure in History: Empirical Analysis of Germany’s Smallpox 
Prevention: 
If the predictions of the model applied to the German case, one would expect states which were 
highly exposed or whose socio-economic conditions facilitated the spread of epidemics to adopt 
more comprehensive prevention policies than less vulnerable countries. The following section 
tests this conjecture by addressing a simple question: Under which conditions were German 
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governments willing to introduce and enforce mandatory vaccination laws? To investigate this 
issue, let us consider a standard probit model which estimates the probability of a state requiring 
its citizens to get immunized as a function of epidemiological exposure.  
 ���௜,� = �ଵܴ�ݒ݁ݎ௜ + �ଶ��݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௜,� + �ଷܵℎ�݈݁݀௜,� + ܴ݁��݋݊�݈ �݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ  + ܶ�݉݁ �݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ + ߝ௜,�  
 
Besides the dependent variable VAC11 which takes the value of one if mandatory vaccination 
laws are in force in country i in year t and zero otherwise, the model relies on the following 
measures of exposure: 
 
- River which denotes the length of navigable rivers within the state's territory. The 
intuition behind this variable is that throughout most of the 19th century the bulk of 
interregional trade relied on rivers as the dominant means of transportation. Since trade 
was a frequent catalyst for the spread of epidemics, regions which were connected to 
the river trade network were arguably more exposed to imported epidemics than states 
which were not. 
 
- Exposure which gives the length of a state's borders in relation to its surface. High 
values of border thereby indicate increased exposure because the risk of infectives 
entering the country and widely spreading the pathogen before the epidemic can be 
detected and contained should be highest for relatively small, densely populated 
countries with long borders. As in the case of the previous variable "River", "Exposure" 
is constructed based on historical GIS data.12  
 
-Shield which captures the possibility of states freeriding on the health efforts of their 
neighbors. Shield is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if an adjacent state of 
country i has implemented mandatory vaccination laws and zero otherwise.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 The Necessary information was drawn from the final report on the 1870-74 pandemic contained in: Imperial 
Health Department (ed.) Mitteilungen aus dem Reichsgesundheitsamt, various issues, 1881-1884. These 
publications include a history of smallpox in Germany and state whether and when a state had introduced 
mandatory vaccination laws. 
12
 The corresponding source are own computations based on the HGIS database of historical geo-information data 
constructed by the university of Mainz. Available online at www.hgis-germany.de 
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The summary statistics of my sample and the results of the estimation are depicted in tables 1 
and 2: 
 
Summary Statistics:  
 
Observation Period 1800 - 1870    
Level of Observation German states 
and Prussian 
Provices 
   
 
 River Exposure Shield 
Number of States with 
Mandatory Vaccination 
Laws during 
Observation Period 
18 665.38  
(Std. Dev. = 
997.6) 
235.7  
(Std. Dev. = 
166.55) 
0.44  
(Std. Dev. = 
0.51) 
Number of Non-
Vaccinating States 
20 314.5 
 (Std. Dev = 
524.2) 
158. 67 
 (Std. Dev. = 
217.10) 
0.7 
 (Std. Dev. 
=0.47) 
 
 
Estimation Results: Probit Estimation, Dependent Variable = VAC 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Exposure 0.0033 .0012 2.51 0.01 
Shield -1.2628 .5467 -2.31 0.02 
River 0.0008 .0004 2.00 0.03 
Constant -0.3774 .4216 -0.89 0.37 
Pseudo R2 0.22    
 
The signs of all coefficients are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model: In 
particular, it seems that epidemiological exposure put some German states under pressure to 
strive for universal immunization whereas their exogenous conditions let others grow lax on 
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prevention. Corroborating this notion, the coefficient of "shield" is statistically highly 
significant and carries a negative sign. Hence, policymakers were apparently aware of other 
countries' prevention efforts and gladly seized the opportunity to rely on well protected 
neighbors instead of strictly enforcing - often unpopular - vaccination laws themselves. This 
observation is not only important because it suggests that epidemiological free-riding did take 
place in reality. Given that most states had adopted their vaccination policies in the first half of 
the century it also points to the remarkable persistence of the phenomenon. The final account 
of the 1870-74 epidemic in Germany is therefore a sobering message. For indeed, the 
Reichsimpfgesetz (“National Vaccination Law”) eliminated prevention externalities and   
robbed the smallpox virus off its potential reservoirs within German territory. But this failure 
to coordinate had existed for decades and it seems that only the catastrophe of the epidemic 
could break the ubiquitous inertia and pave the way for a serious modernization of the 
prevention infrastructure.    
 
5. Making Prevention Work: The Case of Baden and Wurttemberg  
The fact that variation in exposure and epidemiological free-riding are key factors in explaining 
international differences in immunization policies is an important insight from the German 
smallpox epidemic. Yet, the case offers more lessons to learn. For one, safe and effective 
vaccines are not available for many diseases. And even when vaccination is possible, it would 
be naïve to believe that mandatory vaccination laws alone could guarantee high immunization 
rates. Let us therefore scrutinize the experiences of the German states in more detail and address 
two additional questions: How does the success of the vaccination laws depend on the way the 
regulations are implemented? And second: Given that health institutions were tailored to 
specific environmental and socio-economic needs, does the historical case suggest there are 
exogenous conditions which facilitate the emergence of institutions which are sufficiently 
flexible to deal with all sorts of different infections? 
 
Addressing these issues requires an in-depth analysis of statistical and archival sources. 
Performing this analysis for the entire sample of all German states is not only beyond the scope 
of this paper. It is simply impossible because corresponding evidence has not survived in many 
cases. We will therefore follow a more modest approach by considering only the case of the 
two South-Western states of Baden and Wurttemberg.  
The experiences of these states lend themselves to this purpose for various reasons: First, 
regional and local archives in the present state of Baden-Württemberg feature a wide range of 
statistical and qualitative records which are exceptional both by the standards of the 19th 
century and in comparison with other German regions. Moreover, with regard to initial 
conditions the case is an almost perfect miniature version of the later German Empire. Thus, 
Baden was arguably highly exposed to contagion from abroad while Wurttemberg was in the 
position to free-ride on the prevention efforts of its neighbor. Adding to that, the two were not 
only representative of the German Empire in the 19th century. Their health authorities were 
also familiar with a number of difficulties which keep bothering their present-day peers 
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including problems to detect and contain outbreaks in a region with extensive trade and labor 
mobility. 
In order to learn, what insights Baden’s and Wurttemberg’s struggle with smallpox carry for 
present-day prevention strategies, the next section will briefly sketch the two states’ 
epidemiological environment and the historical evolution of their vaccination systems. With 
this knowledge at hand it will be possible to analyze how their different initial conditions 
determined the long-term characteristics – and the ultimate success – of their anti-epidemic 
policies.  
 
5.1. The Epidemiological Conditions of Baden and Wurttemberg:  
Vaccination had a promising start in Baden and Wurttemberg alike: In Baden for instance, the 
first cowpox vaccinations had been performed in 1803 and as soon as 1804, officially confirmed 
inoculations amounted to a respectable 14.773 with public health officials estimating a total 
number of operations of about 25.000 (Maler, 1804, p. 62). Similar success was recorded in 
Wurttemberg, where numerous doctors offered free vaccinations with some of them spending 
enormous time and effort to expand the measure to remote hamlets and tiny villages.13 
However, it became soon apparent that indifference, ignorance, poverty, free-riding or sporadic 
cases of fundamental opposition would prevent universal immunization if the measure 
remained entirely voluntary.14 Both states therefore first introduced a number of indirectly 
coercive measures like the mandatory vaccination of recruits, orphans and students in public 
schools. As with the Reichsimpfgesetz of 1874, the final trigger for the general introduction of 
compulsory vaccination came with a smallpox epidemic which hit both states in 1815 and 
created the political climate for the vaccination laws of 1815 (Baden) and 1818 (Wurttemberg).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Schwäbische Chronik, 16. 10. 1801, p. 365; M. Lächlin, Geschichte der allgemeinen Einführung der 
Kühpockenimpfung in Botnang in den Jahren 1801, 1802 und 1803, unpublished manuscript 1804, reprint  in: G. 
Cless, Impfung und Pocken in Württemberg, Stuttgart 1871, p. 105-108  
14
 In Baden the corresponding entity was termed Sanitary Commission, in Wurttemberg Collegium Archiatrale. 
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Diagram 1: Smallpox Vaccination Quotas, Prevalence and Mortality in Baden and Wurttemberg: (A) 
Vaccination Quotas: Ratio of Number of Vaccinations and Number of Births, 
 
 
 
(B) Mortality: Smallpox Deaths per 1000 Inhabitants: 
 
 
Note: For 1814-1817 and 1848-1851, Wurttemberg sources indicate only average mortality. To ensure 
comparability, the annual data from Baden have been converted to averages for these periods. 
 
The depicted data reveal that the initial impact of the mandatory vaccination laws was similar 
in Baden and Wurttemberg. In particular, vaccination rates did not respond immediately to the 
new laws but went through a transition period before adjusting on higher levels. Be it for 
institutional constraints, opposition or lack of infrastructure, mandatory vaccination had no 
sizeable epidemiological impact but with a considerable time-lag. However, in later periods 
variation in immunization rates and disease prevalence was surprisingly strong for two states 
with almost identical legal framework. Put differently, if the diverging long-term experiences 
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did not stem from the laws themselves they must have been caused by differences in the 
epidemiological or institutional environment. This fits well with the observation that the 
vaccination rates kept rising in both states as long as the disease was endemic and sufficiently 
present in collective consciousness. Yet, as the policies translated into decreasing infection rates 
and as it became apparent that the protective capacities of vaccination were temporarily limited, 
public and private incentives for prevention diminished and increased the importance of both 
the two countries’ natural conditions and of effective governance.  
We have argued, that institutional differences largely emerge from variation in environmental 
conditions. But how did the two states’ epidemiological environment differ concretely? The 
most important differences stemmed from the geography of South-Western Germany. First, 
Wurttemberg extended over a larger, often mountainous territory, while Baden was almost 
entirely made up by the valley of the Rhine and adjacent plains. As a result, extending medical 
coverage to the countryside was harder in Wurttemberg than in its western neighbor. In 
addition, Wurttemberg was in the fortunate position to be almost exclusively surrounded by 
states which promoted comprehensive immunization if they did not impose mandatory 
vaccination themselves. Baden lacked such an epidemiological “buffer zone” and faced 
neighbors whose prevention policies were at best lax by the country’s own standards. Thus, in 
Switzerland vaccination was neither mandatory nor particularly encouraged by the state. And 
in the adjacent French departments of the "Haut Rhin" and the "Bas Rhin", doctors were in 
principle required to vaccinate free of charge, but immunization rates in Alsatia nevertheless 
failed to reach the Baden level.  
Taking the time to consider the Alsatian case is worth the effort because certain deficiencies of 
the French system were well-known to the Badenese health department (the “Sanitary 
Commission”) and strongly influenced its attempts at implementing more efficient institutional 
solutions. To begin with, the Sanitary Commission observed that none of the two départements 
set incentives for vaccinators to fulfill their duties with great zeal. In the southern departement 
du "Haut Rhin"for example, medical practitioners received neither travel allowances nor a fixed 
salary or a fee for inoculations. As in most other parts of France, only very few vaccinators who 
surpassed a threshold number of operations were awarded a so-called medaille de vaccine and 
a prime which ranged from 200-300 Fr. (Darmon (1986), p. 259). Still, seeing that a doctor 
could earn about 300 F per month if he practiced only in his resident community, this was a 
meager incentive especially in rural regions where the numbers of  vaccinees were small and 
the ways to reach them long and exhausting (Darmon (1986), p. 259) 
The incentive situation looked slightly better in the northern "Departement du Bas-Rhin" where 
the government installed public health officials (Médecins Cantonaux) who received a fixed 
salary and were in charge of vaccinating and providing fundamental health care to the poor. 
However, the salaries of the Alsatian Médecins Cantonaux were grossly inferior to those of 
German public doctors like the Badenese Physicus or the Wurttemberg Amtsarzt.15 As a result, 
the Médecins Cantonaux felt understandably little inclination to practice in remote areas, let 
alone to document their vaccinations with sufficient diligence. In consequence, the French 
authorities were unable to attain high immunization rates and to contain recurrent epidemic 
                                                          
15
  A Physicus or Amtsarzt received between 350 and 500 fl per year, which was more than twice the 600 - 1000 
Fr (= approximately 140 - 234 fl15) of the Alsatian Médecins Cantonaux. 
CHAPTER 2: Future Lessons from Past Epidemics? 
 
27 
 
outbreaks. At least in the eyes of Badenese observers France was therefore a constant health 
threat and a notorious hotbet for imported smallpox infections. 
That this situation convinced the Sanitary Commission of the necessity to install institutions 
which promised almost universal immunization and immediate detection of eventual outbreaks 
was also due to the country’s economic interests: The Badenese fisc took enormous benefit 
from the tariff revenues generated by the international trade on the Rhine. Moreover, the well-
being of the local economy in the border region depended critically on the integration of the 
goods' and labor markets on both sides of the river. Countering epidemic threats by isolationist 
policies was therefore no option for Baden’s decision-makers.  
In sum, it is evident that Baden was more exposed than Wurttemberg. In contrast to the sample 
of all German states, Baden’s and Wurttemberg’s epidemiological exposure can - however - be 
quantified by a more specific measure than the length of their borders. To do so, consider the 
two states’ foreign trade: For Baden, trading activities came down to interacting with countries 
that followed an epidemiological laissez-faire approach like France or Switzerland. On the other 
hand, the vast majority of travelers and goods entered or left Wurttemberg via another 
vaccinating German state, be it Baden, Bavaria or Hessen. If at all its citizens therefore 
interacted with foreigners who were either vaccinated or had traveled across the 
epidemiological “buffer zone”. Chances were consequently high that potential carriers of the 
disease fell ill (and were quarantined!) long before they reached Wurttemberg territory. These 
different levels of exposure can be quantified from the 1840s onwards when Baden and 
Wurttemberg entered the German Customs Union (Zollverein). The Zollverein issued annual 
statistics which give the tariff revenues of all import-, export- and transit- tariffs collected by 
the single member states.16 These data provide a relatively accurate basis of comparison because 
the Zollverein had removed all domestic custom barriers such that economic exchange between 
Wurttemberg and its well protected, neighbors does not appear in the statistics.17 Based on this 
indicator, Baden’s contact with insufficiently immunized foreign countries – and therefore its 
exogenous epidemic risk – was almost consistently twice as high as the corresponding 
Wurttemberg values. This result is even more striking if the fact is taken into account, that the 
Wurttemberg territory was about twice the size of Baden and its population far more numerous.  
                                                          
16It is important to note that among all the statistics which were published by the Customs Union, only these data 
can be used to construct an indicator of a country’s interdependence with external trading partners. This is the case 
because the tariff incomes received by each member state did not reflect the actual tolls collected at its frontiers. 
Rather, customs at foreign borders were collected on joint account, and the proceeds were distributed in proportion 
to the population and resources of the members.  
17
 In addition, the Customs Union levied specific (per unit of quantity) tariffs. Revenue was therefore proportional 
to the amount of goods traded – and thereby probably also to the intensity of border traffic..Finally, the statistics 
reveal that the composition of Badenese and Wurttemberg imports and exports strongly resembled each other. 
Hence differences in the two states’ revenues did not stem from variation in tariff rates but reflected indeed 
different quantities. 
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Source: Statistik des Verkehrs und Verbrauchs im Zollverein, various years 
That these conditions determined the choices of the health bureaucracies in both states emerges 
clearly from archival sources. Thus, in 1830 the Wurttemberg health department declined an 
initiative for reinforced controls and more intensive vaccination coverage in the border regions 
by pointing to the fact that the small number of imported smallpox cases did not justify the costs 
of the intervention. On the other hand, Baden promoted revaccination in its entire periphery – 
a policy that was generally accepted and – in cases of epidemic outbreaks –  even explicitly 
demanded by the local population.18 
In fact 19th century Baden and Wurttemberg provide almost a textbook example of historical 
path-dependency and institutional inertia causing decision-makers to stick with organizational 
arrangements even if they had been tailored to conditions which had become obsolete long ago. 
This aspect was particularly evident in the area of vaccine procurement and the every-day 
implementation of the vaccination laws. Both these fields were critical for the ultimate success 
of public prevention efforts and – surprising it might seem – it was precisely for its unfavorable 
starting point that the Badenese health system ended up on a superior development path than 
the Wurttemberg one. 
High immunization rates were unfeasible in both countries unless their health authorities 
managed to enlist the support of physicians and patients. To this end, they had to make sure the 
effort costs of all individuals involved in the process did not rise to prohibitive levels. In order 
to proceed, we will therefore need to assess which factors determined the vaccination costs of 
19th century doctors and patients.  
As a matter of fact, direct monetary costs exerted no decisive influence on the immunization 
choice of citizens in Baden and Wurttemberg alike. The reason was that vaccination fees were 
simply too low to effectively deter inoculations: Prior to the mandatory vaccination act of 1818, 
getting a child inoculated would cost a Wurttemberg family 15 Kreutzers. After 1818 this price 
was reduced to 12 kr. Compared to the estimated level of 1815 food prices, this implies that the 
fee of a vaccination amounted to no more than the price of 5 pounds rye bread or 1.5 pounds 
                                                          
18
 Multiple Examples are provided in: GLA Karlsruhe, 236-1604β (Sannitary Comission), „Epidemic outbreaks 
1827-1871“ 
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pork ( Wolff(1998), p. 165). Performing the same exercise for Baden, one finds that a 
vaccination would cost between 27 and 18 Kreutzers which translates into 10 (7) pounds of 
bread or 1.2 (0.8) pounds of pork in 1806 Mannheim prices (Krauß, (1993), p. 89). Laws and 
ordinances in both states further stipulated, that vaccinations had to be offered free of charge to 
all families who received poor relief or were classified “indigent” by their municipality. Data 
from Baden reveal that depending on the region this classification applied to 10-30% of the 
population. This fraction was even higher in many rural districts where inhabitants of remote 
farms were routinely treated as “poor” which could bring the share of publicly financed 
vaccinations to more than 50 percent.19  Hence, for those individuals for whom foregoing 10 
pounds of bread constituted a serious constraint, vaccination was costless anyway. Turning to 
physicians, one finds piles of complaints and petitions which were submitted to the health 
departments of the two states. Yet, Baden’s and Wurttemberg’s vaccinators hardly criticized 
the size of their remunerations. If at all, they were bothered by the bureaucratic wrangling to 
obtain them: While wealthy individuals covered the vaccination fees themselves, those of the 
poor where paid out of communal or central state's treasuries. As a result, vaccinators received 
no public funds unless they listed all vaccinations by date, place and the vaccinee’s income 
status. Still, even if this tedious task was carefully accomplished, there was no way that 
physicians could be sure to receive salaries and travel reimbursements in due time because the 
intricate appointment schemes were a frequent source of dispute between communal and central 
entities.  
If monetary costs were no major obstacle to the functioning of the vaccination system, travelling 
expenses definitely were. What considerably trouble patients and doctors encountered when 
attempting to meet with each other is vividly depicted by the following mid-century testimony 
of a Baden country doctor:  
"Running a medical practice in the countryside presents far greater a challenge to the 
physical strength and professional abilities of the doctor than practicing in the city. 
Especially in the mountains this task calls for strong men who can bear the ailment of 
laboring day and night no matter how adverse the weather conditions.[...] There was 
rarely any night which passed without the door-bell ringing me out of bed and calling 
me to visit a patient in the town or some village; there was no way, I could have eaten 
my meals at regular hours and finally I resolved to wearing far too light clothes [for the 
cold season] because they would not impede my movement on the long horserides. In 
the end, even my horse could no longer bear the daily drudgery and I needed a second 
one [...] Two of the assistant doctors I later had in Freiburg, competent and diligent 
young men, became the victims of their profession and died after a short time in the 
mountains, one of them having practiced in the same district as I." 20 
Exhausting long-distance walks or horserides of this kind were by no means uncommon and – 
given that immunization was a matter of the active and healthy rather than the bedridden sick – 
many vaccinators spent hours on the way to some solitary hamlet just to learn at their arrival 
that the children they were supposed to vaccinate were in poor health or had been sent to help 
on the fields. Even successful visits in the countryside had little appeal for physicians because 
                                                          
19GLA Karlsruhe 236-160β6(Sanitary Commission), Classification: “Medical Treatment for Indigent Persons” 
20
 Adolf Kussmaul, Jugenderinnerungen eines alten Arztes, Reprint München 1960, p. 295 
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the fees for inoculating the few children of a sparsely populated area hardly justified the effort 
supply the service.21  
As for parents, getting their offspring immunized implied a sizeable income loss. And this was 
not only the case because – unlike their brave country doctor – the inhabitants of remote villages 
had no claim to wage subsidies for a horse. What awaited those who took the trouble of a many-
hour trip on more or less accessible field tracks had little the pain- and harmless kind of 
vaccination we know today. Rather, contemporary medical textbooks recommended to inflict 
no less than 5 crossing cuts of 3cm length and 1cm depth to both forearms of the inoculated 
person. The edges of the wounds would then be forced apart to introduce the vaccine – dried 
lymph from previous vaccinations, which was usually diluted in water, but in less lucky cases 
also in the vaccinator’s saliva.22  Finally, the vaccination-induced cow-pox infection typically 
entailed two to three weeks of painful local skin eruptions and flu-like symptoms like fever, 
nausea and headache, possibly coupled with acute conjunctivitis. At least one adult would 
therefore have to refrain from income-earning activities in order to take care of the vaccinated 
children. This represented a considerable burden especially during harvest times or in poor 
families, where all hands were needed to contribute to the household’s living. Not surprisingly 
so, many documents of patient behavior refer  explicitly to opportunity costs like the following 
testimony of a Baden peasant who justified his refusal to have his children vaccinated by 
claiming that “he could not afford having his children made sick in the middle of the harvesting 
season.”23      
Seeing the above, there is no denying, that a 19th century vaccination was no pleasant 
experience. Things could – however – take a much worse turn if vaccinators were poorly trained 
or failed to exert their duties with due care. In some cases, for instance other diseases – 
especially syphilis – were transmitted through contaminated vaccine or surgical instruments. 
Relatively rare events they were, these incidences inevitably attracted public interest and could 
prompt a veritable hysteria even if the presumed threat was unfounded.24    
Lack of doctors' commitment did not only contribute to patients’ vaccination costs by increasing 
the expected discomfort and the fear of harmful side-effects. It also bothered health authorities 
because unlike present-day vaccines, cowpox vaccinations relatively often failed to provoke a 
sufficient immune response. As a result, vaccinators needed to assess the success of the 
artificially induced infection 5-7 days after inoculation.25 In regions like the mountainous tracts 
                                                          
21GLA Karlsruhe 236-16026 (Sanitary Commission),  Report of the Physicus  of Pfullendorf, April 13th,  1819 
22
 For historical details on vaccination practices see:A.  Bousquet, Traité de la Vaccine, Paris 1833 
23Instruction of the Sanitary Commission, August 2nd , 1815 (Baden), Vaccination Instruction, June 25th  1818  
(Wurttemberg) 
24A typical example relates to a vaccinating surgeon in rural Wurttemberg: In the 1830s, he found no infant 
among his recent vaccinees whose parents would consent in having lymph taken from the pustules of their child. 
Having no vaccine stored he finally resolved to using the lymph of a child whose mother suffered from 
psychosis and periodical seizures. Fearing that the mother’s mental disorder could be transmitted through the 
vaccine, the villagers refused any inoculation and chased the surgeon from their village. One year later, when the 
health officer from the district capital came to investigate the issue and to perform the missing vaccinations, he 
was welcomed with “stones and pitchforks” See: StAL E162-I-2133, Internal Report on Vaccination to the Ministry of Inner Affairs, Stuttgart 
1831
 
25The need to supervise the success of the vaccination remained a problem of smallpox immunization programs 
until the WHO global eradication campaign of the 1970s. 
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of Wurttemberg where many physicians demonstrated little diligence in fulfilling this duty, a 
substantial number of failed vaccinations would therefore pass unnoticed. The official 
vaccination lists therefore gave a biased impression of immunization levels and rendered a 
prompt containment of disease outbreaks virtually impossible.26  
In order to minimize the number of failed vaccinations and to reduce the risk of tampered 
vaccine getting into use, those who did the operation had to be provided with sufficient amounts 
of virulent cow-pox lymph. This was no simple task because techniques to preserve and cool 
the vaccine remained on rudimentary standards throughout most of the 19th century. The lymph 
used in the process was either derived from the dried material of some previous vaccination or 
was directly transferred from the pustules of one vaccinee to the next. In the first case, chances 
were high that the lymph degenerated during storage and failed to cause the immunizing 
outbreak of cowpox. In the second case, doctors needed an unbroken "supply" of vaccinees in 
order to maintain the process of vaccine transmission.27 Due to these constraints, problems of 
vaccine procurement were particularly acute when vaccinations were performed on a private 
basis instead of comprehensive public vaccination campaigns.28 In the latter case, vaccinations 
could be scheduled such that the recently vaccinated children of one community provided the 
lymph for the vaccinations in the next. By contrast, private vaccinations relied on the swayings 
of individual demand and were not precisely plannable in advance. The ensuing uncertainty 
increased effort costs of the vaccinator because patients' refusal to provide lymph from their (or 
their children's) pustules frequently cut off doctors from any supply of new vaccine.  
 
6. The Design of the two German States’ Epidemic Coping Strategies: 
In sum, the health departments in Baden and Wurttemberg needed to conceive institutions 
which solved the following problems: First, the vaccination infrastructure had to be designed 
in a way that minimized the traveling expenses of vaccinators and vaccines, second it had to 
mitigate fears of adverse side-effects and finally it necessitated a constant supply of high quality 
vaccination lymph. Abstracting from minor details, the two states’ responses to this challenge 
differed in three aspects all of which can largely be traced back to Baden’s increased exposure 
to imported epidemics. For, what the country’s authorities had to accomplish was to establish 
                                                          
26Especially in Wurttemberg, the impression of a rather perfunctory attitude towards documentation is further 
supported by various pieces of anecdotal evidence: In one case, a physician indicated that the vaccination reports 
of his predecessor were utterly unreliable if not forged because they indicated not a single unsuccessful 
vaccination - instead of the usual 10-20% failure rate. What is more, the lists also contained passages in which 
dozens of vaccinations and follow-up visits had apparently been filled in just a few days before their official 
submission to the health department. The second example involves a doctor who was reprimanded for shirking 
his documentation duties because he not only refused to revisit vaccinees in rural areas but also delegated this 
responsibility to his untrained 18 year old son whom he moreover entitled to collect a private fee of 1 gulden per 
visit.  
27
 Timing was all the more of essence as the lymph could be collected only within a limited time-frame: If the 
pustules were opened too early, they leaked only small amounts of fluid with little infectious material. If on the 
other hand the operation took place at an advanced stadium, the lymph would already be mixed with pus and debris 
which reduced the power of the vaccine and increased the risk of transmitting other diseases when inoculating new 
vaccinees. 
28This particularity is discussed both by Cless (1875), ch1 and Franz Heim, Historisch-kritische Darstellung der 
Pockenseuchen, des gesamten Impf- und Revaccinationswesens im Königreiche Württemberg, Stuttgart 1838. 
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a system which allowed them to attain almost universal immunization and ensured immediate 
response in case of an epidemic outbreak. 
To integrate as many persons as possible in the program inoculations in Baden were performed 
annually in the course of large public vaccination campaigns in May and June and October. 
Since the introduction of compulsory vaccination in 1815, the dates for these campaigns were 
carefully set to avoid conflict with the sowing and harvesting periods of the main crops. Equal 
importance was placed on the schedule of the subsequent vaccination campaigns to maintain 
the line of vaccine transmission unbroken.29 This course of action represented a suitable 
compromise between the conflicting needs of patients and vaccinators. Due to the mass 
campaigns, physicians could conveniently tour the larger communities of their district and 
combine the assessment of old vaccinations with the procurement of new lymph from the 
recently vaccinated. On the other hand, although the inhabitants of remote farms or villages 
incurred travel expenses, this was a minor inconvenience because the regular vaccination dates 
allowed parents to plan the necessary trip in advance and to choose the closest locality for the 
operation.  
Limiting travelling costs for patients and doctors was indispensable to guarantee the vaccination 
laws high compliance rates. Yet, trusting in compliance alone was a fallacy unless the health 
department could be sure that the operations were properly done and carefully documented. 
Badenese policymakers were therefore anxious to supervise the vaccinators’ activities and to 
ensure a smooth flow of information between health practitioneers and the Sanitary 
Commission. As a second important difference to Wurttemberg, Baden therefore restricted the 
right to perform vaccinations to the district “Physicus”, a licensed doctor who was hired and 
paid by the government. Only in very large or inaccessible districts, the Physicus was allowed 
to appoint additional vaccinators, but he remained the sole responsible for the implementation 
and documentation of the vaccination program. Things were profoundly different in 
Wurttemberg which conferred the right to perform cowpox inoculations to any licensed doctor 
or surgeon. This high degree of centralization and standardization proved crucial in several 
aspects: First, since the Physicus was legally obliged to inoculate all children in his district, the 
laws ensured that inhabitants of remote areas and the city poor – in other words, the clientele 
doctors would normally not bother for – were sufficiently protected. Moreover, the Baden 
government relied not only on its network of district doctors, but was also among the first to 
see for comprehensive professional training of nurses and midwifes. As a result, even rural 
areas were relatively well equipped with academically trained medical personnel who provided 
fundamental healthcare and facilitated the detection and containment of epidemic outbreaks.30   
Finally, the fact that the art of inoculating cowpox was part of the standard curriculum for future 
doctors and midwifes, arguably reduced the risk of failed vaccinations and complications like 
the unintended transmission of other diseases. The different degrees of professionalization in 
                                                          
29The corresponding laws and ordinances can be found in: (Baden)  Philipp Carl Baur von Eiseneck, Sammlung 
sämtlicher Gesetze, Verordnungen, Instructionen, Belehrungen und Entscheidungen, welche in dem Gross-
Herzogthume Baden über Gegenstände der Gesundheitspolizey erscheinen sind, Karlsruhe 1830, (Wurttemberg): 
Albert Renscher (ed.), Vollständige, historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der württembergischen Gesetze,  
Stuttgart 1830;  
30
 In fact, archival evidence shows that it took rarely more than a day for the district health officials to report cases 
of smallpox to the Sanitary Commission and to perform revaccinations if necessary.  
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the Baden and Wurttemberg health sectors mattered little during the early stages of smallpox 
prevention. In fact, when smallpox was still endemic, patients cared little whether they received 
a vaccination from a doctor, a surgeon or even the schoolteacher or some local clergyman. 
Moreover, as initial resistance against the new method often stemmed from folk beliefs and 
mistrust against allopathic medicine, local vaccinators were in a better position to lobby for 
immunization than academic doctors from without.31 However, with rising vaccination rates 
and decreasing smallpox prevalence the balance changed. For, although surgeons and laymen 
had vaccinated with satisfying results, the quality of their services was virtually unpredictable 
for patients and the health bureaucracy alike. Wurttemberg with its small number of publicly 
employed and supervised vaccinators therefore recorded a number of unpleasant incidents 
ranging from the use of badly stored and ineffective vaccine to complete lack of follow-up 
documentation and from the accidental transmission of other infections to the issuing of forged 
vaccination certificates.32 At a time, where the microbiological foundations of vaccination were 
unknown even to medical scholars, such complications reinforced reliance on folk medicine 
and fostered all sorts of pseudo-scientific antivaccionism in bourgeois circles. Before long, the 
wide-spread uneasiness turned into a veritable political force as it found a charismatic and 
energetic leader in the person of the Stuttgart doctor Carl Georg Nittlinger. By 1874 Nittlinger 
had produced 25 voluminous tracts against vaccination and while Baden’s doctors and patients 
silently accepted immunization if they did not genuinely support it, Wurttemberg became an 
epicenter of German antivaccionism. In the infant years of smallpox prevention, the 
decentralized Wurttemberg system might have seemed a cost-effective way to ensure sufficient 
immunization coverage in a country with moderate epidemic risk. Yet, as time passed, it proved 
increasingly problematic because controlling the large and heterogeneous group of vaccinators 
was difficult. By contrast, the vaccinating doctors in Baden were tenured officials, whose salary 
and career – including the possibility to move from unpopular remote districts to the 
metropolitan areas of Mannheim, Heidelberg or Karlsruhe – depended on the degree by which 
they fulfilled the expectations of the health department. Hence their incentives to meet 
immunization targets and documentation standards were sufficiently strong to guarantee that 
Baden’s reliance on few government-appointed doctors yielded superior results than the 
fragmented solution of Wurttemberg.  
Speaking of the benefits from centralization, brings us to the third major difference between the 
two German states: the costs of procuring suitable vaccination lymph. Here too, the need to 
counter the risk of imported epidemics resulted in the Baden authorities being more inclined to 
take matters in their own hands than their Wurttemberg counterparts. In the latter, the collection 
of fresh vaccine was largely confined to private channels and individual patients’ willingness 
to provide lymph for subsequent arm-to-arm vaccinations. For the first third of the century, 
Wurttemberg had not passed any regulations on vaccine procurement but a law which exhorted 
the district doctors to collect and store fresh vaccine and awarded a prime of 1 fl to any peasant 
who reported a case of natural cowpox among his cattle.33 In contrast to these piecemeal efforts, 
Baden was fast in providing its vaccination policies with an institutional infrastructure. In 
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33Albert Renscher (ed.), Vollständige, historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der württembergischen 
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particular, the country was by far the first to establish public vaccination institutes 
(Impfinstitute). These institutions provided free vaccinations by specially appointed doctors to 
anyone who allowed the vaccinators to collect fresh lymph once the pustules had reached the 
proper stadium. Moreover, the vaccination institutes were assigned the tasks of seeing for the 
immunization of orphans and the city poor, of receiving and storing fresh strains of vaccine 
from medical institutions abroad, of collecting and preparing the lymph from occasional 
eruptions of cowpox and of promptly supplying doctors with vaccine whenever needs were 
voiced. All in all, Baden had four such institutes which were strategically located to serve the 
Northern parts of the country (Impfinstitut Mannheim), the capital and adjacent central regions 
(Impfinstitut Karlsruhe and Impfinstitut Freiburg) and the very South (Impfinstitut Meersburg). 
They operated in relatively modest premises – the Mannheim institute for instance consisting 
of no more than three rooms. That the costs of installing and maintaining the network of 
vaccination institutes remained virtually negligible for the state’s treasury, can be inferred from 
the surviving cost calculations of  the Mannheim Impfinstitut, Thus, the tables reveal that the 
costs of establishing the institute and paying the salaries of two physicians amounted to 293fl 
54kr. Assuming that this sum applied also to the three other institutes, the total costs of setting 
up the system in 1808 would have come down to 1178fl 55kr. In the subsequent years, the 
Mannheim institute received a fixed budget of 192fl, whereas the smaller ones in Freiburg, 
Karlsruhe and Meersburg had to contend with 104fl each, which gives a total of 504fl for the 
four institutes.34 Comparing these costs with other items on Baden’s health bill shows that the 
vaccination institutes accounted for less than 0.5% of total health spending.35 The numbers are 
– however – even more telling if the decentralized Wurttemberg system is taken as a basis for 
comparison: By law, Wurttemberg peasants were paid a prime of 2 fl for reporting cases of 
cowpox among their cattle. Once a case was reported, the district health official was required 
to collect lymph and to generate fresh vaccine by transmitting the animal lymph to a human 
vaccine. This process was to be repeated on at least two successive dates and if the operation 
was successful, the owner of the infected animal would be awarded an additional prime of 2 fl. 
The accruing travelling costs of the vaccinator were covered by the state at an average rate of 
3fl. 30kr per day. In sum, obtaining a single dose of fresh vaccine would thus normally come 
at a cost of 11fl. After the introduction of the prime in the late 1820s, the yearly average of 
reported cases was 30, six of which would lead to a successful transfer of animal lymph to 
human recipients. In 1861/62, when the system had already reached a mature state of 
development, an average of 35 cases was reported, but again, the number of successful 
transmissions remained at merely 12. As a result, the sole procurement of original vaccine cost 
the Wurttemberg state between 282 fl. (average 1828-31) and 339 fl. (average 1861/62), which 
is equal to 56% and 67% of the costs Baden encountered for maintaining its four vaccination 
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 For 1808 the sources list direct central government spending of 18730fl on poor relief and medical treatment for 
indigent individuals. Salaries for government-appointed health staff and costs for the maintenance of hospitals and 
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expenditure on police and health affairs”. Yet, the numbers can be reconstructed using the more detailed budget 
bills of the Baden parliament. For selected years, these are available from 1819 onwards and depict health 
spendings that increased from slightly below 100.000fl in 1819 to 139324fl in 1831/32 and finally 163500fl in 
1861/62.35  Hence, vaccination institutes accounted for less than 0.5% of total health spending as stated above. 
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institutes.36 Moreover, collecting vaccine was a loathed burden of district doctors, which 
reduced their commitment to the cause of vaccination and raised the state’s supervision costs. 
This is not only reflected in a district doctor’s sarcastic comment that he could find no point in 
“examining every single wart on the udders of the cows in the neighboring villages”.37 More 
seriously, the availability of vaccine remained a constant problem in Wurttemberg whereas in 
Baden it ceased to be a pressing concern after the establishment of the vaccination institutes. 
For, although complaints of vaccine shortage do appear in the early Baden sources, they vanish 
after 1810 and the highly detailed annual vaccination reports of the Sanitary Commission do 
not allow the matter more space than the standardized statement that the institutes successfully 
provided all district doctors with sufficient amounts of lymph.38 How smoothly the system 
worked is strikingly apparent if actual outbreaks are considered. The Baden infectious disease 
regulations stipulated that all children or – in case of severe outbreaks – even the entire 
population was to be (re)vaccinated on the spot whenever outbreaks of smallpox were reported. 
The detection of disease cases therefore led to a sudden and unpredictable increase in the 
demand for vaccine. However, the network of the vaccination institutes proved able to deal with 
such challenges as a number of successful revaccination campaigns illustrates: A particularly 
impressive example for such interventions dates back to 1826/27 when Alsatia was hit by a 
large-scale smallpox epidemic that caused more than 12000 infections and claimed at least 2464 
lives.39 As Baden and Alsatia were economically far too integrated to suspend cross-country 
trade and labor mobility, the Badenese authorities implemented a comprehensive vaccination 
campaign in the entire border region. Due to this focused prevention effort the country managed 
to keep its 1826/27 smallpox mortality at the negligible level of 7 cases. In Wurttemberg on the 
other hand, lymph procurement not only remained a serious problem – with physicians’ 
complaints of vaccine shortage numbering more than 30 for 1827 alone – but also prevented 
the fast containment of smallpox outbreaks. For, more than two decades after the 1826/27 
revaccination campaign in Baden, in 1849/50, Wurttemberg was threatened by an epidemic 
wave entered the country from Switzerland and Baden. Yet, unlike its western neighbor 20 
years before, Wurttemberg obviously failed to contain the outbreak as the sudden increase in 
the mortality rates for the years 1849-1851 as depicted in diagram 1 illustrates.  
The success of the Badenese system was also due to the fact that the vaccination institutes and 
the public doctors were parts of a larger network which began to form in the 19th century and 
supplied the population with fundamental health services and provided the government with 
information on sanitary conditions and outbreaks of notifiable diseases. Besides the Physicus, 
each district disposed of licensed midwifes who had taken a centralized examination or even 
graduated from special schools that were linked to the medical departments of the universities 
in Heidelberg and Freiburg. Those who engaged in this work were however not only acquainted 
with technical skills. Since they were elected by the women of their district they also enjoyed 
the trust and support of the local population. And it was certainly no minor detail that the 
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government urged midwifes to lobby for vaccination and required candidates at the schools in 
Heidelberg and Freiburg to study inoculation. Unlike Wurttemberg, where adherents of the anti-
vaccination movement were no rarity even in the medical profession, Baden therefore 
successfully implemented a strategy which was just recently recommended by the WHO as a 
part of the organization’s roadmap for the prevention of Ebola: Drawing on the expertise and 
enlisting the support of lay practitioners and traditional healers.40 
When it came to the detection of outbreaks, the prevention networked reached sill lower: From 
midcentury onwards, mayors and local police officers in every Baden community disposed of 
standardized forms they only needed to fill in and submit to the Sanitary Commission to report 
presumable cases of smallpox. By doing so, they triggered a routine response which set in 
simultaneously at the local and the regional level: If the district doctor confirmed the diagnosis 
of the disease, his office conferred him the right to initiate emergency vaccinations at the state’s 
expense and to impose revaccinations by police force if necessary. While vaccinations set in in 
the exposed community, the Sanitary Commission would contact the closest vaccination 
institute to ensure the continued supply of vaccine, informed the district doctors of adjacent 
communities and inquired whether they disposed of sufficient stocks of lymph to commence an 
own revaccination campaign if corresponding needs were voiced. The fascinating feature of 
this piece of evidence is the speed at which the entire process took place: Among the dozens of 
notification forms which survived in the Badenese Generallandesarchiv, most show that the 
Sanitary Commission responded on the same day or within a day’s time to a potential outbreak 
and that vaccinations and containment measures were performed immediately. This swift flow 
of communication was evidently due to the fact that competencies were clearly defined and that 
local officials – medically trained or not – were informed about the course of action to be taken 
whenever new infections with smallpox occurred. The historical findings also shed light on the 
prospect of current epidemiological policies. In particular, they suggest that seemingly simple 
early warning systems like pre-written forms, check- and contact lists might give the health 
authorities a valuable head-start in the fight against epidemics. For, if a pile of printed 
notification forms and the effort of country-doctors who toured their districts on horsebacks 
sufficed to halt epidemics like the 1826 outbreak in Alsatia, cellular phones and online-
communication might have an even larger impact if appropriately used.     
A final note in this context relates to the health institutions' ability to cope with heterogeneous 
epidemic threats. There is little doubt that the Baden system represented an appropriate response 
to smallpox. This result would - however - be more intriguing if it was not confined to a specific 
disease but applied to other infections as well. In fact, there are reasons to assume this was the 
case. To start with, contemporary sources frequently refer to the country as an example of 
succesful disease prevention. Yet, there is more: In the post-war period of 1918-1920, Germany 
was hit by the global influenza pandemic of the "Spanish Flu". At the time, neither a vaccine 
nor antiviral medication was available and all doctors could do to oppose the disease was 
isolating patients and treating the symptoms. Unfortunately, statistical evidence on mortality 
and morbidity is patchy for the first wave of the pandemic. By contrast, corresponding data 
were reported by some - although not all - federal states during the second wave of the pandemic 
1919/20. The exciting feature of this information lies with the fact that Baden again weathered 
                                                          
40
 See: WHO (ed), Ebola Response Roadmap, Published online, August 2014 
CHAPTER 2: Future Lessons from Past Epidemics? 
 
37 
 
the epidemic comparatively well although it was highly exposed and more densely populated 
than the German average. Thus, while mortality amounted to about 6 per 1000 nationwide, the 
corresponding figure for Baden stands at 4/1000. And even if anecdotal evidence is rare, it 
suggests that the district doctors played a substantial role in bringing this result about. For, it 
was typically the public doctors who pressed the administration into adopting quarantine 
measures like the temporal closure of schools. In some cases physicians' initiatives even 
succeeded in enforcing unpopular measures like the cancellation of festivals and the closure of 
cinemas and theaters.41      
 
7. Conclusion: 
In past and present alike, infectious diseases caused enormous harm both in terms of economic 
damage and human suffering. Notwithstanding the considerable costs of epidemics, prevention 
policies at the national - and in particular - at the international level are often deficient or poorly 
enforced. This is all the more intriguing as effective means of prophylaxis are well known and 
seldom expensive. The present paper has attempted to shed light on this puzzle by combining 
methods of mathematical epidemiology, theoretical economics and economic history.  
In order to derive testable theoretical predictions, it has first introduced a compartmental model 
of disease spread. Next, this framework was integrated into an economic choice model to 
capture the relationship between the expected costs of an epidemic and the optimal response 
policies. The model predicts that national prevention efforts will always fall short of the 
internationally optimal level if countries are connected and policymakers do not coordinate 
their preventive activities. The reason is that prevention in one country is an unpaid factor in 
the “production” of immunity abroad. Regarding the total costs of an outbreak, the analysis 
showed that they are increasing in the spreading capacity of the disease and in the length of the 
infective period. Turning to the prevention externality, it was found that the national allocations 
will be more distorted the closer the connectivity between countries, the greater international 
variation in epidemiological conditions, the faster the spread of the epidemic or the longer the 
infective spell. Conversely, the externality shrinks if prevention efforts have little effect on the 
international level or if countries are sufficiently exposed to ensure comprehensive national 
health policies anyways.  
In a next step, the theoretical results were tested based on the experiences of the 1870-74 
smallpox pandemic which ravaged Europe after the Franco-Prussian war. The empirical 
analysis corroborated the theoretical findings as it found that German states were more likely 
to pass and enforce mandatory vaccination laws if they were highly exposed to the risk of 
imported epidemics. On the other hand, states which proved relatively lax in their prophylactic 
policies were typically bordered - and hence protected - by countries which had introduced 
mandatory immunization regulations before. Consequently, epidemiological free-riding was no 
mere academic scenario but a real danger which was not banned until the “Reichsimpfgesetz” 
made the vaccination of all infants mandatory throughout Germany in 1874.  
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Vaccination is certainly a cornerstone of prevention. Nevertheless, successful disease control 
depends at least as much on the implementation of immunization programs and on the rapid 
detection and containment of potential outbreaks. In consequence, the paper has attempted to 
analyze first, how preventive policies evolved under different socio-economic and geographical 
conditions and second, to identify the common characteristics of successful anti-epidemic 
strategies. Given the limitations of the surviving archival evidence, it has thereby focused on 
the well-documented case of the states of Baden in Wurttemberg in the 19th century.  
The increased scrutiny provided support and several additions to the previous results. First, the 
case of Baden and Wurttemberg resembled the German situation in the sense that Baden was 
epidemiologically more exposed than its eastern neighbor. The country's policymakers reacted 
by creating institutions which allowed for a rapid and coordinated response in case of severe 
outbreaks. The common characteristics of these institutions were strict centralization, control 
of the medical personnel and a high degree of standardization at all stages of the vaccination 
system. When it came to translating these general principles into an actual prevention 
infrastructure, Baden’s health authorities relied on a set of relatively simple but apparently 
effective measures. Thus, the country was among the first establish public vaccination institutes 
which were in charge of vaccinating the poor and maintaining stocks of high-quality vaccine. 
In spite of their modest budget, these institutions allowed for economies of scale and played a 
central role in facilitating rapid response – i.e. prompt mass-vaccination campaigns  – in case 
of epidemic outbreaks. And even under less dramatic circumstances they were a key factor in 
maintaining the second pillar of the Badenese system’s success: the acceptance and the support 
of a majority of the country’s citizens. In contrast to other regions, where the use of 
contaminated or denatured vaccine had repeatedly spurred popular protest, the vaccination 
institutes allowed Baden’s citizens to be relatively sure they received safe vaccination lymph. 
That inoculations were performed at the state of contemporary medical art – and that patients’ 
pain costs were kept at acceptable levels – was also due to the fact that vaccination permissions 
were exclusively granted to public doctors. By setting minimum standards for the operation and 
obliging the public doctors to submit written reports about all vaccinations and follow-up visits 
they performed, the system reduced the risk of failed vaccinations and guaranteed that the 
reported inoculations reflected the true extent of immunization. In addition, the regular timing 
and standardized procedure of the public vaccination campaigns fostered a certain habit-
formation and reduced resistance against the policy. More importantly though, the Sanitary 
Commission successfully addressed popular opposition – or ignorance – by enlisting the 
support of midwifes, teachers and pastors, of actors that is, who disposed of intimate local 
knowledge and particular trust in their resident communities. Finally, Baden’s strive for 
detection and containment encouraged constant communication between the Sanitary 
Commission, medical practitioners, local officials and the general public. Being as much a 
source of conflict as of epidemiological information, this effort proved crucial because it 
initiated institutional learning within the public health sector. For, in the course of time, the 
health-authorities were able to draw on this knowledge and established efficient response 
mechanisms like checklists and standardized forms for doctors and local officials which 
simplified documentation and facilitated immediate and coordinated action if necessary.  
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In contrast, Wurttemberg’s geographical and socio-economic conditions failed to put the 
country’s decision-makers under the pressure to see for a similar degree of institutionalization. 
The central feature of this result lies not only with the fact that the possibility to free-ride on 
their neighbors’ prevention effort eventually turned the Wurttemberg authorities into the fools 
of their own fortune. What is more important, historical path-dependency apparently trapped 
the country in a state of institutional inertia. For although more and more contemporary experts 
– even members of Wurttemberg’s own health department –  observed that Baden benefited 
considerably from its centralized system, the Wurttemberg authorities proved incapable of 
reforming the decentralized and uncoordinated vaccination system before the 
“Reichsimpfgesetz” of 1874 forced them to do so.  
In sum, the epidemics of the past have a simple lesson to teach: Coordination pays off. Yet, 
since public health institutions inevitably reflect a complex set of biological, geographical and 
political conditions, even countries which face the same diseases may embark on totally 
different policy trajectories. Moreover, as a result of free-riding and historical path-dependency, 
institutions which facilitate cooperation at the international level are seldom created unless the 
horrors of a huge outbreak like the 1870 pandemic pave the way for concerted political action. 
With all due caution, history therefore suggests that there might be a lot to gain on a global 
scale if the heighted interest in current health threats like Ebola or pandemic influenza was 
channeled into initiatives for multilateral health institutions, binding commitments to certain 
immunization and documentation targets and constant and intensive cooperation in the 
detection and containment of outbreaks. This is particularly true as highly institutionalized 
health sectors like that of 19th century Baden seem to benefit from their coordination and 
response mechanisms when addressing both known threats like smallpox and  newly emerging 
diseases like the “Spanish Flu”. Given that rapid socio-economic development and 
environmental change raise epidemic spreading capacities world-wide, the capacity to deal with 
heterogeneous pathogens will be pivotal for future prevention success. The doctors of the 19th 
century would therefore certainly agree with their literary confrere that  
“The plague never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in 
furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; 
and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it 
would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.42”(Albert Camus, 
The Plague) 
But they would also tell us that the plagues of the future – might they disguise as Ebola, 
influenza or some hitherto unknown pathogen – can be prevented by institutions which record 
the warning signs and trigger early action no matter which city in the world the rats chose to 
infest.   
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Darwin beats Malthus: Medicalization, Evolutionary Anthropology and the 
Demographic Transition 
 
 
Abstract 
For the better part of human history, life was most fragile and death most imminent during infancy and 
early childhood. The death of a child may be hardly bearable from a humanitarian perspective. Yet, 
certain currents in economic theory attach a silver lining to high mortality by claiming that the 
Malthusian check on population raises per capita income and facilitates the accumulation of capital. The 
present paper challenges this conventional wisdom. In essence, it argues that high levels of 
environmental risk produce genetic and behavioral adaptations which induce individuals to have many 
- in terms of parental investment - cheap offspring. Conversely, stable environments recast the tradeoff 
between child quantity and quality in favor of more quality-based reproductive strategies. Incorporating 
these biological relationships into the traditional Barro-Becker model of fertility, the paper finds that 
both declining extrinsic mortality and increased effectiveness of parenting effort potentially trigger a 
demographic transition. Thus, the economic benefits of Malthusian population checks are mitigated 
because high mortality endogenously produces high fertility whereas improved survival encourages 
human capital investment and fosters long-term growth. To assess whether the theoretical predictions 
conform with historical reality, I use smallpox vaccination in 19th century Germany as a natural 
experiment. Performing an econometric analysis of 67 districts in the Granduchy of Baden provides 
evidence, that comprehensive immunization and advanced medicalization came along with reduced 
mortality, significantly lower fertility and increased parental care. In sum, it therefore seems 
that Malthusian mechanisms are at least partly offset by countervailing biological adaptations. 
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1. Introduction 
Death is old. A skeletal figure, wrapped in black, carrying a huge scythe. Be it on gravestones 
or paintings, the image is ubiquitous – and deeply flawed. For in fact, throughout centuries of 
human history, the face of death was the face of an infant: As late as the turn of the 20th century, 
3 out of 10 European children died before school age. And although progress has been made, 
WHO statistics continue to report sobering 16000 infant deaths per day worldwide.1  
The enormous amount of human suffering behind these figures is undeniable. Still, a substantial 
body of macroeconomic literature attaches a silver lining to the high mortality rates in 
underdeveloped nations. Following Malthusian arguments, research like Clark (2007) stresses 
the fact that mortality acts as a buffer to reduce population growth and raises per capita income. 
In the same vain, Young (2005), Lagerlöf (2003) and Brainerd and Siegler (2003) postulate a 
benign effect of epidemics by arguing that they foster human capital acquisition or raise wages 
by increasing the scarcity of labor. Voigtländer and Voth (2005) went as far as dubbing death 
through infectious diseases a “horseman of the riches” because high mortality led to higher 
income which – by Engel’s Law – created a positive feedback effect on the demand of 
manufactures.  
A direct implication of these results – albeit rarely spelled out expressis verbis – is a strong 
skepticism regarding the economic benefits of medical and social progress. Neo-Malthusians 
would therefore probably agree with Azarnert (2006) who claims that “a premature public 
health intervention to reduce early child mortality, although in harmony with humanitarian 
approach in the short run, generates a mechanism that works against children’s survival chances 
in the long run.” (Azarnert (2006), p. 294)  
The present paper challenges this received wisdom. Based on recent advances in evolutionary 
biology, it argues that high mortality triggers physiological and psychological adaptations 
which foil the prospects for sustained economic growth. The dimensions and potential 
implications of these behavioral responses are largely ignored by both (Neo-)Malthusian 
theories and the canonical “altruism model” proposed by Barro and Becker (1986): In the world 
of Malthus, individuals follow the irresistible “passion between the sexes” without adapting to 
their environment (Malthus (1798), ch. 2). As for the Barro/Becker model and its numerous 
extensions, they typically assume the relative costs of reproducing, rearing and educating 
offspring unaffected by changes in the environment.2 In other words, high expected mortality 
does not prevent parents from attaching closely to their children and low mortality does not 
foster increased investment in child “quality”. Offspring quantity and quality being treated as 
normal goods, these models predict that improved survival reduces the price of children which 
in turn will translate into population growth and declining living standards unless productivity 
and wages increase accordingly.  
The life sciences reach different conclusions: In the world of Darwin, fertility is not the outcome 
of uncontrolled emotions, but a function of ecological conditions. Parents who seek to 
                                                          
1
 UNICEF, WHO, World Bank UN DESA/Population Division (2014), Data Appendix   
2
 The model reaches the empirically unfounded prediction that a decline in mortality reduces the expected costs 
of surviving children which in turn raises the demand for offspring. As a result, improved survival will translate 
into population growth. 
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maximize their fitness (the combination of life expectancy, socio-economic rank and 
reproductive success) are expected to counter high mortality by “hedging their bet” and 
adopting a “high fertility-low investment” strategy. The “Malthusian gift” of positive checks 
on population growth therefore turns out a cold comfort because the evolved behavioral 
response to high mortality leads to high fertility, sluggish human capital accumulation and 
socio-economic stagnation. Conversely, improved survival, medical progress and the 
dissemination of medical knowledge carry a “Darwinian gift” of low fertility, higher investment 
in child quality and rising living standards. Hence, rather than fearing a Malthusian trap, 
biologists point to falling mortality as a necessary precondition for the fertility transition and 
the acceleration of human capital accumulation.  
To assess if Malthus was wrong where Darwin was right, the present paper ventures into various 
fields outside the focus of traditional economics including evolutionary anthropology, ecology, 
and psychology. Concentrating on the interface between economics and the life sciences, it 
contributes to different strands of research. Regarding theory, it is the first to incorporate the 
principles of evolutionary life history theory into an economic optimization model. Doing so, it 
ties up some loose ends in the economic literature on the fertility decline. In particular, it 
provides a parsimonious explanation for one of the central forces in endogenous growth models 
like Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) or Soares (2005): 
the emergence of preferences which favor a small family size and heavy investment in human 
capital. At the same time, accounting explicitly for ecological conditions sheds new light on 
empirical findings which would otherwise contradict the classical theory of the demographic 
transition. For, standard accounts of the process typically require either a mortality decline 
before the fertility decline or a strong increase in per capita income. Unfortunately, empirical 
support for these claims is mixed. In fact, most studies of completed demographic transitions 
detect a negative nexus between fertility and income but fail to establish an unambiguous timing 
of the rise of per-capita income and the onset of the fertility decline.3 Regarding the hypothesis 
of incremental habit formation, historical records include a number of cases in which the 
fertility decline paralleled or - rarely - preceded the fall in mortality.4 Just like the emergence 
of preferences for increased offspring quality, these initially puzzling observations can – 
however – be explained as evolutionary adaptations to changed environmental conditions. How 
these adaptations form in the course of natural selection and how they contribute to our 
understanding of the demographic transition will be the central questions in the following 
sections: Section 2 introduces the paper’s biological background, namely life history theory 
(LHT) and the Darwinian mechanism of r/K-selection. Section 3 analyzes how the traditional 
economic models of fertility are affected if evolutionary fitness maximization is incorporated 
in the household’s objective function. Seeing that LHT has not been merged with economic 
theory so far, section 4 discusses the empirical plausibility of the “Darwinian” fertility model 
proposed in section 3.  In order to gauge the potential size of adaptations to variation in selective 
pressure, section 5provides a historical case study of smallpox vaccination in 19th century 
Germany. The case is particularly valuable because vaccination caused a sizable decline in 
                                                          
3
 For a survey see Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1993). More recent contributions include: Tertilt (2008) and 
Shoven(2011) 
4
 For an overview see Caldwell (2006) 
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extrinsic mortality5 and improved parents’ ability to influence the survival chances of their 
children to an unprecedented extent. Having analyzed the historical impact of medical progress 
on the demographic transition, section 5 discusses potential policy implications and concludes. 
           
2. Understanding the Economics of Nature: Life History Theory 
Grasping the fundamentals of life history theory (LHT) is easiest on those days of spring, when 
nature turns into a huge and bustling bazaar: Birds twittering in the trees under your window, 
insects buzzing in the air, the neighbors’ cat displaying and caterwauling on the roof at four 
o’clock in the morning – in a sense they all sell or purchase genes in order to pass them down 
to future generations. Life history theory (LHT) seeks to understand the economic logic of this 
exchange. Based on the insight that all organisms face binding genetic and energetic 
constraints,6 LHT considers reproductive success or early death as the results of a series of 
optimization problems. Nature has solved these problems in a variety of ways: Some species 
like Atlantic Salmons produce thousands of offspring in one suicidal effort and die immediately 
afterwards. Others like rabbits compensate the risk of being a simple a prey by fast maturation 
and notorious fecundity. Finally, suburban humans invest in violin, chess and Chinese classes 
in order to make sure, their adored little cherub succeeds in life.  
The above life history strategies can all be defined as optimal combinations of so-called life 
history traits. A life history trait is a numerical indicator (e.g. size at birth, age at first 
reproduction) which corresponds to a specific tradeoff between the conflicting energetic needs 
of survival, growth and reproduction. Following the convention of evolutionary biology, both 
single life history traits and entire life history strategies, are ordered along a “slow-fast” 
continuum. For example, males may solve the tradeoff between mating and parenting effort by 
marrying one woman and have few offspring (slow) or by trying their luck at serial seductions 
(fast). Conversely, females can continue the quest for their “Mr. Right” (slow) or be happy with 
the “Mr Not So Right” they have found and begin reproduction (fast). Finally, parents may 
choose to invest in few, highly competitive offspring (slow) or to have many children who 
might – however – fail to survive or reproduce. 
Which of these strategies maximizes the fitness of an individual – or an entire species for that 
matter – is a function of ecological characteristics like food sources, predation, disease stress 
or climate. Since natural selection favors optimal adaptations to these characteristics, life 
history traits are subject to evolutionary plasticity. This implies that reproductive choice and 
nurturing behaviors – hence, the biological underpinnings of the demographic transition we are 
interested in – are predominantly shaped by the selective pressure of infant and childhood 
mortality. Biologists typically formalize the relationship between mortality and optimal fertility 
by the concepts of r- and K-selection.7 To highlight the logic behind these prototypical LHT-
strategies, consider the following stylized example: The population consists of only two 
competing dynasties who face an extrinsic mortality rate of μ which is unaffected by parental 
                                                          
5
 The term “extrinsic mortality” is used by biologists to refer to mortality risks which are beyond human control.    
6
 This precludes the emergence of Darwinian Demons, that is, of organisms which reproduce immediately after 
birth, have infinitely many offspring and live forever. 
7
 For an overview see: Rockwood (2015) 
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care. Call the first lineage the “rabbits” or the r-lineage. Rabbit parents seek to maximize their 
fitness by producing as many descendants as biologically feasible but refrain from investing in 
their quality. By contrast, the second lineage, the “kangaroos” or K-lineage, reduces fecundity, 
and provides their few children with a “womb” of intensive care and education.8 Which of the 
two dynasties will prove “fitter” in terms of passing down their genes to future generations 
depends on the environment. The dangers of highly unstable and unpredictable, r-selecting 
ecosystems are best countered by producing many (in terms of parental investment) cheap 
offspring. For even if many of them fall victim to predators, diseases, natural disaster or 
violence, there will always be some left to carry on the lineage. On the other hand, stable 
environments favor K-selective strategies because improved survival increases competition for 
resources and suitable mates. What is more, the marginal return to quality investment rises in 
the offspring’s expected life span because quality investment – be it practical skills, academic 
attainment, reputation or socially preferable characteristics – is incorporated in individual 
children and cannot be transferred if the carrier of these traits dies.9 Parents who seek to increase 
the future competitiveness of their descendants will therefore only collect the dividend of their 
investment if a sufficient number of offspring reaches adulthood and succeeds in the strive for 
mates and resources. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. The panels show the 
expected number of reproductively successful offspring under the “rabbit” and the “kangaroo” 
strategy. While � is exogenous, total fitness – quantified by the reproductive success of future 
generations – depends on parenting effort and varies across the two dynasties. Thus, as mortality 
decreases, the fitness of the r-lineage increases proportionally because the expected number of 
survivors rises linearly as � falls. By contrast, the fitness of K-strategists grows more than 
proportionally because in addition to the linear survival effect, their offspring also benefit from 
the rising competitiveness effect. As shown in figure 1, r-selective behavior provides a selective 
advantage in high mortality environments where the expected return to quality investments is 
low. Yet, as survival chances improve, this outcome is reversed such that fitness is maximized 
by parents who chose a K-selective strategy.  
 
                                                          
8
 In fact, the scholarly terms of r- and K- selection stem from r=rate and K=carrying capacity. Yet, thinking of 
rabbits and kangaroos is definitely more intuitive.    
9
 In the animal kingdom, the ramifications of this fact are most palpable in the case of large mammals: Due to 
their long gestation and lactation periods, females of these species typically produce only one offspring per 
season. Their reproductive fitness therefore depends on the ability to survive multiple periods. 
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Figure 1: r-selection and K-selection under different environmental conditions 
    
 
Before leaving biology and turning to economic theories of fertility, let us briefly summarize 
the gist of the previous section: To begin with, life history theory proposes that all living 
organisms solve economic optimization problems when allocating scarce energy resources. 
Moreover, whether fast (r-selective) or slow (K-selective) strategies are ultimately more 
successful depends on environmental characteristics, in particular on the prevailing mortality 
regime. In consequence, to be in line with evolutionary biology, an economic model of human 
reproduction must account for the fact that the relative rewards in the tradeoff between child 
quantity and quality change as mortality rises or falls.  Keeping these results in mind, let us 
assess in more detail how the inclusion of LHT fits into the received economic theory of 
fertility.  
 
3. From Biology to Economics – A Darwinian Fertility Model  
It is not difficult to integrate adaptation to environmental risk into the standard economic theory 
of fertility. Yet, this simple modification leads to remarkable alterations in the predicted 
responses to declining mortality. In particular, it will turn out that evolutionary plasticity creates 
an endogenous feed-back mechanism which curtails Malthusian crises if the improvement in 
survival rates is substantial and sufficiently obvious to impact the households’ family planning. 
Low-mortality 
environments: Selective 
advantage of K-strategy 
High-mortality environments: 
Selective advantage of r-
strategy 
___ Fitness of K-strategists            ___ Fitness of r-strategists 
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To support this claim, we rely on the classic Barro-Becker model, and tentatively integrate 
evolutionary fitness in the objective function.  
As in the original Barro-Becker set-up, consider the problem of representative parents whose 
utility depends on the consumption ݑሺܿሻ of energetic resources (including investment in own 
human capital) and on the value assigned to their offspring. The emotional bond between 
parents and children enters the model through the “altruism” parameter ߚ which links parents’ 
utility to the value of their children ݂ሺܰ, ݍሻ.10 Of course, offspring “value” is determined by a 
variety of factors including survival, health, kinship support, mutual affection, wealth, success 
or social recognition. Still, irrespective of cultural particularities, these factors are nothing if 
not the socio-economic concomitants of evolutionary fitness. Thus, we can interpret the illusive 
“value” of children as their fitness which depends on parental quality investment q.  
For mathematical convenience, utility from consumption ݑሺܿሻ is assumed to exhibit the 
conventional functional characteristics, namely being twice continuously differentiable and 
exhibiting positive but decreasing marginal returns in c. The analytical treatment of fitness 
merits closer attention because it constitutes the major point of departure from the orthodox 
Barro-Becker framework. Following standard evolutionary models like Smith and Fretwell 
(1974), the fitness of each child is a sigmoid function of parenting effort.11 At very low levels, 
the impact of quality investment is therefore modest but rapidly increasing. As parents increase 
their efforts, the corresponding marginal returns become smaller and eventually converge to 
zero as q approaches infinity. In the interest of analytical tractability, we will abstract from the 
possibility of birth order effects, sibling competition and correlated mortality risks. With this 
simplifications, the total fitness of the lineage is given by the expected number of survivors 
from N births multiplied by individual fitness, i.e. ݂ሺܰ, �, ݍሻ = ሺͳ − �ሻ ∙ ݂ܰሺ�, ݍሻ, 
where � denotes the exogenous part of mortality. Given that human infants require a minimum 
of care to survive at all, ݂ሺܰ, �, Ͳሻ = Ͳ by construction. Furthermore, to capture the different 
evolutionary pressures of r- and K- selective environments, the fitness function meets the 
following criteria: First, the sensitivity of ݂ with regard to q indicates the effectiveness of 
parental solicitude. Consequently, the elasticity of the fitness function �௤ can be considered a 
formal measure of parents’ ability to control the fitness of their offspring. Next, mortality � 
influences fitness via two different channels. To begin with, for given levels of q, higher 
mortality limits survival and therefore reduces ݂ሺܰ, ݍሻ in absolute terms. In addition, high 
childhood mortality and morbidity prevent the accumulation of somatic capital (e.g. physical 
strength, beauty, academic and practical skills) and mitigate the expected impact of each unit 
of parental investment. Under high mortality regimes, K-selective strategies therefore loose 
their competitive advantage against r-strategies because a one-percent increase in q leads to 
smaller gains in offspring fitness than under more favorable conditions. We incorporate this 
                                                          
10
 For the complete model and the underlying assumptions see: Barro and Becker (1988), pp. 1-9  
11
 This functional form was first introduced and discussed in: Smith and Fretwell (1974), pp. 499-503 
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selection effect into the model by requiring �௤ to be smaller the higher extrinsic mortality �, i.e. ����� < Ͳ.    
Translated into mathematical terms, the overall problem of a representative couple can now be 
expressed by the following objective function: max௖,�,௤ ܷሺܿ, ܰ, ݍሻ = ߙ݈݊ሺܿሻ + ߚሺͳ − �ሻ ∙ ݂ܰሺ�, ݍሻ  
As parents attempt to choose their optimal reproductive strategy, the set of feasible solutions is 
constrained by the fact that rearing and educating children is a time consuming task and 
competes with income earning activities. Under the additional assumptions that (i) wages are 
exogenous, that (ii) all adults are endowed with one unit of time and (iii) income cannot be 
saved, parents’ budget constraint takes the below form: ܿ = ݓሺͳ − ܰ݌ݍሻ, 
where w and p respectively denote the wage rate w and the “price” of parenting effort p. Using 
this expression, c can be eliminated from the objective function, such that the problem depends 
only on the two choice variables ݍ and ܰ. Normalizing wages to 1 and taking the derivatives 
of the modified function U delivers the following optimality conditions: ሺ�ሻ  ߙܰ݌ͳ − ܰ݌ݍ =  ߚሺͳ − �ሻ ∙ ݂ܰ′ሺ�, ݍሻ ሺ��ሻ  ߙ݌ݍͳ − ܰ݌ݍ =  ߚሺͳ − �ሻ ∙ ݂ሺ�, ݍሻ 
We can eliminate ܰ  from the system by dividing (ii) and (i) to obtain the following relationship:  ሺ���ሻ   ݍ∗ = ቆ ݂ሺ�, ݍሻ݂′ሺ�, ݍሻቇ ↔  �௤∗ = ͳ 
The equation states the intuitive fact that at the optimum, fertility and parenting effort are set to 
the levels where the opportunity costs of having one more child or of providing all existing 
children with one additional unit of quality investment are exactly equal. More importantly 
though, the expression depends only on ݍ, � and exogenous parameters. This being the case, 
the optimal adjustment of quality investment in response to changes in mortality can be derived 
from the total differential of (iii) ቀ (���∙௤+��)∙�−��௤∙��ሺ�ሻ2 ቁ  ݀ݍ + ቀ ௤∙����� ቁ ∙ ݀� = Ͳ (iv) 
Using that ݍ∗ =  ��� ↔  ௗ௤ௗ� = −  �∙��������∙௤  < 012 
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 Note that the sigmoid form of the fitness function allows for f’’ > 0 at low levels of q. Yet, choosing such a 
small q violates the optimality condition �௤∗ = ͳ . For since f(N,0) = 0, qf’(q) is strictly larger than f(q) for all q 
on the convex segment of f.     
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The interpretation of this expression is straightforward: As in the qualitative case of the 
“rabbits” and the “kangaroos”, increased extrinsic mortality reduces the optimal investment in 
child quality. Yet, if this is the “quality” side of the parental tradeoff, what about “quantity”? 
To answer this question, we solve (ii) for N and compute the total derivative of the expression: ܰ =  ͳ݌ݍ − ߙߚሺͳ − �ሻ݂ሺ�, ݍሻ ݀ܰ =  ቀ− ଵ௣௤2 − ఈ��ఉሺଵ−�ሻ�2ቁ  ݀ݍ − ఈఉ  ቀ�−ሺଵ−�ሻ��ሺଵ−�ሻ2�2 ቁ  ݀�  
Relying on the optimality condition  �௤∗ = ͳ, the relationship can be restated as follows: ௗ�ௗ� =  ቀ− �௤ቁ ௗ௤ௗ� −  ఈఉ  ቀ�−ሺଵ−�ሻ��ሺଵ−�ሻ2�2 ቁ (v) 
 
The first product is strictly positive13 and captures the fact that parents respond to harsh 
environments by substituting child quality by quantity. The second one is – however – negative 
because increased mortality reduces offspring fitness for any initial level of ݍ∗. As a result, the 
tradeoff between reproduction and consumption is recast and adults face incentives to increase 
their own consumption while reducing both q and N. Contrary to quality investment, the total 
effect on optimal family size is therefore ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the 
fitness and utility functions.  
Inspecting (v) is nevertheless instructing because we observe that high mortality environments 
produce large N but in two exceptional cases: In the first, the weight of consumption α is 
extremely large compared to the altruism or “child-preference” parameter β. In the second, 
mortality forces fitness to such low levels that parents balance the opportunity costs of reducing 
family size by switching from reproduction to increased consumption (i.e. ݂ is small and �݂ 
large in absolute terms).   
Why is it justified to consider the above scenarios “exceptional”? The answer is, because both 
biological and socio-economic arguments cast doubt on their applicability to real populations – 
in particular to those in a demographic transition. For one, demographic studies of ancestral 
populations have shown that very few successful reproductive events suffice to raise human 
fitness above average (Jones JH, Bird RB. (2014), pp. 65-71.). Unless the probability of survival 
virtually drops to zero, the biological opportunity costs of investing neither in child quality nor 
quantity will therefore be too high to be offset by higher parental consumption. Adding to that, 
it is frequently observed that parents in traditional societies compensate the lack of modern 
financial markets and social security by relying on children as a form of old-age insurance. 
Consequently, raising a certain minimum number of offspring to adulthood seems to be a socio-
economic necessity in pre-demographic transition economies which in turn ensures that the 
propensity to consume (α) is not too large relative to the propensity to reproduce (β).  
                                                          
13
 Recall that ௗ௤ௗ� < Ͳ! 
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Seeing this evidence, even critical spirits should agree that under realistic assumptions, high 
levels of � reduce the relative price of fertility vs. child quality and translate into a shift towards 
higher reproduction and lower parenting effort. Conversely, improved survival boosts the 
benefits of offspring quality and serves to suppress the optimal level of fertility. 
The central message of these results is that biology buffers Malthusian dynamics in that 
predictable, low-mortality environments produce an endogenous fertility decline whereas under 
inimical circumstances, this pattern is reversed and both birth and death rates remain on high 
levels. Even more intriguing for theorists, the model also predicts that a preceding fall in 
absolute mortality is no necessary condition for the onset of the fertility decline. Rather, parents 
will start to increase quality at the expense of offspring quantity as soon as the perceived 
effectiveness of parental effort rises. In this case, the elasticity of the fitness function with regard 
to q (�௤∗) will be larger and the optimal investment in offspring quality must rise in order to 
fulfill the fitness maximizing condition �௤∗ = ͳ. Well in line with a number of historical studies, 
model therefore concludes that reductions in family size can accompany or precede the 
mortality decline provided that parents obtain better means to influence their children's fitness. 
Besides for its fit with historical evidence, this scenario is also relevant to current development 
policies because many transition societies experience improvements in medical care and public 
education as byproducts of social and economic progress. Finally, the suggested Darwinian 
fertility model provides theoretical support to sewer the empirically questionable link between 
rising per capita income and the demographic transition. For, since the optimal level of 
parenting effort – and hence the resources devoted to each child – are determined by 
environmental factors, higher real wages are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
incentives to increase offspring competitiveness and limit family size. 
Closing the theoretical analysis, we note that the combination of Darwinian principles with 
economic modelling provides a remarkably simple explanation for otherwise puzzling 
demographic patterns. It is accordingly tempting to incorporate fitness maximization into a 
general equilibrium model in order to assess its role in human capital accumulation and 
endogenous economic growth. However, this analysis would be a mere academic exercise 
unless the evolutionary disposition to adopt faster or slower life history traits was evident in 
observed human fertility strategies. Let us therefore defray the calibration of a full-fledged 
endogenous growth model to future research and contend with the discussion of two 
fundamental preliminary questions: First, notwithstanding its theoretical appeal, is the 
incorporation of evolutionary fitness into parents’ objective function equally plausible from an 
empirical point of view? Or, more concretely, are there biological processes which cause actual 
humans – as opposed to the hypothetical homines oeconomici of the model – to behave like 
fitness maximizers? Moreover, if individual humans turn out to maximize their fitness, what 
about entire societies? And finally, in case evolutionary algorithms permeate the social sphere, 
under which conditions do these adaptations trigger or impede the onset of a demographic 
transition in real societies?  
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4. Linking the Model to Reality – Are Humans Fitness-Maximizers? 
4.1. Physiological Adaptations  
The ability to switch from slower to faster life history strategies belongs to our evolutionary 
heritage. In fact, the mechanism is rooted so deeply that it operates partly through the endocrine 
– hormonal – system without surfacing to the level of conscious decision. In a sense, humans 
are coded to maximize fitness – be it despite themselves in some cases. This is the case because 
the human foetus reacts to environmental signals from the first months of gestation onwards. If 
environmental conditions (e.g. nutrition) are stable and favorable, the endocrine system 
“judges” the prospects for growth and successful reproduction good and facilitates rapid growth 
and early maturation.14 Conversely, extreme levels of disease prevalence, physical stress and 
malnutrition indicate inimical future conditions and therefore impair maturation.15 Finally, in 
cases between these prototypes, life history traits exhibit great scope for evolutionary plasticity 
and follow Darwinian optimization algorithms. For example, young organisms respond to 
environments where episodes of stability and affluence alternate with insecurity and famine by 
seizing the few - probably short - spells of favorable conditions and precipitate maturation to 
facilitate fast and frequent reproduction.(Worthman (1999) pp. 135-165) Unlike the 
permanently elevated levels of stress caused by exceedingly harsh environments, the moderate 
and pulsating hormone responses to unpredictable environments do not inhibit maturation, but 
affect the endocrine system’s hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal and hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axes. These two hormonal circuits in turn co-determine the development of stress-and 
steroid-responsive neural processes which are associated with reproductive timing.(Cameron 
(2008), pp. 795-801). When it comes to the feasibility of fast or low LHT strategies, 
evolutionary forces therefore apparently to nudge humans towards fitness-maximizing behavior 
regardless of individual preferences or socio-cultural conditions.  
If this was the only evidence to support the integration of Darwinian fitness into the economic 
theory of fertility, critical readers would rush to ask: What is all the fuss about minor biological 
curiosities? And indeed, their critique would not go entirely astray. For one, physiological 
processes like the onset of puberty or the length of the reproductive period are ultimately subject 
to genetic constraints. Their demographic effect is therefore strictly limited. Moreover, these 
adaptations merely determine an individual’s ability to reproduce. They say nothing about 
parents’ willingness to have additional children or to invest heavier in existing ones. Thus, in 
order to be consistent with the idea that humans choose their reproductive strategy (more or 
less) consciously to maximize their utility, there ought to be a link between the gains in fitness 
and the gains in perceived utility. Put differently although we have modelled humans as fitness 
maximizers, few people will regard themselves as such. They are more likely to strive for 
“happiness”, “love and mutual affection”, “harmony with traditions and social norms” and 
many more. Given that physiological processes have just been showed to determine only a small 
fraction of the overall variation in human life history strategies other evidence is therefore 
needed to make fitness maximization a viable approximation of actual behavior. In particular, 
                                                          
14
 In actual population data, this reaction corresponds to the empirical observation of a sustained secular decline 
in the age of menarche in virtually all developed countries. See: Wood (2009), p. 417 
15Corresponding evidence is discussed by  Ellis (2004), pp. 920-958; Chisholm,and Quinlan (2005), pp. 233-265  
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high environmental risk should not only reduce the marginal impact of quality investment in 
the fitness function. It should also lower the expected utility gains – e.g. the emotional rewards 
– parents associate with caring for their children. Addressing these matters involves two 
empirical questions, namely first, whether parents adjust their post-natal investment – as 
opposed to the physiologically determined pre-natal ability to reproduce – according to the 
model’s predictions and second, whether the underlying psychological processes really respond 
to mortality risks or to some other unobserved variable. 
 
4.2. Psychological Adaptations: 
Being used to think of the canonical quantity-quality tradeoff, economists might be surprised 
that deliberate discrimination in the allocation of scarce resources to individual offspring is not 
self-evident but constitutes a key difference between humans and other primates. For, no matter 
how pervasive and culturally enshrined the ideal of selfless and sacrificing mother love might 
be, it does not belong to our genetic blueprint. One important explanation for this is forwarded 
by anthropologists like Hrdy (1999) who point out that human infants differ from young 
primates by their inability to cling immediately after birth. As the neonate cannot cling and 
signal to its mother "care for me, I am worth the effort", the degree of parental investment 
hinges on the expected “value” parents associate with their newborn. The facultative nature of 
postpartum investment constituted a major selective advantage for early hominids because – 
following the rationale of fitness maximization – it ensured that the high costs of brain 
development and childhood dependency were only incurred if the survival of the child in 
question was sufficiently certain to justify the effort.  
Traces of this evolutionary heritage can be detected in the infant mortality rates observed in 
pre-modern human societies. Advanced medical care being unavailable, the survival of 
newborns was critically dependent on costly parental behaviors like close supervision, 
protection and constant provision of high-quality nutrients (e.g. by regular breastfeeding). 
Consequently, if humans adapted psychologically to selective pressure, parental investment and 
its observable outcome – childhood survival – ought to exhibit a high degree of variation in 
response to environmental conditions. Following this intuition, Volk and Atkinson (2013) 
compared infant mortality rates in pre-modern Europe, present-day hunter and gatherer 
societies with those observed among primates and non-human monkeys. As figure 2 illustrates, 
their findings strongly support the hypothesis of facultative post-natal investment, because in 
spite of their parents’ superior intellectual capacities, the depicted survival rates of human 
infants are extremely heterogenous and not necessarily higher than those of newborn monkeys.   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: Darwin beats Malthus 
 
13 
 
 
Figure 2: Infant Mortality Rates in Human Societies and among Primates 
 
The above observation is a powerful antidote against excessive human self-esteem. More 
importantly though, it suggests that the human mind is probably as sensitive to extrinsic 
mortality as the endocrine system. Hence, as predicted by the Darwinian fertility model, human 
parents seem to follow psychological reaction norms which channel them towards a “high 
fertility and low investment strategy” whenever environmental conditions render this strategy 
fitness maximizing. The existence of this “Darwinian” development trap is indicated by a 
growing body of literature which suggests that the negative relationship between mortality and 
parenting effort and the positive correlation between mortality risk and fertility are universal 
patterns of human populations.  
To give but a few examples of this work, Bereczkei (2001) found highly discriminative 
maternal effort based on child characteristics in a longitudinal study of 600 Hungarian women. 
In his sample, mothers of high-risk infants reduced their quality investment q by shortening the 
duration of breast-feeding and inter-birth intervals, compared to women whose infants stood 
better survival chances.( Bereczkei (2001), pp. 197-212). Similar results were forwarded by Nettle 
(2009) who used data from the Millennium Cohort Study (n = 8660 families) to show that in 
deprived neighborhoods in Britain, life expectancy was reduced while age at first birth was 
younger, breastfeeding duration shorter and reproductive rates higher. Remarkably enough, 
roughly the same pattern has been detected in historical European populations where – as 
contemporary medical textbooks put it – urban children raised in “precarious, immoral 
CHAPTER 3: Darwin beats Malthus 
 
14 
 
conditions” tended to reproduce earlier than their peers in rural areas or in higher strata of the 
society (Krieger (1869), pp. 115). Again, the historical assessment is supported by present-day 
researchers including Anderson, Kermyt G. (currently developing countries), Caroline 
Uggla and Ruth Mace (Ireland), Charlotte Strömer and Virpi Lumaa (Pre-demographic 
Transition Europe) (2014), all of whom detect a positive relationship between fertility and 
mortality and negative effects on measures of child quality.   
Seeing these corroborative correlations, it is sufficiently safe to consider the first question 
settled: Post-natal parenting effort is subject to evolutionary plasticity and it responds to signals 
of environmental harshness and unpredictability in the way predicted by the Darwinian model.  
Let us therefore turn to the components of the fitness function and proceed to the second 
question: Were we right in considering extrinsic mortality and the controllability of childhood 
survival (i.e. the effectiveness �௤∗ of parenting effort) are the main causes of the observed 
variation in reproductive strategies? And if so, which psychological mechanisms translate high 
values of μ and low values of �௤∗ into lower (perceived) utility gains from parental solicitude?  
Scholars in the field of evolutionary psychology answer this question by pointing to the fact 
that high mortality, be it due to recurring food shortages, bad sanitary conditions, pollution or 
social conflict, exposes (prospective) parents to chronic stress. Prolonged exposure to harsh and 
unpredictable environments results in permanently elevated levels of glucocorticoids, the 
"stress hormones" which in turn influence the core hardware of human cognition and behavior. 
In particular, sustained stress affects two portions of the brain – the hippocampus and the 
prefrontal cortex – and impairs learning, emotional regulation and the control of aggressive 
outbursts. What is more, under stress complex choice problems are processed within the 
dorsolateral striatum of the prefrontal cortex which results in rapid, habit-based and 
increasingly myopic decision making. At the same time, glucocorticoids buffer the impact of 
neuropeptids like oxytocin and prolactin which promote bonding, trust and nurturing 
behavior.16 This implies that higher extrinsic risk depresses the impact of parental effort q in 
the fitness and the individual utility function because the stress responses limit altruism, 
increase impatience and reduce emotional responsiveness. Under these conditions the value 
assigned to the (uncertain) future survival of children is low and the ability to enjoy stable and 
mutually affectionate relationships impaired which will discourage parents from investing too 
heavily in their offspring. The notion that quality investment necessitates a minimum level of 
security is corroborated by research in evolutionary psychology and economics alike. Thus, in 
a variety of different cultural and social contexts, it has been shown that parents' willingness to 
provide their children with formal education increased significantly after public health 
interventions that improved childhood survival rates.17 Moreover, recent work by Quinlan 
reveals that parenting effort declines as aggressive pathogens render premature mortality an 
ubiquitous and uncontrollable phenomenon.18 Finally, the influence of evolutionary algorithms 
is evident in defective parental behavior, particularly in postpartum depression PPD. With an 
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incidence rate of 5 to 25 percent (subclinical forms of the disorder not being accounted for), 
PPD occurs frequently enough to be of demographic and economic relevance. More importantly 
though, PPD is no random byproduct of the hormonal changes associated with puerperium. 
Rather, besides by certain genetic predispositions, post-natal depression is most accurately 
predicted by factors which inform mothers that either the costs of raising offspring are high 
(stress, lack of social and kinship support, unwanted/illegitimate pregnancy) or that the fitness 
gains from supporting a particular neonate are low (low birth weight, high birth order, wrong 
sex). Under such inimical circumstances, symptoms like fatigue, sadness, listlessness or 
aggression motivate mothers to withdraw investment from offspring with low reproductive 
value. As a result, scarce energy resources can be redirected to a new pregnancy (thereby 
increasing fertility and spreading the risk of reproductive failure among many offspring) or 
towards older evolutionary more valuable children.19  
Let us briefly summarize the message of the above findings: Human reproductive strategies 
depend crucially on evolved psychological responses to environmental mortality cues. 
Moreover, the influence of these adaptations is highly persistent because parenting styles are 
“heritable” to a substantial extent. In other words, children whose parents have followed a fast 
life history strategy are more likely to exhibit opportunistic mating and limited nurturing effort. 
One reason for this is the fact that what constitutes “right” parental behavior belongs to the 
individual's assumptive worldview which is formed during childhood. Moreover, children who 
grow up under stressful conditions and insensitive or insufficient parental solicitude, experience 
permanently increased levels of glucocorticoids which impair their ability to form close and 
lasting interpersonal bonds in their adult life. (Kaplan and Lancaster (2003), pp. 170-223)   
The heritability of parenting behavior is so remarkable because it leads to the perpetuation and 
diffusion of life history traits which maximize the fitness of their carriers. If this was not the 
case, individual adaptations would fail to translate into society-wide institutions and their 
impact would be too weak to play a perceptible role in the progression of the demographic 
transition. Seeing this concern, the following section will assess how high mortality stress 
affects the set of formal and informal institutions adopted by a population.  
 
4.3. From the Individual to the Social Sphere:   
Although losing a child is first and foremost a personal tragedy, societies with elevated levels 
of premature mortality tend to erect collective barriers against the traumatic impact of 
bereavement. The evolutionary purpose of these institutional shields is obvious: guaranteeing 
that parents maintain mental stability and continue to fulfill their social and familial 
responsibilities. Given this inherent logic, the workings of collective coping are best deciphered 
on the basis of their “targets”, that is, based on the situational factors which determine the level 
of psychological stress associated with negative life events.  
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Concerning the intensity of psychological distress, trauma and resilience research posit that 
experiences are perceived more unsettling, the more disturbing and unforeseen the underlying 
event. The same holds, if the situation contradicts a person’s learned world view or involves 
feelings of helplessness and loss of control.20 Present day parents will hardly hesitate to 
associate all of the above characteristics with the death of a child. By contrast, ancestral 
populations adopted norms and practices which affected both adults’ perception of and their 
expectations about childhood death.  
To begin with, at times where the state of medical art did not allow to improve childhood 
survival significantly, the death of young children was widely considered a part of God's 
judgment and beyond the scope of human control. The idea that those who died young were 
blessed to “shuffle off their mortal coil” had an unbroken tradition from Greco-Roman times 
and was further reinforced by the Christian notion of a heavenly afterlife. Providing a rescue 
from feelings of guilt or from the emotional void of otherwise senseless loss, these beliefs 
permeate historical sources to the point leaving their imprint in every-day language. For 
example, in the 18th and 19th centuries, it was a common euphemism to say a child had 
“himmelt” (i.e. ascended to heaven) when referring to a premature death.21 Moreover, religious 
rituals and popular traditions structured the transition from grief to the resumption of the 
family's normal life –  a function which has been found to reduce the risk of complicated grief 
in both Western and non-Christian societies like e.g. China.22  
Mostly stripped off religious connotations, a second set of psychological mechanisms targeted 
the unexpectedness and “injustice” of childhood death. In particular, unlike today, the first years 
were not regarded as a carefree prelude but as the most perilous period in life. Accordingly, 
high rates of infant mortality were viewed as a sad but natural condition. Like religious coping, 
resignation of this kind increased psychological resilience because prospective parents could 
emotionally prepare for the possibility to bury some of their children. At the same time, 
however, this process of anticipatory mourning produced a measure of ambivalence towards 
young children and caused parents to limit or postpone heavy emotional commitment.  
The notion that parental attachment responds sensitively to mortality cues is supported by 
evidence from a wide range of past and present societies. Thus, in her seminal study on the 
social value of children, Zelitzer (1985) shows that until the 19th century, the death of young 
children was met with resignation rather than despair. Her findings are supported by the work 
of Stone on preindustrial England and Ariès’ study on early modern France (Ariès (1982), pp. 
82-83) which point to the fact that parents rarely attended the funerals of their infants or buried 
children “who had died to soon” in the backyard as we do with pets today.23 With few 
exceptions in upper-class families, elaborate burial rites and mourning were equally uncommon 
in Roman Italy if a child died younger than five.( Rawson, Benjamin (2003), ch. 2)  
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Of course, this does not imply that parents did not care for their children at all, it simply means 
that they followed a strategy, evolutionary theorists would refer to as “emotional bet-hedging”. 
Rather than devoting all their love, physical energy and financial resources to one or two 
children, they spread their risk by allowing for more births and maintaining a certain distance 
until their offspring had survived the critical first years of life. In the words of Montaigne: “I 
have lost two or three children in infancy, not without regret but without great sorrow.”24 
Ethnologists have documented similar attitudes in present-day traditional societies. In 
particular, many cultures consider children as “incomplete” and deny them full personhood 
until they have passed a certain age. Thus, for newborns of the Ayoreo in Bolivia it is “not 
unusual to remain unnamed for several weeks or months, particularly if the infant is sickly. The 
reason given is that – should the child die – the loss will not be so deeply felt.” Similarly in 
Zambia, “when a Tonga child died before it was named, there was no mourning…the old 
women will tell the mother to hush her wailing, saying this is only a ghost.”25  
Curiously, it was as late as in the 19th century that doctors in Europe complained parents treated 
young infants with more or less apparent indifference. For example, a German doctor in Prussia 
noted that medical care was seldom asked for in case of small children, because under the age 
of 2 to 5 years they died too easily anyways. His confreres in Württemberg observed with barely 
suppressed disgust: “There are districts in our country, where parents watch 10 little children 
die till they call the doctor for the 11th .”  And finally, country doctors in Bavaria reported that 
in times of economic hardship, it was always the youngest children of poor families who 
suffered most from indolence and therefore experienced dramatic excess mortality.26 
Since variants of these practices have developed in uncounted cultural and historical contexts, 
there is little doubt that high mortality societies do transform individual adaptations into 
institutions at the population level. What is more, in historical settings, both the emergence and 
the decline of these institutions conformed closely with the predictions of the Darwinian fertility 
model. To appreciate this point, let us consider a set of social norms which contributed directly 
to elevated mortality and high birth rates. This category equally includes drastic behaviors like 
shortening the inter-birth interval by infanticide or abandonment of “defective” newborns and 
milder reactions like allo-parenting or cooperative child-rearing. While their impact on 
mortality is self-evident, these institutions also tended to raise fertility because “outsourcing” 
some childcare activities allowed parents to support more dependent children and because the 
spell of postnatal amenorrhea is shorter if mothers do not breastfeed or wean their babies early.  
A prominent example for this fragmentation of parental responsibilities is the practice of wet-
nursing. In fact, the use of wet-nurses was so wide-spread in preindustrial Europe, that it had 
become a highly organized profession by the 17th century. Still, although some states – 
especially France – developed laws to regulate their employment, the majority of wet nurses 
were destitute peasant women and it was well known that children who were breastfed by their 
mothers stood much better chances at survival than nurslings.27 Yet, since mortality was high 
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anyways and – medical science being in its infancy – largely out of parental control, a couple 
could nevertheless increase their fitness by trying their luck at a higher number of pregnancies. 
Things changed, when medical innovations like vaccination, bacteriology, disinfection and 
pasteurization rendered childhood survival less random. These advances not only boosted the 
impact of parenting effort but also tilted selective pressure from r- towards K-selective 
characteristics. As a result, wet-nursing became increasingly contested and vanished around the 
turn of the 20th century.28 The salient feature of this process is that the decline of wet-nursing 
was paralleled by the rise of “modern” institutions which evidenced a trend towards higher 
valuation of children and “slower” life history strategies. Thus, confirming the predictions of 
the theoretical model, increased effectiveness of parental solicitude (εq↑) caused society to 
redirect resources from fertility promoting to child quality promoting institutions. One example 
for these newly formed institutions is the establishment of pediatrics as a separate branch of 
medicine in late 19th century Europe.29 Given that the differentiation occurred only after 
scientific progress had provided parents with the means to control offspring survival more 
effectively, the supply of specialized medical services can be interpreted as a sign of increased 
willingness to invest in children from a very young age onwards.  
A second example relates to early childhood education: Around the middle of the century, 
reformers like Fröbel, Pestalozzi and – somewhat later – Montessori pioneered the idea that 
children were neither miniature nor incomplete or defective adults. Instead, infancy came to be 
considered a central developmental stage which required specific, age-appropriate stimulation 
of cognitive and social skills. As the new educational paradigm spread, more and more parents 
felt the pressure to commit precious time and resources to the education of their children. 
Refusing to breastfeed or failing to take basic hygienic precautions began to be publicly 
frowned upon just like swaddling infants, leaving them unattended, rocking them excessively 
or feeding them alcohol to keep them quiet.30 This said, the fact that parental effort became 
fashionable while practices which had long served to facilitate frequent reproduction turned 
unacceptable, suggests that society was in toto moving from fast to slow life history strategies. 
Institutional change assumed a critical role in this transition because it contributed to the 
preservation and rapid diffusion of successful adaptations to the changed selective pressures. 
Due their mediating function between society and evolutionary environment, many more 
institutions were affected by the scientific and social leaps of the 19th century. Consequently, 
there is no doubt that much more could be said about labor laws and compulsory schooling or 
about maternity leave and the codification of child rights. However, to avoid going off on 
tangents, let us content with our glimpse on institutional development and summarize the major 
implications of the section: First, institutions mimic individual adaptations in that increased 
effectiveness of parental care and lower extrinsic risk trigger a self-reinforcing trend towards 
smaller families, higher quality investment and improved survival. Notwithstanding the 
potential to promote socioeconomic modernization, this result points also to development risks 
and suggests that improvements in survival rates alone are insufficient to promote the shift from 
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r- to K-strategies. This is the case because families will only modify fertility and parenting 
patterns if traditional institutions (e.g. castes, limits to social mobility) do not reduce the 
expected payoff of quality investments and if parents recognize the increased effectiveness of 
their efforts (εq↑).   
That problems of this sort are present in currently developing countries is highlighted by the 
notoriously poor record of birth control programs, many of which fail although contraceptives 
are widely available and survival rates often improved. Still, only if parents know that certain 
health interventions will prevent infant and childhood mortality, their subjective environmental 
risk is reduced and the tradeoff between child quantity and quality substantially altered. 
Consequently, societies which see for the provision of fundamental health care and the spread 
of medical knowledge ought to experience an earlier and more rapid fertility decline than 
populations where these conditions are not fulfilled. Assessing the empirical content of this 
proposition is of course possible, but it requires us to abandon the sphere of general psychology 
and cross cultural institutional patterns. For, to analyze the relative importance of biological 
factors rigorously, it is indispensable to control for countervailing influences like variation in 
geographic or socio-economic conditions.   
 
5. Historical Case Study: Assessing the Darwinian Gift of Medicalization in 19th 
Century Germany 
Historical evidence offers a unique possibility to test whether and to what extent medicalization 
promoted the transition from fast (r-selective) to slower (K-selective) life histories. The 
evidence in question is the experience of smallpox vaccination in 19th century Germany. The 
case is highly intriguing for several reasons. First, in the light of the previous sections, medical 
innovations must exert a strong and lasting impact on mortality if they are to alter parenting 
behavior perceptively. Moreover, the effect needs to be immediately apparent and the causality 
between the health intervention and improved survival must be sufficiently obvious to become 
common knowledge. Briefly summarizing the historical epidemiology of smallpox one finds 
that vaccination fulfills these criteria with ease. 
 
5.1. A Brief History of Smallpox  
The first unmistakable descriptions of smallpox date back to 4th century China. By the 13th 
century, the disease was endemic in the known world, extending its grip from Japan to Britain 
and from Iceland to northern Africa. From that time onwards, it followed a characteristic 
epidemiological pattern of regular explosive epidemics along the main trading routes of Eurasia 
and the Mediterranean. Since a single attack of smallpox conferred long-lasting immunity, 
epidemics mainly affected young children and spared communities until the pool of infectible 
individuals sustained a new outbreak. In spite of this periodicity, the number of children who 
became exposed was so overwhelming that 18th century scholars grimly observed that no-one 
would make a difference between the ravages of smallpox and the plague, were it not for the 
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habit to count children’s lives only once they had survived the former.31 Similarly stressing the 
omnipresence of smallpox, 19th century historians referred to them as a “communist disease” 
which struck rich and poor with blind disregard for class, sex or mode of living. (Bohn (1875), 
p.1).  
For early periods, such assessments have to be taken at face value but from the 18th century 
onwards it is possible to quantify smallpox mortality in a number of European cities and 
regions. Swedish and French census data for example indicate that in the late 18th century, 
smallpox deaths on average accounted for 11% of overall mortality. These numbers are 
confirmed by some German states which feature shares between 11% (Berlin, 1754-1800), 
12.5% (Eastern Prussia, 1765-1785) and 11% (Wurttemberg, 1750-1800).32 Concerning 
smallpox prevalence, the picture drawn by the historical sources is even gloomier as 18th  
century scholars from France and Germany estimated that approximately 80% of each cohort 
would catch the disease – a number which their present-day confreres only slightly corrected to 
66-75%. (Wolff (1998), p. 101). This situation changed dramatically with the discovery of the 
cowpox vaccination in 1796. In a mere 75-pages volume, English country doctor Edward Jenner 
revolutionized smallpox prevention by describing how immunity could be acquired by 
inoculating individuals with cowpox, a flu-like disease with local skin eruptions that caused no 
severe danger to the life of the infected person.(Jenner [1796]) 
Seeing the enormous death tolls of smallpox, the impact of vaccination on extrinsic mortality 
was substantial and it must have been sufficiently obvious to recast the tradeoff between the 
number and quality of children. This strong “treatment effect” alone is nevertheless insufficient 
to make vaccination a viable natural experiment for the demographic impact of medicalization. 
For any meaningful comparison it also needs exogenous variation in the spread of medical 
knowledge (to obtain untreated controls) and detailed data on vaccination rates, population 
characteristics and vital statistics. For research purposes it is therefore a fortunate fact that the 
South Western German states of Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg, passed mandatory 
vaccination laws in the early 19th century and carefully documented the effect of these laws 
ever afterwards. Statistical and anecdotal evidence are thereby particularly detailed in the case 
of the Grand Duchy of Baden, where the data are – for many years at least – available down to 
the district level. This fact bears central importance for identification because certain 
characteristics of Baden's vaccination system caused the impact of medicalization to be stronger 
in some districts than elsewhere.  
 
5.2. Using Vaccination as an Indicator for the Perceived Effectiveness of Parenting Effort: 
Does Medical Knowledge Contribute to the Fertility Decline? 
The reason for the differential spread of medicalization stemmed from the way inoculation was 
practiced during the 19th century. In practical terms, the success of the vaccination system 
hinged on the availability of fresh cowpox-lymph because preservation and cool storage of the 
vaccine remained on rudimentary standards throughout most of the 19th century. The lymph 
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used in the process was either derived from the dried material of some previous vaccination or 
was directly transferred from the pustules of one vaccinee to the open cuts on the forearms of 
another (arm-to-arm vaccination). In the first case, chances were high that the lymph had 
degenerated during storage and failed to cause the immunizing outbreak of cowpox. In the 
second case, doctors had to make sure that there was an unbroken "supply" of individuals 
seeking vaccination in order to maintain the process of vaccine transmission. Timing was all 
the more of essence as the lymph could be collected only within a limited time-frame: If the 
pustules were opened too early, they leaked only small amounts of fluid with little infectious 
material. If on the other hand the operation took place at an advanced stadium, the lymph would 
already be mixed with pus and debris which reduced the power of the vaccine and increased 
the risk of transmitting other diseases when inoculating new vaccinees.33 To address this 
challenge, Baden was fast in backing up its immunization policies with an institutional 
infrastructure. In particular, the country established public vaccination institutes (Impfinstitute), 
that is, institutions where parents could have their infants vaccinated for free whenever they 
desired to do so. In exchange, they were obliged to allow the vaccinators to collect fresh lymph 
from the children once the pustules had reached the proper stadium. The doctors who worked 
for the vaccination institutes therefore needed to maintain close contact with the families in the 
proximity of the institute in order to make sure they would always find an unvaccinated child 
to produce fresh vaccine. This interaction required a great deal of patience and persuasion as a 
Mannheim doctor confessed in 1808:  
"...whenever vaccinations are to be performed, some children are reported ill, others do not show 
up because the mother has suddenly made up her mind or because the grandmother or the 
neighbors have argued against the operation. Or again, there is no recently vaccinated child 
available because the overly-protective mother refuses to wake her toddler from his sleep, 
because she wants to spare him the pain or because she fears to expose him to cold weather. 
And then probably after having waited for hours, the doctors have to restart the whole business 
and rash to find some other [recently vaccinated] child - a vexation that unnerves even the most 
patient personality."34 
 
But what was arguably a nuisance for the physicians might have had life-saving consequences 
for the babies they "milked" for vaccine. This was the case because public doctors and publicly 
salaried midwives were exhorted to frequently check on the sanitary conditions in their 
constituencies, to inform parents of proper childcare and promote health preserving habits like 
breastfeeding. But of course, the zeal with which these duties were fulfilled were a matter of 
the respective health practitioners' discretion. Yet, these matters were more likely addressed if 
the doctor had to visit the families anyways.35 What was more, while vaccination was 
mandatory for all children, the provision of lymph for future vaccinations was not. The 
vaccinators would therefore have to explain the benefits of the measure to young parents and 
convince them of its safety. By doing so they contributed to a profound change in the popular 
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conception of infant and childhood mortality. For, prior to vaccination, deeply rooted folk 
wisdom had perpetuated almost all of the adaptations predicted by the theory of anticipatory 
mourning, Thus, it held that diseases like smallpox were an inevitable ailment, a process of 
purification rather than a disease and were necessary to eliminate evil substances from the body 
before it reached adulthood. Sometimes, the idea of physical purification was moreover coupled 
with the religious belief that epidemics were manifestations of God's judgment and 
punishment.36 As a result, early sources like the following 1813 report are littered with 
complaints of “popular ignorance and prejudice”  
 "...Thus, the following prejudice is deeply rooted [in popular opinion], that the natural smallpox 
poison is a priori contained in the body (...), that this poison cannot be emitted from the body 
through the few pustules [after vaccination] and that this will eventually give rise to other 
diseases even if it might prevent the outbreak of smallpox."37 
In spite of the vaccination’s early success, these attitudes did not vanish in the course of time. 
If anything, traditional conceptions of smallpox took on an elitist and pseudo-scientific 
inflection from midcentury onwards. This tilt of balances resulted from the fact that increasing 
professionalization and medical progress went along with a heightened interest in what would 
today be referred to as “alternative medicine.” Among other centers, the university towns and 
spas in the German South attracted all sorts of naturopathic practitioners – trained doctors as 
well as laymen – who produced an impressive body of literature and succeeded in conquering 
their share of the mass media including newspapers and popular journals. A motley group they 
were, the adherents of homeopathy, herbal cures or hydrotherapy were nevertheless united in 
their contempt for “unnatural” methods like vaccination and promised corporeal balance 
through “natural” cures and diets. Again, this attitude suggested that disease was an integral 
part of life, more a manifestation of physical disequilibrium than a harm to be combated. And 
since alternative medicine received an uncommonly intensive coverage in contemporary media, 
the naturopathic fashion fostered anti-vaccionism just the same way as traditional prejudices 
had before.  
Traditional and seemingly “modern” opposition against vaccination are central for our purposes 
because they influenced attitudes towards environmental risk and thereby co-determined the 
expected impact of parenting effort (εq). Whether or not a household perceived childhood 
mortality as something inevitable or as a danger to be actively prevented depended critically on 
the frequent interaction and constant communication with academically trained doctors. Parents 
who participated in the vaccination system were therefore arguably better able to prevent infant 
mortality and might therefore have switched to a slower life history strategy than other 
households. 
 
                                                          
36
 This was particularly true during the first decades of the 19th century when widespread ignorance in medical 
matters fatally coupled with the symptoms and age-specific incidence of smallpox. Well before the 
bacteriological revolution of the 1860s, it was simply too plausible to assume an infection inevitable that used to 
affect more than two thirds of all children. In addition, symptoms like high fevers, intense pain, rashes and 
pustules leaking a fetid mixture of lymph and tissue debris were easily interpreted as signs of the body struggling 
to free itself from evil fluids. 
37
 Werfer (1813), p. 146   
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5.3. Estimating the Impact of Medicalization: 
To test this conjecture, I collected socio-economic indicators and population data of Baden’s 
67 districts (Amtsbezirke).  Regarding the measure of medicalization, archival records allowed 
me to locate the vaccination institutes and their years of establishment. In addition, it was 
possible to retrieve information on economic characteristics of the districts in the sample 
including urbanization and poverty rates. Using these data38, I estimated the following 
econometric model: 
 ܶ݋ݐ�݈�݁ݎݐ�,� = ݔଵܶ݋ݐ�݈݉݋ݎݐ�,� + ݔଶܸ�ܿܿ�݊ݏ�,�+ ݔଷܲ݋ݒ݁ݎݐݕ�,� + ݔସܥ�ݐݕ + ܶ�݉ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ +�݁݃�݋݊�݈ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ +  ��,�, 
 
The dependent variable TotalFert corresponds to the number of births per 100 inhabitants in 
district i and year j. Whether local fertility levels responded to evolutionary pressures or not is 
assessed by the coefficient of Totalmort, that is, by the number of infant deaths per 100 
inhabitants.39 Positive values of x1 thereby indicate that high mortality was associated with high 
fertility, whereas negative x1 suggest an inverse relationship between the two. Since the 
effectiveness of parenting effort depends on an interplay of scientific and social institutions, �௤ 
is approximated by two indicators of medicalization which capture key determinants of parents’ 
ability to improve the fitness of their offspring. The first, of these indicators is the binary 
variable “VaccIns” which takes the value of 1 if  a vaccination institute was operating in district 
i during year j and zero otherwise. Given the institutes’ reliance on popular support, VaccIns 
can reasonably be assumed to reflect the spread of medical knowledge – and hence parents’ 
expected capacity to exert control on childhood survival. Knowledge was – however – of 
limited use to improve childhood survival, if medical services were not available. The second 
variable, “DOC”, therefore assesses whether households had access to fundamental healthcare 
at all. The intuition behind the measure is as follows: In addition to local mortality data, the 
Badenese mortaliy records note whether the official certificate of death was signed by a doctor 
or a local official. The value of this information stems from the fact that fatal diseases or 
accidents are commonly considered the core expertise of a doctor. If a death was signaled to 
some petty official, it is natural to suspect that the bereaved family was either unable to reach 
a physician or did not trust in modern medicine. Hence, by computing the fraction of deaths 
signaled by a doctor, it was possible to construct a measure for the availability and the popular 
reliance on medical services.  In order to control for the potential influence of socio-economic 
characteristics, I further introduced the variables “City” and “Poverty”, which respectively 
                                                          
38
 The sources are: Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe: ) 236-16019-16045 and 234-6041, Staatsarchiv 
Freiburg, 908/1-135 (Leichenschau), Statistik der Inneren Verwaltung des Großherzogthums Baden, 
various issues 1851-1893 
39
 Since the data contain only information on mortality within certain age brackets, I labelled all deaths age < 1 
as “infant deaths” 
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account for urbanization and the prevailing poverty rate.40  Finally, district dummies and time 
controls were employed in order to capture local and time fixed effects.  The results of the 
estimation are depicted in Table 1. In addition to the simple OLS model, specification 2 uses 
district and time controls. Moreover, to reduce the risk of extreme observations biasing the 
estimates, specification 3 performs a quantile regression of the median.  
Turning to the results, one finds that the estimated coefficient reflect the predictions of life 
history theory almost perfectly. For one, high overall mortality – i.e. high environmental risk – 
comes along with statistically significant increases in fertility. Next, arguably reflecting 
Malthusian dynamics, poverty reduces fertility, whereas the impact of urbanization remains – 
somewhat surprisingly – insignificant. More importantly though, medicalization did promote 
the expected shift towards reduced family size because the coefficients of VaccIns and DOC 
are statistically significant and negative in all (respectively in two out of three) specifications.  
 
Table 1: Estimated Effects of Medicalization on Fertility 
Model OLS  OLS, Panel  Quantile 
Regression 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
TotalMort 1.0000306 20.02 1.175.945 24.16 1.089.841 23.37 
VaccIns -0.4718797 -4.96 -0.4563893 -5.37 -0.5315497 -5.98 
DOC -0.1364501 -1.37 -0.1667520 -1.34 -0.241978 -2.54 
Poverty -0.0453486 -7.91 -0.0393697 -7.54 -0.0443673 -8.08 
City -0.0636008 -1.12 -0.1561412 -2.96 -0.0377227 -0.7 
Time Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Regional 
Controls  
No  Yes 
(Amtsbezirke) 
 Yes 
(Amtsbezirke) 
 
Adj-R2 0.51  0.62  Pseudo R2 = 0.39  
Number of 
Observations 
801  801  801   
 
Having recognized the congruence between the theoretical model and the historical dataset, let 
us dare a tentative assessment of the respective size of the mortality and medicalization effects: 
Addressing first things first, consider the coefficient of Totalmort. Across all specifications, x1 
                                                          
40
 Poverty captures the fraction of individuals who were entitled to poor relief among the deceased in the 
corresponding year. Assuming that the poverty rate among the dead was approximately equal to that among the 
survivors, poverty should be an accurate measure of the actual poverty rate in a district. 
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is larger or equal to one which implies that each additional death was offset by a corresponding 
increase in fertility. This result is not trivial since it provides one of the central hypotheses of 
the Darwinian fertility model with empirical backbone: The effects of Malthusian checks are 
strictly limited because elevated levels of mortality channel the population towards an r-strategy 
with high levels of “replacement” fertility.  
Reductions in environmental risk and increased effectiveness of parental effort produce exactly 
opposite results. The impact of improved information – as measured by VaccIns - is particularly 
strong with districts where a vaccination institute was located recording estimates of about 0.4-
0.5 births less than elsewhere. Qualitatively, the impact of doctors’ availability is similar, 
although the estimated coefficients do not attain statistical significance in all specifications.  
However, to the extent the estimates turn out significant, their quantitative impact is not 
negligible. In particular, having one percent more death certificates signed by a doctor comes 
along with approximately 0.13 - 0.24 fewer births per year. 
There is yet another interesting link between the historical data and the Darwinian fertility 
model: Based on LHT, parents respond not only to cues of extrinsic mortality but also to 
variation in the effectiveness of their efforts. In particular, we expected fertility to be smaller, 
the greater the effectiveness of parental investment (εq). Using quantile regression and 
analyzing the estimated coefficients at different points of the distribution allows us to obtain 
some indication about the accuracy of this prediction. The intuition behind this procedure is as 
follows: If parents desired larger families when facing environments which reduced the impact 
of fitness promoting investment, the coefficients of the medicalization variables ought to be 
smaller for higher quantiles of the fertility distribution. This being the case, high fertility could 
be considered an indicator of ineffective or dysfunctional health institutions and – 
correspondingly – reduced parental inclination to adjust fertility plans downwards. The 
information to test this conjecture can be obtained from an interquantile range regression of the 
difference between quantiles. The coefficients in the difference regression are thereby 
interpreted as follows: If a coefficient xi takes the value of zero, the sensitivity of fertility to 
variable i is the same at all points of the distribution. If xi is significant in the interquantile 
regression and carries the same sign as in the original estimation, the expected effect of variable 
i is larger at higher levels of fertility. Finally, if xi reverses its sign, the fertility response to 
changes in i is smaller at high levels than at lower ones. As shown in table 2, the coefficients 
of the medicalization variables seem to obey to the logic of LHT outlined above. Thus, although 
the difference is only significant for VaccIns, the absolute impact of medicalization is damped 
at the upper (90% quantile) than at the lower end (10% quantile) of the fertility distribution. Put 
differently, if fertility was high, the response to medical infrastructure was comparatively weak 
and parents apparently based their family planning on other factors. By contrast, at low levels 
of fertility, the response to medicalization is reinforced which is suggestive – albeit no 
conclusive proof – of a heightened sensitivity to improvements in εq and the presence of a 
quantity-quality tradeoff.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: Darwin beats Malthus 
 
26 
 
 
Table 2: Interquantile Regression 
Model Interquantile Regression  
 
Difference Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
TotalMort -0.1644442 -0.66 
VaccIns 0.4907308 1.75 
DOC 0.0011318 0.32 
Poverty 0.0165889 1.28 
City -0.365399 -2.23 
Pseudo-R2 0.1-quantile 
Pseudo-R2 0.9-quantile 
 
0.43 
0.47 
 
Number of Observations 801  
 
5.4. Robustness against Endogenous Mortality:           
At this point, critical readers might be troubled by the possibility of reversed causation in the 
relationship between fertility and mortality. This problem would occur if high mortality was a 
direct cause of high fertility. Given the facultative nature of parenting behavior, the idea is not 
too implausible. For example, parents might have sought to “correct” an unexpectedly large 
family size by withdrawing investment from children of higher birth orders or of the “wrong” 
sex.  
In order to account for this problem and to obtain unbiased estimates for the effect of extrinsic 
mortality μ, I therefore performed an instrumental variable estimation for the coefficient of 
Totalmort. To be a viable instrument for exogenous mortality a variable should be strongly 
correlated with mortality while being independent of fertility. Fortunately, the scrutiny of 
Baden's statistical officers provides us with such a measure. For, besides information on 
fertility, mortality and core socio-economic characteristics, the records also feature annual 
statistics on the frequency of specific causes of death. Some of these, like diarrhea or frailty 
arguably reflect harsh environments (i.e. extrinsic mortality) as well as parental negligence. 
Others like accidents or coronary diseases had probably little impact on infant and childhood 
mortality. Yet, there is one disease which breaks with this pattern: pertussis. The reason for this 
is first that the disease follows a specific course which starts with mild cold-like symptoms 
before gradually escalating to the characteristic whooping cough. In addition, pertussis is an 
airborne disease which spreads when an infected person spills tiny droplets containing the 
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bacillus Brodetella Pertussis. Yet, although the latter causes the infection, the most severe 
symptoms are not the workings of the bacillus itself but stem from a toxic it produces to override 
the body's immune system. Thus, the disease is most contagious during its early stages when 
the concentration of Brodetella Pertussis is high whereas the symptoms are either mild and 
unspecified or missing altogether. In consequence, there was little to do for parents who sought 
to protect their children from the disease nor was it possible to expose unwanted children 
directly to contagion. At the same time, pertussis occurred epidemically and in a largely random 
manner. In other words, it is hard to conceive a channel through which high fertility might have 
influenced the prevailing level of pertussis mortality. Following this rationale and using the 
number of deaths from pertussis as an instrument for Totalmort, I found the estimation results 
depicted in Table 3.41 As it turns out, the positive effect of mortality is robust and remains 
statistically highly significant. As predicted by life history theory, mortality therefore exerts a 
systematic influence on fertility.   
Table 3: Instrumental Variables Estimation 
Model IV  
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
TotalMortIV 0.7221714 2.15 
VaccIns -0.51874 -5.14 
DOC -0.0006542 -1.39 
Poverty -0.051114 -5.01 
City -0.1771814 -3.07 
Time Controls Yes  
Regional Controls  Yes  
Adj-R2 0.26 First Stage F_Statistic: 40.83 , Prob>F =0 
Number of Observations 798  
 
 
                                                          
41 The data were drawn from the same sources as in Tables 1-2 
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5.5. Medicalization and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff; Effects on the “Value” of Children 
The previous results clearly suggest that the empirical patterns of human fertility respond to 
signals of elevated mortality. Still, with regard to theory, this is merely half the battle. After all, 
the Darwinian fertility model further predicts that the decline in fertility ought to initiate an 
increase in child quality investment. Thus, if the theory fits with socio-biological facts, we 
would expect parents in the better medicalized districts of the sample to have formed early 
emotional bonds and to have invested more heavily in the wellbeing of their children. Assessing 
this prediction is empirically more involved than identifying the effect on fertility because it 
requires to quantify the – almost immeasurable – degree of parental attachment and the 
propensity to invest in child quality.  
At first glance, educational indicators like schooling or literacy rates seem suitable candidates 
for the desired measure of parental quality investment. Yet, there at least with respect to the 
Baden dataset, there are reasons to doubt the accuracy of these “natural” indicators. To begin 
with, literacy was almost universal in South Western Germany during the observation period. 
For example, a survey by the ministry of justice showed that 97% of the inmates in the prisons 
of the state of Baden had fundamental reading and writing skills in the 1850s.42 In other words, 
being able to read and write was too common a characteristic to qualify as a measure of 
exceptionally high parental solicitude. Much the same holds for schooling because primary 
education was mandatory and free for all children under the age of 14. Secondary education by 
contrast was offered by many different institutions, ranging from the Gymnasium and the 
Oberrealschule to different types of vocational courses. As a result, data on the attendance of 
these – not necessarily public – schools is scattered and does probably not even capture the true 
extent of parents’ quantity-quality tradeoff. For, while youngsters in an academic secondary 
school like the Gymnasium did not contribute to the family budget, students who enrolled in 
vocational schools like the Höhere Bürgerschule might also have pursued an apprenticeship 
and made a living on their own. Finally, schooling rates fail to reflect the influence of early 
childhood mortality because investments in formal education were made well after the critical 
first years of the child's life when mortality was highest.  
Consequently there is little doubt that a different measure for the value placed in child quality 
is called for. In fact, the historical record does provide such an indicator. For, doctors, local 
officials, teachers and clergymen frequently observed that the mortality rate of legitimate 
children was far lower than that of illegitimate children. The same observers did not hesitate to 
spell out the reasons for this fact. As the prestigious Journal of Public Health (Zeitschrift für 
die Staatsarzneikunde) put it in its 1837 issue: 
“…having no other choice, mothers of illegitimate children leave their newborns with a nurse. 
In most cases, nurses are poor women who receive a mere pittance for the sad business of taking 
these starved, neglected children and letting them die as soon as possible. Only the friends of 
the poor and the doctors know in what sheds and cages these wretched little creatures are kept 
during their short lives, in what dirt they dwell, what disgusting stodge they are fed and what 
appalling maltreatment they experience every day…”43 
                                                          
42
 Diez (1863), p 102 
43
 Zeitschrift für die Staatsarzneikunde (1837), p 448       
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To the extent that excess mortality of illegitimate children was chiefly due to neglect or 
maltreatment, it can be considered a sign of parents pursuing an exceedingly fast life history 
strategy and trying to get rid of the unwanted consequences. However, in districts where infant 
mortality rates were more or less the same for legitimate and illegitimate children, the value 
placed in each child – or the social sanctions for neglect - were probably high enough to set 
incentives for a slower “low fertility/high quality investment” strategy.  
Relying on this intuition, I constructed the variable “Value” which measures the excess 
mortality of illegitimate children relative to overall infant mortality: 
 ܸ�݈ݑ݁ = ܶ݋ݐ�݈݉݋ݎݐ − �݈݈݁݃݉݋ݎݐܶ݋ݐ�݈݉݋ݎݐ  
 
The expression is easily interpreted: If there is no difference between the mortality rate of 
illegitimate children and the district average, value will be equal to zero. By contrast, if the risk 
of dying is higher for illegitimate than for legitimate children, value will be negative. Finally, 
in the unlikely case that the group specific mortality risks are reversed, value changes its sign 
and becomes positive.  
As before, the underlying data were drawn from the medical statistics compiled by Baden’s 
Ministry of Inner Affairs and comprise records of all births and neonatal deaths of legitimate 
and illegitimate children in the 67 districts (Amtsbezirke) during the period 1851 - 1863. Using 
this information, I estimated the following econometric model 
 ܸ�݈ݑ݁�,� = ݔଵܶ݋ݐ�݈݉݋ݎݐ�,� + ݔଶܦܱܥ�,�+ ݔଷܲ݋ݒ݁ݎݐݕ�,� +  ݔସܸ�ܿܿ�݊ݏ�,� + ݔହ ܿ�ݐݕ +ܶ�݉ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ + �݁݃�݋݊�݈ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ +  ��,� 
 
The results of the estimation are depicted in table 4. As in the analysis of Baden’s fertility 
patterns, the estimated coefficients fit well with evolutionary theory. In particular, high fertility 
and poverty seem to prevent early attachment and facilitate the neglect and abuse of unwanted 
illegitimate children (i.e. the coefficients of Totalfert and Poverty are significant and negative). 
By contrast, the indicators of advanced medical coverage, DOC and VaccIns come along with 
an increased valuation of children (although statistically not significant in the latter case). Thus, 
as predicted by LHT and the Darwinian model, parents who face low exogenous mortality (μ↓, 
small values of Totalmort) and who know that offspring survival is a matter of parenting effort 
and health investment (εq↑, high values of DOC and/or VaccIns = 1) will be more willing to 
invest physically and emotionally in their children. 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Child “Value” 
Model OLS  OLS, Panel  
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
TotalMort -0.0019081 -3.07 -0.0018655 -2.71 
DOC 0.0000264 2.08 0.0000242 1.89 
Poverty -0.0001432 -1.96 -0.0001312 -1.78 
VaccIns 0.0011753 0.97 0.0013295 1.09 
City -0.0000692 -0.1 0.0001405 0.18 
Time Controls Yes  Yes  
Regional 
Controls  
No  Yes 
(Amtsbezirke) 
 
Adj-R2 0.033  0.044  
Number of 
Observations 
801  801  
 
Summarizing the empirical evidence, the case of 19th century Baden comes down to two 
lessons, both of which support the earlier theoretical results: First, the transition from high to 
low levels of fertility is substantially accelerated if the extrinsic mortality risk is low and if 
fundamental medical knowledge is widely spread. Moreover, this beneficial effect on fertility 
carries over to the valuation of children and translates into reinforced parental effort and – 
arguably – higher investment in human capital.    
 
4.6. Corroborative Evidence: 
Seeing their theoretical and practical implications, it is indispensable to assess the general 
applicability of the above results. Fortunately, Baden's experience is no isolated case although 
it alone provides sufficiently detailed micro-level data to conduct a rigorous econometric 
analysis. In spite of these limitations, the notion that medicalization acts as a catalyst for the 
onset of a fertility decline is supported by the experiences of Baden’s neighbors Württemberg 
and Alsatia. Starting with the former, one finds that medicalization in Württemberg was 
generally less comprehensive than in Baden. The country had not only failed to establish 
vaccination institutes but was also more lax in enforcing its vaccination laws. Moreover, in the 
course of the 19th century, Baden’s universities turned into prestigious centers for medical 
research and provided the country with large numbers of academically trained doctors who – 
not the least for their own benefit – became important proponents of rapid comprehensive 
medicalization. By contrast, Württemberg was a hot-bet of vociferous anti-vaccination agitation 
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and a center of alternative medicine. Scholarly medicine was therefore met with more mistrust 
and information about new prevention and treatment methods spread much more slowly than 
elsewhere. There was – however – one district of Württemberg which broke with this pattern: 
In the Jaxtkreis, local schoolteachers and the clergy were convinced of the benefits from 
immunization and determined to promote the universal vaccination and revaccination of all 
young adults. Having no other means to accomplish this aim, they came up with the ingenious 
– albeit morally questionable – idea to officially announce a forged “amendment” to the 
Württemberg vaccination laws. The additional article was said to require the revaccination of 
all 14-year olds. Local officials saw no reason to prevent this staging and did not impede the 
regular revaccination of all students at the district's secondary schools.44 The initiative of local 
officials, doctors and teachers therefore worked in a similar way as the Badenese Impfinstitute 
and spread fundamental medical knowledge.  As a result, immunization in the Jaxtkreis was 
almost universal while smallpox mortality remained at negligible levels and hardly reached half 
the size of the Wurttemberg average. The remarkable feature of the story is that increased 
medicalization was not confined to successful prevention of smallpox. Rather it led to lower 
levels of general infant and childhood mortality and – as if to prove the predictions of life history 
theory true – this reduction of environmental risk translated into lower fertility rates. The 
available mortality and fertility rates of Württemberg and the Jaxtkreis are depicted in table 5. 
Both rates are significantly lower in the latter than the Württemberg average, although the 
dataset is too limited to construct the control variables for a multivariate regression as in the 
case of Baden. 
Table 5: Mortality and Fertility in Wurttemberg and in the Jaxtkreis45 
 1835-46 1847-55 1856-67 1868-80 1881-95 
Infant Mortality 
Jaxtkreis (Deaths per 
100 life births) 
 
32.7 31.5 31.4 30.1 23.3 
Infant Mortality 
Wurttemberg (Deaths 
per 100 life births) 
 
33.9 34.8 35.4 31.9 24.8 
Fertility Jaxtkreis 
(Births per 1000 
inhabitants)  
 
40.9 36.4 40.2 43.0 34.5 
Fertility Wurttemberg 
(Births per 1000 
inhabitants) 
43.6 38.1 40.7 44.6 35.9 
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 Lange (1891), data appendix 
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Finally, similar findings can be established if one ventures a look across Baden’s Western 
frontier to the French region of Alsatia. The adjacent two departments of the Bas-Rhin and the 
Haut-Rhin resembled their Eastern neighbor strongly in terms of socio-economic structure. 
Nevertheless, their health infrastructure deviated substantially from Baden’s path In the Bas-
Rhin, the prefectural administration had established so called médecins cantonaux at the 
beginning of the 19th century. Besides offering public vaccinations, these doctors were in 
charge of providing free health care for the poor and of supervising the sanitary conditions in 
their constituencies. A similar office was not established in the Haut-Rhin until a smallpox 
epidemic had ravaged the department in 1836/37 claiming more than 10000 lives. 
Medicalization was therefore less advanced and perceived extrinsic mortality arguably higher 
than in the Bas-Rhin. Figure 3 shows the effect of the institutional differences on fertility rates.  
Again, as predicted by LHT, the closer net of fundamental medical services apparently helped 
to lower fertility rates. Moreover, after the introduction of a local health-care system similar to 
that of the Bas-Rhin in the 1840s, the fertility difference between the two departments vanishes 
and eventually reverses. 
Figure 3: Fertility in Two French Départements 1836-185146 
(Crude Birth Rates = Births per 1000 Inhabitants) 
 
This impression is further corroborated by the available evidence on regional levels of school 
attendance. Since elementary schooling was less universal in rural France than in South-
Western Germany, differences in the two departments’ attendance rates are a more reliable 
indicator of variation in child quality investment than in Baden (or Wurttemberg for that 
matter). Here again, the Bas-Rhin outperformed its Southern neighbor in the 1830s and 1840s 
with an average attendance rate of 71% versus 64% in the Haut-Rhin. Yet, the difference 
disappears in the mid-1850s, where both departments recorded approximately equal schooling 
                                                          
46
 Data drawn from Archives Départementales du Bas-Rhin, 5M67 and Archives Départementales du Haut Rhin, 
5M68 
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rates of 75.9% and 76.4%.47 Still, with all due caution, the evidence seems to support life history 
theory in that lower fertility in the Bas-Rhin came along with higher human capital investment 
and more advanced medicalization.  
6. Conclusion: 
For the better part of human history, life was most fragile and death most imminent during 
infancy and early childhood. Today, the death of a child is considered a tragedy, hardly bearable 
and deeply unnatural. Yet, what seems abhorrent to present-day observers, was a sad but 
commonplace experience for our ancestors. While this is deeply revolting from a humanitarian 
perspective, certain currents in macroeconomics and economic history claim that the 
Malthusian check on population growth ultimately raised per capita income, facilitated capital 
accumulation and thereby contributed to slow but sustained growth in pre-industrial Europe. 
The present paper has questioned this convention. Its doubts are founded in recent results 
forwarded by the life sciences, including anthropology, evolutionary biology, medicine and 
psychology. Based on life history theory, researchers in these fields provide ample evidence 
that human reproductive behavior is subject to evolutionary plasticity. Mating and parenting 
strategies are apparently tailored to different ecological niches in order to maximize long term 
fitness. Fitness in turn has been shown to be a function of exogenous characteristics with 
unpredictable, high-mortality environments favoring high fertility low investment and stable, 
predictable environments giving a selective advantage to more investing low fertility high 
quality strategies.  
Putting these observations into mathematical form and incorporating them into a conventional 
economic model of fertility the paper has established that declining extrinsic mortality or 
increased effectiveness of parental effort both lead to a switch from the pre-demographic 
transition pattern of high fertility and mortality to the post-transition pattern of reduced family 
size and heavy investment in child quality. That this result is more remarkable than it appears 
at first glance stems from the fact that evolution has created strong mechanisms which nudge 
parents towards faster or slower life history strategies. Thus, a number of physiological and 
psychological adaptations determine both the feasible number of births and parents expected 
costs and benefits from investing in the competitiveness of their offspring. Whether or not 
parents face a quantity quality tradeoff at all and how they value the different alternatives 
thereby depends on the prevailing mortality framework. Consequently, we expected fertility to 
decline earlier and child quality investment to increase faster the lower environmental mortality 
risk.  
To test this proposition empirically, the paper has studied the effects of smallpox vaccination 
in 19th century Baden. Besides for its exceptionally good availability of statistical data, the case 
of smallpox was particularly instructive because prevalence was high and the decline in 
mortality after the introduction of universal immunization dramatic. Adding to that, the state of 
Baden was fast in establishing a highly institutionalized health system. This feature proved 
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 Unfortunately, the surviving statistics contain only averages and no annual data. Therefore a more precise 
analysis of schooling rates was impossible. 
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crucial for identification purposes because the centralized vaccination system required the 
establishment of so called vaccination institutes to ensure a constant supply of high quality 
vaccine. Seeing the technical constraints of the commonly practiced arm to arm vaccination this 
implied that the doctors of a vaccination institute needed to maintain permanent contact with 
the population in their district. Medical knowledge and fundamental health services were 
therefore more accessible in districts which had a vaccination institute than elsewhere. Using 
this difference allowed us to estimate the effect of reduced environmental risk through 
improved health conditions. As it turned out, progress in medicalization came along with lower 
fertility and higher valuation of the individual child even if socio-economic factors were 
controlled for. The results were moreover robust against potentially endogenous mortality and 
were backed by anecdotal evidence from adjacent regions. 
The bottom line of these findings is quickly stated: Neither biology nor history obey neatly to 
Malthusian rules. If anything, the two of them have crafted human behavior in a way that 
mitigates the impact of positive checks on population and precludes the emergence of 
preventive ones under adverse conditions. Thus, where the provision of fundamental health care 
and educational progress are concerned, there is no contradiction between economic and 
humanitarian objectives. For, in essence the logic of evolution is simple: If death lurks around 
every corner, he can only be bet on numbers. Of course, this strategy ensures survival but it 
does so at the cost of reduced human capital investment, stagnation and miserable living 
conditions. Only if survival is sufficiently certain, the evolutionary dividend of parental effort 
rises and the population converges towards a new equilibrium in which families are smaller but 
– arguably – a great deal better off. 
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